Contempt's Evaluative Presentation and Connection to Accountability

In Michelle Mason (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Contempt. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 131-150 (2018)
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In this chapter, I defend a novel account of contempt’s evaluative presentation by synthesizing relevant psychological work (Rozin et al. 1999; Fischer and Roseman 2007; Fischer 2011; Hutcherson and Gross 2011) with philosophical insights (Mason 2003; Bell 2005; Abramson 2009; Bell 2013). I then show how a concern about contempt’s status as an emotion involved in holding people accountable can be helpfully addressed. Finally, I gesture at an account of why, when we feel contemptuous toward people, our accountability responses involve withdrawal and exclusion rather than approach and confrontation.
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Archival date: 2018-04-22
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