How Explanation Guides Confirmation

Philosophy of Science 84 (2):359-68 (2017)
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Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H|O&E) = P(H|O). In this paper I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them.

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Nevin Climenhaga
Australian Catholic University


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