Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246 (2015)
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Abstract

Perszyk has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s challenge by highlighting further relevant similarities between CCFs and facts about the laws.

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Yishai Cohen
University of Southern Maine

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