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  1. A Model for Multiple Appearances Based on Williamson's GCEL.Irene Bosco - manuscript
    Human epistemic subjects cannot but employ imperfect and limited tools to gain knowledge. Even in the seemingly simple business of acquiring knowledge of the value of a physical quantity, what the instrument reads or perception tells more often that not does not correspond to real value. However, even though both our perceptual apparatus and measuring instruments are sensible to background noise, under certain conditions, collecting more information of the same quantity using the same tools leads to an improvement of the (...)
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  2. Topological Epistemology as Epistemology First.Thomas Mormann - manuscript
    Abstract. The aim of this paper is to sketch a topological epistemology that can be characterized as a knowledge first epistemology. For this purpose, the standard topological semantics for knowledge in terms of the interior kernel operator K of a topological space is extended to a topological semantics of belief operators B in a new way. It is shown that a topological structure has a kind of “derivation” (its “assembly” or “lattice of nuclei”) that defines a profusion of belief operators (...)
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  3. Modal Epistemology.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - manuscript
    Some central epistemological notions are expressed by sentential operators O that entail the possibility of knowledge in the sense that 'Op' entails 'It is possible to know that p'. We call these modal-epistemological notions. Using apriority and being in a position to know as case studies, we argue that the logics of modal epistemological notions are extremely weak. In particular, their logics are not normal and do not include any closure principles.
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  4. Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...)
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  5. The Epistemic Significance of Numerals.Jan8 Heylen - forthcoming - Synthese 198 (Suppl 5):1019-1045.
    The central topic of this article is de re knowledge about natural numbers and its relation with names for numbers. It is held by several prominent philosophers that numerals are eligible for existential quantification in epistemic contexts, whereas other names for natural numbers are not. In other words, numerals are intimately linked with de re knowledge about natural numbers, whereas the other names for natural numbers are not. In this article I am looking for an explanation of this phenomenon. It (...)
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  6. Indicative Conditionals Without Iterative Epistemology.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper argues that two widely accepted principles about the indicative conditional jointly presuppose the falsity of one of the most prominent arguments against epistemological iteration principles. The first principle about the indicative conditional, which has close ties both to the Ramsey test and the “or-to-if” inference, says that knowing a material conditional suffices for knowing the corresponding indicative. The second principle says that conditional contradictions cannot be true when their antecedents are epistemically possible. Taken together, these principles entail that (...)
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  7. Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain.Nicholas Leonard & Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup.
    Building on recent formal work by Aleks Knoks, we explore how the idea that certain epistemic norms may be indeterminate could be implemented in a default logic.
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  8. Reasoning About Knowledge in Context.Franck Lihoreau & Manuel Rebuschi - forthcoming - In Manuel Rebuschi, Martine Batt, Gerhard Heinzmann, Franck Lihoreau, Michel Musiol & Alain Trognon (eds.), Dialogue, Rationality, Formalism. Interdisciplinary Works in Logic, Epistemology, Psychology and Linguistics. Springer.
    In this paper we propose a new semantics, based on the notion of a "contextual model", that makes it possible to express and compare — within a unique formal framework — different views on the roles of various notions of context in knowledge ascriptions. We use it to provide a logical analysis of such positions as skeptical and moderate invariantism, contextualism, and subject-sensitive invariantism. A dynamic formalism is also proposed that offers new insights into a classical skeptical puzzle.
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  9. Permissivism and the Truth Connection.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Permissivism is the view that, sometimes, there is more than one doxastic attitude that is perfectly rationalised by the evidence. Impermissivism is the denial of Permissivism. Several philosophers, with the aim to defend either Impermissivism or Permissivism, have recently discussed the value of (im)permissive rationality. This paper focuses on one kind of value-conferring considerations, stemming from the so-called “truth-connection” enjoyed by rational doxastic attitudes. The paper vindicates the truth-connected value of permissive rationality by pursuing a novel strategy which rests on (...)
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  10. Structured Argumentation Dynamics: Undermining Attacks in Default Justification Logic.Stipe Pandžić - forthcoming - Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence:1-41.
    This paper develops a logical theory that unifies all three standard types of argumentative attack in AI, namely rebutting, undercutting and undermining attacks. We build on default justification logic that already represents undercutting and rebutting attacks, and we add undermining attacks. Intuitively, undermining does not target default inference, as undercutting, or default conclusion, as rebutting, but rather attacks an argument’s premise as a starting point for default reasoning. In default justification logic, reasoning starts from a set of premises, which is (...)
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  11. Dynamic Consequence for Soft Information.Olivier Roy & Ole Thomassen Hjortland - forthcoming - Journal of Logic and Computation.
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  12. The Problem of Closure and Questioning Attitudes.Richard Teague - forthcoming - Synthese.
    The problem of closure for the traditional unstructured possible worlds model of attitudinal content is that it treats belief and other cognitive states as closed under entailment, despite apparent counterexamples showing that this is not a necessary property of such states. One solution to this problem, which has been proposed recently by several authors (Schaffer 2005; Yalcin 2018; Hoek forthcoming), is to restrict closure in an unstructured setting by treating propositional attitudes as question-sensitive. Here I argue that this line of (...)
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  13. Publicity and Commitment to Believe.Robert Williams - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...)
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  14. The Qualitative Thesis.David Boylan & Ginger Schultheis - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (4):196-229.
    The Qualitative Thesis says that if you leave open P, then you are sure of if P, then Q just in case you are sure of the corresponding material conditional. We argue the Qualitative Thesis provides compelling reasons to accept a thesis that we call Conditional Locality, which says, roughly, the interpretation of an indicative conditional depends, in part, on the conditional’s local embedding environment. In the first part of the paper, we present an argument—due to Ben Holguín—showing that, without (...)
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  15. Be Modest: You're Living on the Edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.
    Many have claimed that whenever an investigation might provide evidence for a claim, it might also provide evidence against it. Similarly, many have claimed that your credence should never be on the edge of the range of credences that you think might be rational. Surprisingly, both of these principles imply that you cannot rationally be modest: you cannot be uncertain what the rational opinions are.
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  16. Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):93-115.
    Orthodox Bayesianism is a highly idealized theory of how we ought to live our epistemic lives. One of the most widely discussed idealizations is that of logical omniscience: the assumption that an agent’s degrees of belief must be probabilistically coherent to be rational. It is widely agreed that this assumption is problematic if we want to reason about bounded rationality, logical learning, or other aspects of non-ideal epistemic agency. Yet, we still lack a satisfying way to avoid logical omniscience within (...)
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  17. Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision.Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic (3):766-811.
    We propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies are such that logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on dynamic belief revision. The key idea we (...)
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  18. Frege and Saving Substitution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2687-2697.
    Goodman and Lederman (2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.
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  19. Imagining stories: attitudes and operators.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):639-664.
    This essay argues that there are theoretical benefits to keeping distinct—more pervasively than the literature has done so far—the psychological states of imagining that p versus believing that in-the-story p, when it comes to cognition of fiction and other forms of narrative. Positing both in the minds of a story’s audience helps explain the full range of reactions characteristic of story consumption. This distinction also has interesting conceptual and explanatory dimensions that haven’t been carefully observed, and the two mental state (...)
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  20. Voluntary Imagination: A Fine-Grained Analysis.Ilaria Canavotto, Francesco Berto & Alessandro Giordani - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-26.
    We study imagination as reality-oriented mental simulation : the activity of simulating nonactual scenarios in one’s mind, to investigate what would happen if they were realized. Three connected questions concerning ROMS are: What is the logic, if there is one, of such an activity? How can we gain new knowledge via it? What is voluntary in it and what is not? We address them by building a list of core features of imagination as ROMS, drawing on research in cognitive psychology (...)
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  21. Realism and Anti-Realism Are Both True (and False).Eric Dietrich - 2020 - Mind and Matter 18 (2):121-148.
    The perennial nature of some of philosophy’s deepest problems is a puzzle. Here, one problem, the realism–anti-realism debate, and one type of explanation for its longevity, are examined. It is argued that realism and anti-realism form a dialetheic pair: While they are in fact each other’s logical opposite, nevertheless, both are true (and both false). First, several reasons why one might think such a thing are presented. These reasons are merely the beginning, however. In the following sections, the dialetheic conclusion (...)
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  22. Rosenkranz’s Logic of Justification and Unprovability.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (6):1243-1256.
    Rosenkranz has recently proposed a logic for propositional, non-factive, all-things-considered justification, which is based on a logic for the notion of being in a position to know, 309–338 2018). Starting from three quite weak assumptions in addition to some of the core principles that are already accepted by Rosenkranz, I prove that, if one has positive introspective and modally robust knowledge of the axioms of minimal arithmetic, then one is in a position to know that a sentence is not provable (...)
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  23. Factive Knowability and the Problem of Possible Omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.
    Famously, the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In this argument, knowability is analyzed in terms of having the possibility to know. Several philosophers have objected to this analysis, because it turns knowability into a nonfactive notion. In addition, they claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience can be avoided. In this (...)
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  24. Lateralism – The Globalization of US Hegemony after World War II.Yang Immanuel Pachankis - 2020 - Dissertation, Communication University of China
    This is a preliminary search and research of world order and global politics. It is history-based and examines the concept of globalization as a result of causes. The prevailing hegemonic power of United States is constituted of physical presence of troops, financial power, and most importantly, predominance in lateralized power in governance bodies around the world. Time is never linear per se in concept or in discoveries, sovereignty as so. The preeminence of space entities and discoveries of planet management is (...)
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  25. Moore’s Paradox and the Logic of Belief.Andrés Páez - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (2):1-15.
    Moore’s Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikka’s interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way (...)
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  26. Privilege and Position: Formal Tools for Standpoint Epistemology.Catharine Saint-Croix - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):489-524.
    How does being a woman affect one’s epistemic life? What about being Black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social positions can give rise to otherwise unavailable epistemic privilege. “Epistemic privilege” is a murky concept, however. Critics of standpoint theory argue that the view is offered without a clear explanation of how standpoints confer their benefits, what those benefits are, or why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. For this reason, many regard standpoint theory as being out (...)
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  27. Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to (...)
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  28. Doxastic Logic.Michael Caie - 2019 - In Jonathan Weisberg & Richard Pettigrew (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 499-541.
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  29. Impossible Worlds and Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3433-3458.
    One response to the problem of logical omniscience in standard possible worlds models of belief is to extend the space of worlds so as to include impossible worlds. It is natural to think that essentially the same strategy can be applied to probabilistic models of partial belief, for which parallel problems also arise. In this paper, I note a difficulty with the inclusion of impossible worlds into probabilistic models. Under weak assumptions about the space of worlds, most of the propositions (...)
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  30. Non‐Classical Knowledge.Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):190-220.
    The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating (...)
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  31. Two Tales of Epistemic Models.Yang Liu - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):291-302.
    This short paper has two parts. First,we prove a generalisation of Aumann’s surprising impossibility result in the context of rational decision making. We then move, in the second part, to discuss the interpretational meaning of some formal setups of epistemic models, and we do so by means of presenting an interesting puzzle in epistemic logic. The aim is to highlight certain problematic aspects of these epistemic systems concerning first/third-person asymmetry which underlies both parts of the story. This asymmetry, we argue, (...)
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  32. A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.
    The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the laws (...)
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  33. Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.
    I present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fine’s works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmers’ positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situation—a configuration of objects and properties—verifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to (...)
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  34. Actuality and the a Priori.Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):809-830.
    We consider a natural-language sentence that cannot be formally represented in a first-order language for epistemic two-dimensional semantics. We also prove this claim in the “Appendix” section. It turns out, however, that the most natural ways to repair the expressive inadequacy of the first-order language render moot the original philosophical motivation of formalizing a priori knowability as necessity along the diagonal.
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  35. Règles de logique, Règles de discours. La pragmatique de la connaissance selon Hintikka.Fabien Schang - 2018 - Klesis 39:92-124.
    L’article qui suit a pour but de présenter un des aspects centraux de la contribution philosophique de Jaakko Hintikka : l’épistémologie formelle. Le thème choisi, le Paradoxe de Moore, permettra d’illustrer le mot d’ordre de la philosophie formelle, celui d’utiliser des outils logiques en vue de la clarification de problèmes philosophiques. Il s’agit également de mettre en évidence la nature pragmatique du discours épistémique, qui transparaît dans les résultats sémantiques de Hintikka et parle en faveur de la logique illocutoire.
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  36. Defusing the Miners Paradox.Michael J. Shaffer - 2018 - Filosofiska Notiser 5:57-67.
    This paper presents a case for the claim that the infamous miners paradox is not a paradox. This contention is based on some important observations about the nature of ignorance with respect to both disjunctions and conditional obligations and their modal features. The gist of the argument is that given the uncertainty about the location of the miners in the story and the nature of obligations, the apparent obligation to block either mine shaft is cancelled.
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  37. The Logic of Epistemic Justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.
    Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases – predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But (...)
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  38. Lotteries and Prefaces.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 168-176.
    The lottery and preface paradoxes pose puzzles in epistemology concerning how to think about the norms of reasonable or permissible belief. Contextualists in epistemology have focused on knowledge ascriptions, attempting to capture a set of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and denials in a variety of contexts (including those involving lottery beliefs and the principles of closure). This article surveys some contextualist approaches to handling issues raised by the lottery and preface, while also considering some of the difficulties encountered by those (...)
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  39. The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis.Daniele Chiffi & Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (4):1-22.
    The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR4 and AR4¢, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a (...)
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  40. Perspectival Logic of Acceptance and Rejection.Alessandro Giordani - 2017 - Logique and Analyse:265-283.
    This paper aims at developing a logical theory of perspectival epistemic attitudes. After presenting a standard framework for modeling acceptance, where the epistemic space of an agent coincides with a unique epistemic cell, more complex systems are introduced, which are characterized by the existence of many connected epistemic cells, and different possible attitudes towards a proposition, both positive and negative, are discussed. In doing that, we also propose some interesting ways in which the systems can be interpreted on well known (...)
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  41. The Logic of Joint Ability in Two-Player Tacit Games.Peter Hawke - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (3):481-508.
    Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move (...)
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  42. Natural Deduction for Diagonal Operators.Fabio Lampert - 2017 - In Maria Zack & Dirk Schlimm (eds.), Research in History and Philosophy of Mathematics: The CSHPM 2016 Annual Meeting in Calgary, Alberta. Cham: Birkhäuser. pp. 39-51.
    We present a sound and complete Fitch-style natural deduction system for an S5 modal logic containing an actuality operator, a diagonal necessity operator, and a diagonal possibility operator. The logic is two-dimensional, where we evaluate sentences with respect to both an actual world (first dimension) and a world of evaluation (second dimension). The diagonal necessity operator behaves as a quantifier over every point on the diagonal between actual worlds and worlds of evaluation, while the diagonal possibility quantifies over some point (...)
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  43. An Argument for the Safety Condition on Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):517-520.
    This paper introduces a new argument for the safety condition on knowledge. It is based on the contention that the rejection of safety entails the rejection of the factivity condition on knowledge. But, since we should maintain factivity, we should endorse safery.
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  44. An Interpretation of McCall’s “Real Possible Worlds” and His Semantics for Counterfactuals.Alexandru Dragomir - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (1):65-78.
    McCall (1984) offered a semantics of counterfactual conditionals based on “real possible worlds” that avoids using the vague notion of similarity between possible worlds. I will propose an interpretation of McCall’s counterfactuals in a formal framework based on Baltag-Moss-Solecki events and protocols. Moreover, I will argue that using this interpretation one can avoid an objection raised by Otte (1987).
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  45. Introduzione alle Logiche Modali.Marcello Frixione, Samuele Iaquinto & Massimiliano Vignolo - 2016 - Roma-Bari: Laterza.
    La logica modale è nata per studiare i ragionamenti su ciò che è possibile e ciò che è necessario. Negli ultimi decenni, a partire dal lavoro di logici e filosofi quali Rudolf Carnap, Saul Kripke e David Lewis, la sua applicazione è stata progressivamente estesa ad altri ambiti, quali il ragionamento sul tempo, sulla conoscenza e sui sistemi di norme. Queste ricerche hanno condotto a un complesso e intrigante dialogo con alcune fondamentali branche della filosofia: la metafisica, l’epistemologia, la filosofia (...)
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  46. Logic of Implicit and Explicit Justifiers.Alessandro Giordani - 2016 - In L. Felline, A. Ledda, F. Paoli & E. Rossanese (eds.), New Directions in Logic and the Philosophy of Science. College Publications. pp. 119-131.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an intuitive semantics for systems of justification logic which allows us to cope with the distinction between implicit and explicit justifiers. The paper is subdivided into three sections. In the first one, the distinction between implicit and explicit justifiers is presented and connected with a proof-theoretic distinction between two ways of interpreting sequences of sentences; that is, as sequences of axioms in a certain set and as sequences proofs constructed from that set (...)
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  47. On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox.Alessandro Giordani - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):597-611.
    In a recent paper, Alexander argues that relaxing the requirement that sound knowers know their own soundness might provide a solution to Fitch’s paradox and introduces a suitable axiomatic system where the paradox is avoided. In this paper an analysis of this solution is proposed according to which the effective move for solving the paradox depends on the axiomatic treatment of the ontic modality rather than the limitations imposed on the epistemic one. It is then shown that, once the ontic (...)
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  48. Paraconsistent Dynamics.Patrick Girard & Koji Tanaka - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):1-14.
    It has been an open question whether or not we can define a belief revision operation that is distinct from simple belief expansion using paraconsistent logic. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of meeting the challenge of defining a belief revision operation using the resources made available by the study of dynamic epistemic logic in the presence of paraconsistent logic. We will show that it is possible to define dynamic operations of belief revision in a paraconsistent setting.
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  49. Being in a Position to Know and Closure.Jan Heylen - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):63-67.
    The focus of this article is the question whether the notion of being in a position to know is closed under modus ponens. The question is answered negatively.
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  50. Counterfactual Theories of Knowledge and the Notion of Actuality.Jan Heylen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1647-1673.
    The central question of this article is how to combine counterfactual theories of knowledge with the notion of actuality. It is argued that the straightforward combination of these two elements leads to problems, viz. the problem of easy knowledge and the problem of missing knowledge. In other words, there is overgeneration of knowledge and there is undergeneration of knowledge. The combination of these problems cannot be solved by appealing to methods by which beliefs are formed. An alternative solution is put (...)
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