Results for 'feeling'

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  1. Epistemic Feelings and Epistemic Emotions (Focus Section).Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Kourken Michaelian - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries.
    Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...)
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  2.  71
    Epistemic Feelings are Affective Experiences.Slawa Loev - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (3):206-216.
    Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 206-216, July 2022. This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic (...)
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  3. Negative Feelings of Gratitude.Tony Manela - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):129-140.
    Philosophers generally agree that gratitude, the called-for response to benevolence, includes positive feelings. In this paper, I argue against this view. The grateful beneficiary will have certain feelings, but in some contexts, those feelings will be profoundly negative. Philosophers overlook this fact because they tend to consider only cases of gratitude in which the benefactor’s sacrifice is minimal, and in which the benefactor fares well after performing an act of benevolence. When we consider cases in which a benefactor suffers severely, (...)
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  4. Camus’ Feeling of the Absurd.Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (4):477-490.
    Albert Camus is most famous for his engagement with the absurd. Both in his philosophical and literary works his main focus was on the nature and normative consequences of this idea. However, Camus was also concerned with what he referred to as the “feeling of the absurd”. Philosophers have so far paid little attention to Camus’ thoughts about the feeling of the absurd. In this paper I provide a detailed analysis of this feeling. It turns out that (...)
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  5. Feeling togetherness online: a phenomenological sketch of online communal experiences.Lucy Osler - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):569-588.
    The internet provides us with a multitude of ways of interacting with one another. In discussions about how technological innovations impact and shape our interpersonal interactions, there is a tendency to assume that encountering people online is essentially different to encountering people offline. Yet, individuals report feeling a sense of togetherness with one another online that echoes offline descriptions. I consider how we can understand people’s experiences of being together with others online, at least in certain instances, as arising (...)
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  6. Hurt Feelings.David Shoemaker - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (3):125-148.
    In introducing the reactive attitudes “of people directly involved in transactions with each other,” P. F. Strawson lists “gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings.” To show how our interpersonal emotional practices of responsibility could not be undermined by determinism’s truth, Strawson focused exclusively on resentment, specifically on its nature and actual excusing and exempting conditions. So have many other philosophers theorizing about responsibility in Strawson’s wake. This method and focus has generated a host of quality of will theories of (...)
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  7. The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind.Stan Klein - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Research, Practice, and Theory 2 (4):355-376.
    I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer is (...)
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  8. Feeling the right way: Normative influences on people's use of emotion concepts.Rodrigo Díaz & Kevin Reuter - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (3):451-470.
    It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...)
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  9. Feeling of Self-Worth in Else Voigtländer.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2020 - Encyclopedia of Concise Concepts by Women Philosophers.
    In Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) (identical to Über die Typen des Selbstgefühls), Else Voigtländer undertakes an accurate analysis of a category of feelings named “feeling of self-worth” and its types. This entry presents Voigtländer's definition, characterization and taxonomy of the feeling of self-worth.
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  10. Is feeling pain the perception of something?Murat Aydede - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine (...)
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  11. Feeling the Passing of Time.Giuliano Torrengo - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (4):165-188.
    There seems to be a "what it is like" to the experience of the flow of time in any conscious activity of ours. In this paper, I argue that the feeling that time passes should be understood as a phenomenal modifier of our mental life, in roughly the same way as the blurred or vivid nature of a visual experience can be seen as an element of the experience that modifies the way it feels, without representing the world as (...)
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  12. Metacognitive feelings, self-ascriptions and metal actions.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):145-162.
    The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The (...)
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  13. Feeling or thought – both or neither? A short review.Robert Zaborowski - 2012 - Organon 44:27-42.
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  14. Feeling–Thought Linkage and its Forms in the Ancient and Modern Times.Robert Zaborowski - 2009 - In K. Boudouris & M. Adam (ed.), Greek philosophy and the issues of our age. Ionia Publications.
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  15. Two Feelings in the Beautiful: Kant on the Structure of Judgments of Beauty.Janum Sethi - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (34):1-17.
    In this paper, I propose a solution to a notorious puzzle that lies at the heart of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. The puzzle arises because Kant asserts two apparently conflicting claims: (1) F→J: A judgment of beauty is aesthetic, i.e., grounded in feeling. (2) J→F: A judgment of beauty could not be based on and must ground the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful. I argue that (1) and (2) are consistent. Kant’s text indicates that he distinguishes two (...)
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  16. Feeling Extended. A book review.Patricia Grosse - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):271-278.
    A book review of 'Feeling Extended: Sociality as Extended Body-Becoming-Mind' by Douglas Robinson.
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  17. Bodily feelings and psychological defence. A specification of Gendlin’s concept of felt sense.Jan Puc - 2020 - Ceskoslovenska Psychologie 64 (2):129-142.
    The paper aims to define the concept of “felt sense”, introduced in psychology and psychotherapy by E. T. Gendlin, in order to clarify its relation to bodily sensations and its difference from emotions. Gendlin’s own definition, according to which the felt sense is a conceptually vague bodily feeling with implicit meaning, is too general for this task. Gendlin’s definition is specified by pointing out, first, the different layers of awareness of bodily feelings and, second, the difference between bodily readiness (...)
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  18. Feeling, Knowledge, Self-Preservation: Audre Lorde’s Oppositional Agency and Some Implications for Ethics.Caleb Ward - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):463-482.
    Throughout her work, Audre Lorde maintains that her self-preservation in the face of oppression depends on acting from the recognition and valorization of her feelings as a deep source of knowledge. This claim, taken as a portrayal of agency, poses challenges to standard positions in ethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. This article examines the oppositional agency articulated by Lorde’s thought, locating feeling, poetry, and the power she calls “the erotic” within her avowed project of self-preservation. It then explores the (...)
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  19. Feeling at one: Socio-affective distribution, vibe, and dance-music consciousness.Maria A. G. Witek - 2019 - In Ruth Herbert, Eric Clarke & David Clarke (eds.), Music and Consciousness 2: Worlds, Practices, Modalities. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 93–112.
    In this chapter, the embodied consciousness of clubbing and raving is considered through the theory of extended mind, according to which the mind is a distributed system where brain, body, and environment play equal parts. Building on the idea of music as affective atmosphere, a case is made for considering the vibe of a dance party as cognitively, socially, and affectively distributed. The chapter suggests that participating in the vibe affords primary musical consciousness—a kind of pre-reflexive state characterized by affective (...)
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  20. Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). (...)
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  21. The feeling body: Towards an enactive approach to emotion.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2008 - In W. F. Overton, U. Müller & J. L. Newman (eds.), Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved (...)
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  22. The foundation of phenomenological ethics: Intentional feelings.Wei Zhang - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (1):130-142.
    E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.
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  23.  32
    Rational feelings.Alix Cohen - 2018 - In Diane Williamson & Kelly Sorensen (eds.), Kant and the Faculty of Feeling. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 9-24.
    While it is well known that Kant’s transcendental idealism forbids the transcendent use of reason and its ideas, what had been underexplored until the last decade or so is his account of the positive use of reason’s ideas as it is expounded in the “Appendix” of the Critique of Pure Reason. The main difficulty faced by his account is that while there is no doubt that for Kant we need to rely on the ideas of reason in order to gain (...)
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  24. Feeling the Aesthetic: A Pluralist Sentimentalist Theory of Aesthetic Experience.Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen & David Sackris - 2020 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 57 (2):116–134.
    Sentimentalist aesthetic theories, broadly construed, posit that emotions play a fundamental role in aesthetic experiences. Jesse Prinz has recently proposed a reductionistic version of sentimentalist aesthetics, suggesting that it is the discrete feeling of wonder that makes an experience aesthetic. In this contribution, we draw on Prinz’s proposal in order to outline a novel version of a sentimentalist theory. Contrasting Prinz’s focus on a single emotion, we argue that an aesthetic experience is rudimentarily composed of a plurality of emotions. (...)
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  25. The Feeling of Familiarity.Amy Kind - 2022 - Acta Scientiarum 43 (3):1-10.
    The relationship between the phenomenology of imagination and the phenomenology of memory is an interestingly complicated one. On the one hand, there seem to be important similarities between the two, and there are even occasions in which we mistake an imagining for a memory or vice versa. On the other hand, there seem to be important differences between the two, and we can typically tell them apart. This paper explores various attempts to delineate a phenomenological marker differentiating imagination and memory, (...)
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  26.  98
    Feeling and Orientation in Action: A Reply to Alix Cohen.Melissa M. Merritt - 2021 - Kantian Review 51 (5):329-350.
    Alix Cohen argues that the function of feeling in Kantian psychology is to appraise and orient activity. Thus she sees feeling and agency as importantly connected by Kant’s lights. I endorse this broader claim, but argue that feeling, on her account, cannot do the work of orientation that she assigns to it.
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  27. Fitting Feelings and Elegant Proofs: On the Psychology of Aesthetic Evaluation in Mathematics.Cain Todd - 2017 - Philosophia Mathematica:nkx007.
    ABSTRACT This paper explores the role of aesthetic judgements in mathematics by focussing on the relationship between the epistemic and aesthetic criteria employed in such judgements, and on the nature of the psychological experiences underpinning them. I claim that aesthetic judgements in mathematics are plausibly understood as expressions of what I will call ‘aesthetic-epistemic feelings’ that serve a genuine cognitive and epistemic function. I will then propose a naturalistic account of these feelings in terms of sub-personal processes of representing and (...)
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  28. Feeling Badly Is Not Good Enough: a Reply to Fritz and Miller.Benjamin Rossi - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):101-105.
    Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller’s reply to my article helpfully clarifies their position and our main points of disagreement. Their view is that those who blame hypocritically lack the right to blame for a violation of some moral norm N in virtue of having an unfair disposition to blame others, but not themselves, for violations of N. This view raises two key questions. First, are there instances of hypocritical blame that do not involve an unfair differential blaming disposition? Second, if (...)
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  29. Mixed Feelings. Carl Stumpf's Criticism of James and Brentano on Emotions.Denis Fisette - 2013 - In D. Fisette & G. Frechette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 281-306.
    This study attempts to situate Carl Stumpf's theory of emotions with regard to that of his teacher, Franz Brentano, and to the sensualist theory of William James. We will argue that Stumpf's theory can be considered an attempt to reconcile James's sensualism, which emphasizes the role of bodily feelings, with what we will call, for the purposes of this study, Brentano's intentionalism, which conceives of emotions as intentional states. Stumpf claims that James's sensory feelings and Brentano's affective intentional states are (...)
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  30. The Feeling of Religious Longing and Passionate Rationality.Ruth Rebecca Tietjen - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (3):131--152.
    What is the feeling of religious longing and how, if at all, can religious longing justify religious beliefs? Starting with an analogy between religious longing and basic physical needs and an analogy between religious longing and musical longing, I argue that the feeling of religious longing is characterized by four features: its generality, its indeterminate transcendent object which by its nature is not capable of empirical verification or falsification, its mode of being infinitely interested in passion and its (...)
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  31. Affective intentionality and the feeling body.Jan Slaby - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
    This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is (...)
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  32. Feeling Racial Pride in the Mode of Frederick Douglass.Jeremy Fischer - 2021 - Critical Philosophy of Race 9 (1):71-101.
    Drawing on Frederick Douglass’s arguments about racial pride, I develop and defend an account of feeling racial pride that centers on resisting racialized oppression. Such pride is racially ecumenical in that it does not imply partiality towards one’s own racial group. I argue that it can both accurately represent its intentional object and be intrinsically and extrinsically valuable to experience. It follows, I argue, that there is, under certain conditions, a morally unproblematic, and plausibly valuable, kind of racial pride (...)
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  33. Lost feeling of ownership of one’s mental states: the importance of situating patient R.B.’s pathology in the context of contemporary theory and empiricism.Stan Klein - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):490-493.
    In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature (...)
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  34. The Feel of the World: exograms, habits, and the confusion of types of memory.John Sutton - 2009 - In Andrew Kania (ed.), Philosophers on *Memento*. New York: Routledge. pp. 65-86.
    A philosophical analysis of different kinds of memory used in the film Memento.
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  35. The Noetic Feeling of Confusion.Juliette Vazard & Catherine Audrin - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (14).
    Feeling confused can sometimes lead us to give up on the task, frustrated. What is less emphasized is that confusion may also promote happy (epistemic) endings to our inquiries. It has recently been argued that confusion motivates effortful investigative behaviors which can help us acquire hard-to-get epistemic goods (DiLeo et al., 2019; D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). While the motivational power of confusion and its benefits for learning has been uncovered in recent years, the exact nature of the phenomenon remains (...)
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  36. Mixed Feelings: Conflicts in Emotional Responses to Film.James Harold - 2010 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):280-294.
    Some films scare us; some make us cry; some thrill us. Some of the most interesting films, however, leave us suspended between feelings – both joyous and sad, or angry and serene. This paper attempts to explain how this can happen and why it is important. I look closely at one film that creates and exploits these conflicted responses. I argue that cases of conflict in film illuminate a pair of vexing questions about emotion in film: (1) To what extent (...)
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  37. Feeling the Vibrations: On the Micropolitics of Climate Change.Stephanie Erev - 2019 - Political Theory 47 (6):836-863.
    Climate change is more than a discrete issue demanding political attention and response. A changing climate permeates political life as material processes of planetary change reverberate in our bodies, affecting subterranean processes of attention and evoking bodily responses at and below the threshold of awareness. By way of example, I explore the register of bodily feeling to raise the possibility that proliferating anomalies in atmospheric, oceanic, and seismic activities are entering into subliminal experiences of time and confounding embodied expectations (...)
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  38. The Feeling of Doing – Nietzsche on Agent Causation.Manuel Dries - 2013 - Nietzscheforschung 20 (1):235-247.
    This article examines Nietzsche’s analysis of the phenomenology of agent causation. Sense of agent causation, our sense of self-efficacy, is tenacious because it originates, according to Nietzsche’s hypothesis, in the embodied and situated experience of effort in overcoming resistances. It arises at the level of the organism and is sustained by higher-order cognitive functions. Based on this hypothesis, Nietzsche regards the sense of self as emerging from a homeostatic system of drives and affects that unify such as to maintain self-efficacy (...)
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  39.  45
    Kant on Moral Feelings, Moral Desires and the Cultivation of Virtue.Alix Cohen - 2018 - In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Begehren / Desire. De Gruyter. pp. 3-18.
    This paper argues that contrary to what is often thought, virtue for Kant is not just a matter of strength of will; it has an essential affective dimension. To support this claim, I show that certain affective dispositions, namely moral feelings and desires, are virtuous in the sense that they are constitutive of virtue at the affective level. There is thus an intrinsic connection between an agent’s practice of virtue and the cultivation of her affective dispositions.
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  40. Seeing, Feeling, Doing: Mandatory Ultrasound Laws, Empathy and Abortion.Catherine Mills - 2018 - Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (2):1-31.
    In recent years, a number of US states have adopted laws that require pregnant women to have an ultrasound examination, and be shown images of their foetus, prior to undergoing a pregnancy termination. In this paper, I examine one of the basic presumptions of these laws: that seeing one’s foetus changes the ways in which one might act in regard to it, particularly in terms of the decision to terminate the pregnancy or not. I argue that mandatory ultrasound laws compel (...)
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  41. More Than a Feeling.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. (...)
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  42.  21
    Feeling good, sensory engagements, and time out: Embodied pleasures of running.Patricia Jackman, Jacquelyn Allen-Collinson, Noora Ronkainen & Noel Brick - 2022 - Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health 14 (Online early).
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  43. Feeling, Not Freedom: Nietzsche Against Agency.Donovan Miyasaki - 2016 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (2):256-274.
    Despite his rejection of the metaphysical conception of freedom of the will, Nietzsche frequently makes positive use of the language of freedom, autonomy, self-mastery, self-overcoming, and creativity when describing his normative project of enhancing humanity through the promotion of its highest types. A number of interpreters have been misled by such language to conclude that Nietzsche accepts some version of compatibilism, holding a theory of natural causality that excludes metaphysical or “libertarian” freedom of the will, while endorsing morally substantial alternative (...)
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  44. In Defence of Mixed Feelings.Olivier Massin - 2008 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
    Mixed feelings occur when a same subject experience both pleasure and displeasure at the same time. I argued that mixed feelings are not only possible, but that they constitute a widespread phenomenon. In the first part, I answer to three objections against the possibility of mixed feelings, the most important one being that mixed feelings contradict the view that pleasure and displeasure are contraries. In the second part, I argue that pleasure in effort, the pleasure we take in doing things, (...)
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  45. Feeling the strain: Predicting the third dimension of core affect.Mog Stapleton - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):166-167.
    This commentary (1) raises the question about the possible conflation of core affect with the neural representation of interoceptive changes in regard to whether biological value is subpersonal or must be experienced, and (2) proposes that Wundt’s third dimension of core affect – strain-relaxation – can be accounted for in the target model under a generalised predictive model of attention.
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  46.  83
    Efforts and their feelings.Juan Pablo Bermúdez & Olivier Massin - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (1):e12894.
    Effort and the feeling of effort play important roles in many theoretical discussions, from perception to self-control and free will, from the nature of ownership to the nature of desert and achievement. A crucial, overlooked distinction within the philosophical and scientific literatures is the distinction between theories that seek to explain effort and theories that seek to explain the feeling of effort. Lacking a clear distinction between these two phenomena makes the literature hard to navigate. To advance in (...)
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  47. Depression as existential feeling or de-situatedness? Distinguishing structure from mode in psychopathology.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):595-612.
    In this paper I offer an alternative phenomenological account of depression as consisting of a degradation of the degree to which one is situated in and attuned to the world. This account contrasts with recent accounts of depression offered by Matthew Ratcliffe and others. Ratcliffe develops an account in which depression is understood in terms of deep moods, or existential feelings, such as guilt or hopelessness. Such moods are capable of limiting the kinds of significance and meaning that one can (...)
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  48.  28
    Imagine what it feels like.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Anja Berninger & Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination. Routledge.
    Often in our everyday lives, for instance, in decision-taking, empathizing with others, and engaging with fictions, we are able to imagine what a particular emotion feels like. This chapter analyzes the structure of these imaginings as a kind of experiential imagining. After introducing the topic (section 1), I argue that these imaginings cannot be explained exclusively by their content and that a focus on the mode of imagining is required. We not only imagine having emotions, but we also imagine them (...)
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  49.  51
    Feeling the Aesthetic: A Pluralist Sentimentalist Theory of Aesthetic Experience.Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen & David Sackris - 2020 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 2:116-134.
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  50. Beyond Personal Feelings and Collective Emotions: Toward a Theory of Social Affect.Robert Seyfert - 2012 - Theory, Culture and Society 29 (6):27-46.
    In the Sociology of Emotion and Affect Studies, affects are usually regarded as an aspect of human beings alone, or of impersonal or collective atmospheres. However, feelings and emotions are only specific cases of affectivity that require subjective inner selves, while the concept of ‘atmospheres’ fails to explain the singularity of each individual case. This article develops a theory of social affect that does not reduce affect to either personal feelings or collective emotions. First, I use a Spinozist understanding of (...)
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