The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis

Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (4):1-22 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR4 and AR4ยข, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a wide variety of epistemic norms. After comparing the different norms of justification involved in these logical systems, two hexagons expressing Aristotelian relations of opposition will be gathered in order to clarify how (a fragment of) pragmatic formulas can be interpreted in a fuzzy-based question-answer semantics.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-03-08
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
176 ( #31,191 of 2,438,867 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #26,756 of 2,438,867 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.