Meno’s Paradox is an Epistemic Regress Problem

Logos and Episteme 10 (1):107-120 (2019)
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I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and any knowledge must be acquired. is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is. and jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response to the problem is to accept but reject : some knowledge is innate. He argues from this to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. This argument can be understood as a response to an Eleatic problem about the possibility of coming into being that turns on a regress-generating causal principle analogous to the regress-generating principle presupposed by Meno’s paradox.

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Andrew Cling
University of Alabama, Huntsville


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