Homunculi Are People Too! Lewis's Definition of Personhood Debugged

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Abstract
David Lewis defends the following "non-circular definition of personhood": "something is a continuant person if and only if it is a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages. That is: if and only if it is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is R-related to all the rest (and to itself), and it is a proper part of no other such aggregate." I give a counterexample, involving a person who is a part of another, much larger person, with a separate mental life. I then offer an easy repair, which preserves the virtues of Lewis's definition without introducing any new vices.
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Archival date: 2016-12-18
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Four Dimensionalism.Sider, Theodore
Mereology.Varzi, Achille C.

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