Meno’s Paradox is an Epistemic Regress Problem

Logos and Episteme 10 (1):107-120 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and any knowledge must be acquired. is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is. and jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response to the problem is to accept but reject : some knowledge is innate. He argues from this to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. This argument can be understood as a response to an Eleatic problem about the possibility of coming into being that turns on a regress-generating causal principle analogous to the regress-generating principle presupposed by Meno’s paradox.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CLIMPI
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-06-18
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-04-19

Total views
86 ( #30,626 of 44,421 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
78 ( #7,911 of 44,421 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.