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  1. added 2019-09-06
    Resilient Understanding: The Value of Seeing for Oneself.Matthew Slater & Jason Leddington - manuscript
    The primary aim of this paper is to argue that the value of understanding derives in part from a kind of subjective stability of belief that we call epistemic resilience. We think that this feature of understanding has been overlooked by recent work, and we think it’s especially important to the value of understanding for social cognitive agents such as us. We approach the concept of epistemic resilience via the idea of the experience of epistemic ownership and argue that the (...)
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  2. added 2019-09-06
    Meno’s Paradox is an Epistemic Regress Problem.Andrew Cling - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (1):107-120.
    I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and any knowledge must be acquired. is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is. and jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response (...)
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  3. added 2016-09-21
    La objeción de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de la reminiscencia.Alejandro Farieta - 2015 - Pensamiento y Cultura 18 (2):6-28.
    This paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s criticism to the solution to Meno’s Paradox suggested by Plato. According to Aristotle, when Plato says that reminiscence (anámnēsis) is achieved, what is actually achieved is induction (epagōgê). Our interpretation is based on two aspects: (1) semantic criticism, since Plato’s use of the term anámnēsis is unusual; and (2) the theory is not able to give an adequate explanation of the effective discovery.
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  4. added 2016-02-05
    Conocimiento, descubrimiento Y reminiscencia en el menón de platón.Alejandro Farieta - 2013 - Universitas Philosophica 30 (60):205-234.
    This work articulates two thesis: one Socratic and one Platonic; and displays how the first one is heir of the second. The Socratic one is called the principle of priority of definition; the Platonic one is the Recollection theory. The articulation between both theses is possible due to the Meno’s paradox, which makes a criticism on the first thesis, but it is solved with the second one. The consequence of this articulation is a new interpretation of the Recollection theory, as (...)
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  5. added 2016-02-05
    Knowledge, Discovery and Reminiscence in Plato's Meno.Alejandro Farieta - 2013 - Universitas Philosophica 30 (60):205-234.
    This work articulates two thesis: one Socratic and one Platonic; and displays how the first one is heir of the second. The Socratic one is called the principle of priority of definition; the Platonic one is the Recollection theory. The articulation between both theses is possible due to the Meno’s paradox, which makes a criticism on the first thesis, but it is solved with the second one. The consequence of this articulation is a new interpretation of the Recollection theory, as (...)
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  6. added 2015-08-25
    Recollection and the Problem of the Elenchus.Jyl Gentzler - 1994 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):257-295.
    We simply cannot make sense of Socrates' procedure for cross-examining his interlocutors in the early dialogues if we insist that Socrates uses cross-examination only for the purpose of testing his interlocutor's claim to knowledge. This view of Socratic cross-examination cannot explain the fact that Socrates examines theses that he himself proposes and that neither he nor his interlocutor explicitly endorses. In contrast,the supposition that Socrates is inquiring on these occasions provides a good explanation for his procedure. When one is attempting (...)
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  7. added 2015-08-02
    The Possibility of Inquiry. Meno's Paradox From Socrates to Sextus. [REVIEW]Justin Joseph Vlasits - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (3):580-583.
    Review of Gail Fine, The Possibility of Inquiry (OUP 2014).
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  8. added 2015-03-16
    Meno's Paradox in Context.David Ebrey - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):4-24.
    I argue that Meno’s Paradox targets the type of knowledge that Socrates has been looking for earlier in the dialogue: knowledge grounded in explanatory definitions. Socrates places strict requirements on definitions and thinks we need these definitions to acquire knowledge. Meno’s challenge uses Socrates’ constraints to argue that we can neither propose definitions nor recognize them. To understand Socrates’ response to the challenge, we need to view Meno’s challenge and Socrates’ response as part of a larger disagreement about the value (...)
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  9. added 2015-03-07
    Can You Seek the Answer to This Question? (Meno in India).Amber Carpenter & Jonardon Ganeri - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):571-594.
    Plato articulates a deep perplexity about inquiry in ?Meno's Paradox??the claim that one can inquire neither into what one knows, nor into what one does not know. Although some commentators have wrestled with the paradox itself, many suppose that the paradox of inquiry is special to Plato, arising from peculiarities of the Socratic elenchus or of Platonic epistemology. But there is nothing peculiarly Platonic in this puzzle. For it arises, too, in classical Indian philosophical discussions, where it is formulated with (...)
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