Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds

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Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn't part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of their content. Epistemic elitists deny this and think that there is some further constraint the contents of experience must satisfy to be immediately justified. Here I defend epistemic elitism, propose a phenomenological account of what the further constraint is, and explore the resulting view's consequences for our knowledge of other minds, and in particular for perceptual theories of this knowledge.
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Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Helton, Grace & Nanay, Bence
Consciousness and Knowledge.Brogaard, Berit & Chudnoff, Elijah
The Real Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.Brogaard, Berit ‘Brit’ & Gatzia, Dimitria Electra

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