Harm: An Event-Based Feinbergian Account

In Donald Downs & Chris Surprenant (eds.), The Value and Limits of Academic Speech. NY: Routledge. pp. 115-135 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper, I defend an account of harm as event-based but also in the mold of the account offered by Joel Feinberg in his magnum opus, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law.3 The analysis I offer is meant, that is, to be serviceable in a project like Feinberg’s–that is, it is one of normative political philosophy—and, importantly here, useful for determining when speech might rightly be limited. On the account defended here, to undergo a harm is to be the subject of an event wherein one’s interests are wrongfully set back and wherein the status of the undergoing of the harm derives from its being the sort of event that it is (namely, a setting back of interests), independently of the badness of any resulting state.

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Andrew Jason Cohen
Georgia State University

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