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  1. Etica inteligenței emoționale în organizații.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Concepte precum flexibilitate, descentralizare și control, etica în muncă și muncă în echipă în Noua Economie au dus la dezorientarea și subminarea emoțională si psihologică a individului, afirmând că „un regim care nu oferă ființelor umane motive profunde ca să aibă grijă de alții nu-și poate păstra îndelung legitimitatea”. Scopul culturii corporative este să câștige „inimile și mințile” angajaților: să-și definească scopurile prin gestionarea a ceea ce gândesc și simt și nu doar modul în care se comportă. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31864.06404.
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  2. Filosofia inteligenței emoționale în organizații.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Cultura de afaceri a Occidentului până la începutul anilor '90 s-a bazat pe înțelegerea unei diviziuni axiomatice, antitetice, între emoționalitate și raționalitate. Conceptul actual de inteligență emoțională dizolvă opoziția tradițională dintre emoționalitate și raționalitate, cogniție și afectare, gândire și sentiment. Foucault observă că, în raport cu relațiile de putere, o persoană este întotdeauna confruntată cu fenomene complexe care nu se supun formei hegeliene a dialecticii. Puterea se retrage invariabil, se reorganizează, și se reinvestește în noi forme și modalități. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15480.88327.
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  3. Munca emoțională, înger sau demon?Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Lucrul cu emoțiile reprezintă încercarea de a schimba nivelul sau calitatea unei emoții, fiind definit ca managementul propriilor emoții sau munca depusă în efortul de a menține o relație. Munca emoțională poate fi definită ca o formă de reglare emoțională în care angajații trebuie să afișeze anumite emoții ca parte a muncii lor și să promoveze obiectivele organizaționale. Un astfel de control organizațional al emoțiilor poate duce la suprimarea sentimentelor prin disonanță emoțională, percepții relaționale modificate, modele de comunicare schimbate și (...)
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  4. Etica emoțiilor.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Emoțiile au fost considerate adesea o amenințare pentru moralitate și raționalitate; în tradiția romantică, pasiunile au fost așezate atât în centrul individualității umane cât și al vieții morale. Această ambivalență a dus la o ambiguitate între termenii emoțiilor pentru vicii și virtuți. Epicureismul și stoicii au susținut că emoțiile sunt iraționale. Stoicii considerau că virtutea nu este altceva decât cunoașterea, iar emoțiile sunt în mod esențial credințe iraționale. Scepticii considerau că credințele sunt responsabile de durere, recomandând respingerea opiniilor de orice (...)
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  5. Psychological Mechanism of Corruption: A Comprehensive Review. [REVIEW]Juneman Abraham, Julia Suleeman & Bagus Takwin - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Scientific Research.
    Corruption prevention can be more effective if it does not rely merely on legal enforcement. This theoretical review aimed to propose a hypothetical psychological model capable of explaining the behavior of corruption. Moral disengagement is a variable that is considered ontologically closest in “distance” to the variable of corruption behavior. Counterfeit self, implicit self-theory, ethical mindset and moral emotion are taken into account as the pivotal factors of the corruption behavior and its mechanism of moral disengagement. Counterfeit self along with (...)
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  6. Krista K. Thomason, Naked: The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life, Oxford University Press, 2018.Mark Alfano - forthcoming - Criminal Justice Ethics.
    In Naked, Krista K. Thomason offers a multi-faceted account of shame, covering its nature as an emotion, its positive and negative roles in moral life, its association with violence, and its provocation through invitations to shame, public shaming, and stigmatization. Along the way, she reflects on a range of examples drawn from literature, memoirs, journalism, and her own imagination. She also considers alternative views at length, draws a wealth of important distinctions, and articulates many of the most intuitive objections to (...)
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  7. Book Review: Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt. By Macalester Bell. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xi + 292. Price £34.49.). [REVIEW]Alfred Archer - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
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  8. Shame and Attributability.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - forthcoming - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 6.
    Responsibility as accountability is normally taken to have stricter control conditions than responsibility as attributability. A common way to argue for this claim is to point to differences in the harmfulness of blame involved in these different kinds of responsibility. This paper argues that this explanation does not work once we shift our focus from other-directed blame to self-blame. To blame oneself in the accountability sense is to feel guilt and feeling guilty is to suffer. To blame oneself in the (...)
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  9. Extended Review Article: Defending Shame. [REVIEW]Chloë FitzGerald - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
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  10. Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral Standing.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel J. Miller - forthcoming - Ergo.
    Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, (...)
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  11. Relatable and Attainable Moral Exemplars as Sources for Moral Elevation and Pleasantness.Hyemin Han & Kelsie J. Dawson - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Education.
    In the present study, we examined how the perceived attainability and relatability of moral exemplars predicted moral elevation and pleasantness among both adult and college student participants. Data collected from two experiments were analyzed with Bayesian multilevel modeling to explore which factors significantly predicted outcome variables at the story level. The analysis results demonstrated that the main effect of perceived relatability and the interaction effect between attainability and relatability shall be included in the best prediction model, and thus, were deemed (...)
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  12. Are Emotions Perceptions of Value (and Why this Matters)?Charlie Kurth, Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Haley Crosby & Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Jack Basse - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    In Emotions, Values & Agency, Christine Tappolet develops a sophisticated, perceptual theory of emotions and their role in wide range of issues in value theory and epistemology. In this paper, we raise three worries about Tappolet's proposal.
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  13. Blameworthiness is Terminable.Benjamin Matheson - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    A theory of blameworthiness must answer two fundamental questions. First, what makes a person blameworthy when they act? Second, what makes a person blameworthy after the time of action? Two main answers have been given to the second question. According to interminability theorists, blameworthiness necessarily doesn’t even diminish over time. Terminability theorists deny this. In this paper, I argue against interminability and in favour of terminability. After clarifying the debate about whether blameworthiness is interminable or terminable, I argue there’s no (...)
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  14. Jadedness: A philosophical analysis.Andreas Elpidorou - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 1:1-24.
    The essay contributes to the philosophical literature on emotions by advancing a detailed analysis of jadedness and by investigating whether jadedness can be subject to the various standards that are often thought to apply to our emotional states. The essay argues that jadedness is the affective experience of weariness, lack of care, and mild disdain with some object, and that it crucially involves the realisation that such an object was previously, but is no longer, significant to us. On the basis (...)
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  15. Ethics and Overcoming Odious Passions: Mitigating Radicalisation and Extremism through Shared Human Values in Education.Ignace Haaz, Jakob Bühlmann Quero & Khushwant Singh (eds.) - 2023 - Geneva (Switzerland): Globethics Publications.
    This publication articulated in three parts, and twelve chapters endeavours to engage with the complex negative emotions and consequent phenomenon of self-deceit, radicalisation and extremism. First part: Emotions as Lines of Demarcation or Guidelines to Our Self. The Psychodynamic Surrounding of our Intentional Self; second part: Case Studies of Some Concrete Societal Encapsulations of the Negative Passions; and third part: Resisting the Colonisation of Tyrannical Affections. Possible Paths of Mitigating Radicalisation and Extremism. What kind of educational responses can be given (...)
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  16. Exposed: On Shame and Nakedness.Fredrik Westerlund - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2195-2223.
    This article develops a new phenomenological account of the shame people typically tend to feel when seen naked by others. Although shame at nakedness is a paradigmatic and widespread form of shame, it has been under-explored in the literature on shame. The central thesis of the article is that shame at nakedness is rooted in our desire for social affirmation and constituted by our capacity for social self-consciousness. I argue that our ability to sense how others see us and judge (...)
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  17. Is There Such a Thing as Genuinely Moral Disgust?Mara Bollard - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):501-522.
    In this paper, I defend a novel skeptical view about moral disgust. I argue that much recent discussion of moral disgust neglects an important ontological question: is there a distinctive psychological state of moral disgust that is differentiable from generic disgust, and from other psychological states? I investigate the ontological question and propose two conditions that any aspiring account of moral disgust must satisfy: it must be a genuine form of disgust, and it must be genuinely moral. Next, I examine (...)
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  18. Malicious Moral Envy.Vanessa Carbonell - 2022 - In Sara Protasi (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Envy. Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 129-146.
    Malicious moral envy is an aversive reaction to a rival’s moral properties or accomplishments, accompanied by a tendency to level-down the target by morally tarnishing or sabotaging them. In this essay I give an account of malicious moral envy, showing how it is a sub-type of envy more generally. I describe Donald Trump’s behaviors toward Barack Obama and Anthony Fauci as a case study of malicious moral envy. I argue that malicious moral envy is puzzling, first because it is self-defeating, (...)
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  19. Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1135-1152.
    Let cognitivism be the view that moral judgments are cognitive mental states and noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive mental states. Here I argue for moral judgment pluralism: some moral judgments are cognitive states and some are noncognitive states. More specifically, according to my pluralism some judgments are moral because they carry a moral content (e.g., that genocide is wrong) and some are moral because they employ a moral attitude (e.g., indignation, or guilt); the former are the cognitive moral (...)
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  20. Shame, selves, and morality.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (1):122-140.
    This essay critically examines the account of shame and its moral value that Krista Thomason develops in her book, Naked.
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  21. Kant's Theory of Emotion: Toward A Systematic Reconstruction.Uri Eran - 2021 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    Putting together Kant's theory of emotion is complicated by two facts: (1) Kant has no term which is an obvious equivalent of "emotion" as used in contemporary English; (2) theorists disagree about what emotions are. These obstacles notwithstanding, my dissertation aims to provide the foundation for a reconstruction of Kant's theory of emotion that is both historically accurate and responsive to contemporary philosophical concerns. In contrast to available approaches which rest on contested assumptions about emotions, I start from the generally (...)
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  22. Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience.Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):5-19.
    Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accidentally moral experiences, suggests that there is a group of (essentially) moral emotions which in fact exhibit significant unity.
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  23. The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons.Uriah Kriegel & Mark Timmons - 2021 - In R. Dean & O. Sensen (eds.), Respect: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Oxford University Press. pp. 77-98.
    Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective quality of experiencing them. One emotion that is of central importance in many ethical systems is respect (in the sense of respect for persons or so-called recognition-respect). However, discussions of respect in analytic moral philosophy have tended to focus almost entirely on (...)
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  24. Cultivating Disgust: Prospects and Moral Implications.Charlie Kurth - 2021 - Emotion Review 13 (2):101-112.
    Is disgust morally valuable? The answer to that question turns, in large part, on what we can do to shape disgust for the better. But this cultivation question has received surprisingly little attention in philosophical debates. To address this deficiency, this article examines empirical work on disgust and emotion regulation. This research reveals that while we can exert some control over how we experience disgust, there’s little we can do to substantively change it at a more fundamental level. These empirical (...)
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  25. Iris Murdoch and the Epistemic Significance of Love.Cathy Mason - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 39-62.
    Murdoch makes some ambitious claims about love’s epistemic significance which can initially seem puzzling in the light of its heterogeneous and messy everyday manifestations. I provide an interpretation of Murdochian love such that Murdoch’s claims about its epistemic significance can be understood. I argue that Murdoch conceives of love as a virtue, and as belonging at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of the virtues, and that this makes sense of the epistemic role Murdochian love fulfills. Moreover, I suggest that there (...)
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  26. Kantian Guilt.Paula Satne - 2021 - In Beatrix Himmelmann & Camilla Serck-Hanssen (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 1511-1520.
    Claudia Blöser has recently proposed that Kant’s duty to be forgiving is grounded on the need to be relieved from the burden of our moral guilt, a need we have in virtue of our morally fallible nature, irrespectively of whether we have repented. I argue that Blöser's proposal does not fit well with certain central aspects of Kant’s views on moral guilt. For Kant, moral guilt is a complex phenomenon, that has both an intellectual and an affective aspect. I argue (...)
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  27. The Efficacy of Anger: Recognition and Retribution.Laura Luz Silva - 2021 - In Ana Falcato (ed.), The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 27-55.
    Anger is often an appropriate reaction to harms and injustices, but is it a politically beneficial one? Martha Nussbaum (Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1), 41–56, 2015, Anger and Forgiveness. Oxford University Press, 2016) has argued that, although anger is useful in initially recruiting agents for action, anger is typically counterproductive to securing the political aims of those harmed. After the initial shockwave of outrage, Nussbaum argues that to be effective at enacting positive social change, groups and individuals (...)
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  28. Passionate Speech: On the Uses and Abuses of Anger in Public Debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:153-176.
    Anger dominates debates in the public sphere. In this article I argue that there are diverse forms of anger that merit different responses. My focus is especially on two types of anger that I label respectively arrogant and resistant. The first is the characteristic defensive response of those who unwarrantedly arrogate special privileges for themselves. The second is often a source of insight and a form of moral address. I detail some discursive manifestations of these two types of anger. I (...)
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  29. Sages, Sympathy, and Suffering in Kant’s Theory of Friendship.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):452-467.
    Kant’s theory of friendship is crucial in defending his ethics against the longstanding charge of emotional detachment. But his theory of friendship is vulnerable to this charge too: the Kantian sage can appear to reject sympathetic suffering when she cannot help a suffering friend. I argue that Kant is committed to the view that both sages and ordinary people must suffer in sympathy with friends even when they cannot help, because sympathy is necessary to fulfill the imperfect duty to adopt (...)
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  30. The Transformation of Emotion: First and Third Person Perspectives in Developmental Context.Brandon Yip - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):389-395.
    Shun argues that the distinction made between emotions experienced from the first-person perspective and those from the third-person perspective does not capture our everyday emotional experience. My proposal is that even if we accept this claim, first- and third-person perspective taking is still crucial in the development of our emotional psychology. This is so in two respects. First, the features of intimacy and impartiality that mark adult emotional response are a product of a developmental process that involves perspective taking. Second, (...)
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  31. Is boredom one or many? A functional solution to the problem of heterogeneity.Andreas Elpidorou - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (3):491-511.
    Despite great progress in our theoretical and empirical investigations of boredom, a basic issue regarding boredom remains unresolved: it is still unclear whether the construct of boredom is a unitary one or not. By surveying the relevant literature on boredom and arousal, the paper makes a case for the unity of the construct of boredom. It argues, first, that extant empirical findings do not support the heterogeneity of boredom, and, second, that a theoretically motivated and empirically grounded model of boredom (...)
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  32. Moral Experience: Its Existence, Describability, and Significance.Uriah Kriegel - 2020 - In C. Erhard and T. Keiling (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 396-411.
    One of the newest research areas in moral philosophy is moral phenomenology: the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of moral mental life. The idea has been to bring phenomenological evidence to bear on some central issues in metaethics and moral psychology, such as cognitivism and noncognitivism about moral judgment, motivational internalism and externalism, and so on. However, moral phenomenology faces certain foundational challenges, pertaining especially to the existence, describability, and importance of its subject matter. This paper addresses these foundational (...)
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  33. Shame and moral autonomy.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2020 - Ratio 34 (1):44-55.
    Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. To mitigate this skepticism, this (...)
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  34. Learning from Failure: Shame and Emotion Regulation in Virtue as Skill.Matt Stichter - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):341-354.
    On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome your current (...)
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  35. The Moral Necessity of Anger.Krista Thomason - 2020 - In The Ethics of Anger. Lexington Books. pp. 83-101.
    Moral philosophers have defended anger as an important part of our moral lives. In spite of these defenses, skeptics have nonetheless argued that it would be better all things considered to get over anger to the extent that we can. They will often point to moral exemplars like Martin Luther King, Jr. or Gandhi to show both (a) that we can successfully overcome our feelings of anger and (b) that we would be morally better off doing so. In this chapter, (...)
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  36. I’ll Show You: Spite as a Reactive Attitude.Krista K. Thomason - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):163-175.
    Spite is typically considered a vicious emotion that causes us to engage in petty, vindictive, and sometimes self-destructive behavior. Even though it has this bad reputation, I will argue that spite is a reactive attitude. Spite is emotional defiance of another’s command: to spite you, I will do something exactly because you told me not to. Our liability to feelings of spite presupposes that we recognize others as having practical authority, which is why it qualifies as a reactive attitude. I (...)
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  37. Guilt Without Perceived Wrongdoing.Michael Zhao - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (3):285-314.
    According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains (...)
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  38. When Artists Fall: Honoring and Admiring the Immoral.Alfred Archer & Benjamin Matheson - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):246-265.
    Is it appropriate to honor artists who have created great works but who have also acted immorally? In this article, after arguing that honoring involves identifying a person as someone we ought to admire, we present three moral reasons against honoring immoral artists. First, we argue that honoring can serve to condone their behavior, through the mediums of emotional prioritization and exemplar identification. Second, we argue that honoring immoral artists can generate undue epistemic credibility for the artists, which can lead (...)
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  39. Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger.Antony G. Aumann & Zac Cogley - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):44-71.
    This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First, anger communicates to the wrongdoer that her act has been appraised as wrong and demands she feel guilty. This function enables us to explain why apologies make it reasonable to forgo anger and forgive. Second, anger sanctions the wrongdoer for what she (...)
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  40. Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice.Myisha Cherry - 2019 - In Adrienne Martin (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
    Luminaries like Martin Luther King, Jr. urge that Black Americans love even those who hate them. This can look like a rejection of anger at racial injustice. We see this rejection, too, in the growing trend of characterizing social justice movements as radical hate groups, and people who get angry at injustice as bitter and unloving. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum argue that anger is backward-looking, status focused, and retributive. Citing the life of the Prodigal Son, the victims of the Charleston (...)
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  41. Ideals and Idols: On the Nature and Appropriateness of Agential Admiration.Antti Kauppinen - 2019 - In Alfred Archer & Andre Grahlé (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration. Rowman and Littlefield.
    When we admire a person, we don’t just have a wow-response towards them, as we might towards a painting or a sunset. Rather, we construe them as realizing an ideal of the person in their lives to a conspicuous degree. To merit admiration, it is not enough simply to do something valuable or to possess desirable character traits. Rather, one’s achievements must manifest commitments and character traits that define a worthwhile ideal. Agential admiration, I argue, is a person-focused attitude like (...)
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  42. Being realistic about motivation.Charlie Kurth - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2751-2765.
    T.M. Scanlon’s ‘reasons fundamentalism’ is thought to face difficulties answering the normative question—that is, explaining why it’s irrational to not do what you judge yourself to have most reason to do (e.g., Dreier 2014a). I argue that this difficulty results from Scanlon’s failure to provide a theory of mind that can give substance to his account of normative judgment and its tie to motivation. A central aim of this paper is to address this deficiency. To do this, I draw on (...)
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  43. Compassion without Cognitivism.Charlie Kurth - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (35).
    Compassion is generally thought to be a morally valuable emotion both because it is concerned with the suffering of others and because it prompts us to take action to their behalf. But skeptics are unconvinced. Not only does a viable account of compassion’s evaluative content—its characteristic concern—appear elusive, but the emotional response itself seems deeply parochial: a concern we tend to feel toward the suffering of friends and loved ones, rather than for individuals who are outside of our circle of (...)
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  44. What Sentimentalists Should Say about Emotions.Charlie Kurth - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multi-level structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work—for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra the rationalist criticisms of May 2018, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.
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  45. On Keeping Things in Proportion.Adam Lovett & Stefan Riedener - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (3).
    Formula One isn’t very important. You can't care about it too much. The refugee crisis is more important. You can care about it much more. In this paper we investigate how important something is. By ‘importance’ we mean how much it is fitting to care about a thing. We explore a view about this which we call Proportionalism. This view says that a thing’s importance depends on that thing’s share of the world’s total value. The more of what matters there (...)
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  46. Thomason, Krista K. Naked: The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 256. $90.00. [REVIEW]Jordan MacKenzie - 2019 - Ethics 130 (2):267-271.
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  47. "Beasts in human form": How dangerous speech harms.Teresa Marques - 2019 - Araucaria 21 (42).
    Recent years have seen an upsurge of inflammatory speech around the world. Understanding the mechanisms that correlate speech with violence is a necessary step to explore the most effective forms of counterspeech. This paper starts with a review of the features of dangerous speech and ideology, as formulated by Jonathan Maynard and Susan Benesch. It then offers a conceptual framework to analyze some of the underlying linguistic mechanisms at play: derogatory language, code words, figleaves, and meaning perversions. It gives a (...)
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  48. L’indignation : ses variétés et ses rôles dans la régulation sociale.Frédéric Minner - 2019 - Implications Philosophiques 1.
    Qu’est-ce que l’indignation ? Cette émotion est souvent conçue comme une émotion morale qu’une tierce-partie éprouve vis-à-vis des injustices qu’un agent inflige à un patient. L’indignation aurait ainsi trait aux injustices et serait éprouvée par des individus qui n’en seraient eux-mêmes pas victimes. Cette émotion motiverait la tierce-partie indignée à tenter de réguler l’injustice en l’annulant et en punissant son auteur. Cet article entreprend de montrer que cette conception de l’indignation n’est que partielle. En effet, l’indignation ne porte pas que (...)
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  49. Evaluative Perception: Introduction.Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative (...)
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  50. Contempt's Evaluative Presentation and Connection to Accountability.Zac Cogley - 2018 - In Michelle Mason (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Contempt. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 131-150.
    In this chapter, I defend a novel account of contempt’s evaluative presentation by synthesizing relevant psychological work (Rozin et al. 1999; Fischer and Roseman 2007; Fischer 2011; Hutcherson and Gross 2011) with philosophical insights (Mason 2003; Bell 2005; Abramson 2009; Bell 2013). I then show how a concern about contempt’s status as an emotion involved in holding people accountable can be helpfully addressed. Finally, I gesture at an account of why, when we feel contemptuous toward people, our accountability responses involve (...)
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