Against Salmon: Saving Conceptual Theories / Contra Salmon: Salvando as Teorias Conceituais

Itaca 18:133-148 (2011)
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In this paper I intend to expose some of Nathan Salmon's arguments, which aim to show that the conceptual theories of the informational value of singular terms cannot be the case, and to present some objections to these arguments, objections which seek to restore the capacity of the conceptual theories to secure the referent, and to have a concept as the informational value of a singular term. I fulfill such goal by making an initial introduction, where I briefly explain Frege's Puzzle, and then I show Salmon's presentation of Frege's Puzzle along with his arguments against the conceptual theories, and I intermittently present my objections to Salmon's arguments. Finally, I conclude that if the objections are satisfactory, they restore the capacity of conceptual theories that would have been removed by the arguments advanced by Salmon.
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