Kant on Moral Feelings, Moral Desires and the Cultivation of Virtue

In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Begehren / Desire. De Gruyter. pp. 3-18 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper argues that contrary to what is often thought, virtue for Kant is not just a matter of strength of will; it has an essential affective dimension. To support this claim, I show that certain affective dispositions, namely moral feelings and desires, are virtuous in the sense that they are constitutive of virtue at the affective level. There is thus an intrinsic connection between an agent’s practice of virtue and the cultivation of her affective dispositions.

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Alix Cohen
University of Edinburgh

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