Results for 'Molinism'

38 found
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  1. Molinism: Explaining Our Freedom Away.Nevin Climenhaga & Daniel Rubio - forthcoming - Mind:fzab042.
    Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully (...)
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  2. Molinists (Still) Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.
    Perszyk has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s challenge by (...)
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  3. Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?Justin Mooney - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2):131-148.
    John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly’s recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer’s claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom.
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  4. How to Apply Molinism to the Theological Problem of Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (1):68-90.
    The problem of moral luck is that a general fact about luck and an intuitive moral principle jointly imply the following skeptical conclusion: human beings are morally responsible for at most a tiny fraction of each action. This skeptical conclusion threatens to undermine the claim that human beings deserve their respective eternal reward and punishment. But even if this restriction on moral responsibility is compatible with the doctrine of the final judgment, the quality of one’s afterlife within heaven or hell (...)
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  5. Molinism and Theological Compatibilism.Christoph Jäger - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):71-92.
    In a series of recent papers John Martin Fischer argues that the Molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, Molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical Molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that Molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since (...)
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  6. Molinism, Creature-Types, and the Nature of Counterfactual Implication.Daniel Murphy - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):65-86.
    Granting that there could be true subjunctive conditionals of libertarian freedom (SCLs), I argue (roughly) that there could be such conditionals only in connection with individual "possible creatures" (in contrast to types). This implies that Molinism depends on the view that, prior to creation, God grasps possible creatures in their individuality. In making my case, I explore the notions of counterfactual implication (that relationship between antecedent and consequent of an SCL which consists in its truth) and counterfactual relevance (that (...)
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  7. Molinism and Divine Prophecy of Free Actions.Graham Oppy & Mark Saward - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (2):1-10.
    Among challenges to Molinism, the challenge posed by divine prophecy of human free action has received insufficient attention. We argue that this challenge is a significant addition to the array of challenges that confront Molinism.
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  8.  29
    Optimistic Molinism.Andre Leo Rusavuk - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):371-387.
    Some Molinists claim that a perfectly good God would actualize a world that is salvifically optimal, that is, a world in which the balance between the saved and damned is optimal and cannot be improved upon without undesirable consequences. I argue that given some plausible principles of rationality, alongside the assumptions Molinists already accept, God’s perfect rationality necessarily would lead him to actualize a salvifically optimal world; I call this position “Optimistic Molinism.” I then consider objections and offer replies, (...)
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  9. Molinism and Hell.Gordon Knight - 2010 - In Joel Buenting (ed.), The Problem of Hell. Ashgate.
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  10. How Molinists Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2011 - In Christian Kanzian Kanzian, Winfried Löffler & Josef Quitterer (eds.), The Ways Things Are: Studies in Ontology. ontos. pp. 221-240.
    Paper on divine foreknowledge and human freedom.
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  11. Flint's 'Molinism and the Incarnation' is Too Radical.R. T. Mullins - 2015 - Journal of Analytic Theology 3:109-123.
    In a series of papers, Thomas P. Flint has posited that God the Son could become incarnate in any human person as long as certain conditions are met (Flint 2001a, 2001b). In a recent paper, he has argued that all saved human persons will one day become incarnated by the Son (Flint 2011). Flint claims that this is motivated by a combination of Molinism and orthodox Christology. I shall argue that this is unmotivated because it is condemned by orthodox (...)
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  12. Complete Concept Molinism.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):93-108.
    A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of Molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called ‘grounding objection’ to Molinism raises a metaphysical problem. The most promising solution to it is a revised form of the traditional ‘essence solution’. Inspired by Leibniz’s idea of a ‘notio completa’ (complete concept), we propose a mathematical model (...)
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  13. Arguing From Molinism to Neo-Molinism.Elijah Hess - 2015 - Philosophia Christi 17 (2):331-351.
    In a pair of recent essays, William Lane Craig has argued that certain open theist understandings of the nature of the future are both semantically and modally confused. I argue that this is not the case and show that, if consistently observed, the customary semantics for counterfactuals Craig relies on not only undermine the validity of his complaint against the open theist, they actually support an argument for the openness position.
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  14.  60
    The Neo-Molinist Square Stands Firm: A Rejoinder to Kirk MacGregor.Elijah Hess - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):391-406.
    In a previous issue of Philosophia Christi, Kirk MacGregor responded to an essay of mine in which I argued for a neo-Molinist account of open theism. The argument demonstrated how, given standard counterfactual semantics, one could derive an “open future square of opposition,” that is, a depiction of the logical relations that hold between future-tense statements from an open theistic standpoint. Conceding the validity of the argument, MacGregor nevertheless sought to deny its soundness by criticizing both its conclusion and the (...)
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  15. Complete Concept Molinism - Der Molinismus vollständiger Begriffe.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2015 - In Thomas Marschler & Thomas Schärtl (eds.), Eigenschaften Gottes: Ein Gespräch zwischen systematischer Theologie und analytischer Philosophie. Aschendorff. pp. 363-378.
    Theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of Molinism.
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  16.  98
    Leibnizin vastaväitteitä molinistiselle voluntarismille (in Finnish) [Leibniz's Objections to Molinist Voluntarism].Ari Maunu - 2015 - Ajatus 72:53-69.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain and discuss Leibniz’s main objections to the Molinist-Suárezian voluntarist (libertarian) conception of freedom, i.e., the conception involving the supposition of “freedom of indifference” of the will to make contrary choices in exactly the same circumstances. Leibniz’s main objections to the voluntarist conception are the following: (i) it violates the Principle of Sufficient Reason; (ii) it is based on a mistaken picture of the nature of the will.
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  17. The Possibilities of Incarnation: Some Radical Molinist Suggestions.Thomas P. Flint - 2001 - Religious Studies 37 (3):307-320.
    The traditional doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that God became man. But was it necessary that God become the particular man He in fact became? Could some man or woman other than the man born in Bethlehem roughly two thousand years ago have been assumed by the Son to effect our salvation? This essay addresses such questions from the perspective of one embracing Molina's picture of divine providence. After showing how Molina thought his theory of middle knowledge helps alleviate a (...)
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  18. Jumalan ennaltatietäminen ja luotujen vapaus molinismin mukaan (in Finnish) [God's Foreknowledge and Creaturely Freedom according to Molinism].Ari Maunu - 2014 - Ajatus 71:143-172.
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  19.  11
    On Responsibility and Original Sin: A Molinist Suggestion.Mark B. Anderson - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (1):5-25.
    A crucial objection to the doctrine of original sin is that it conflicts with a common intuition that agents are morally responsible only for factors under their control. Here, I present an account of moral responsibility by Michael Zimmerman that accommodates that intuition, and I consider it as a model of original sin, noting both attractions and difficulties with the view.
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  20. How God Knows Counterfactuals of Freedom.Justin Mooney - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):220-229.
    One problem for Molinism that critics of the view have pressed, and which Molinists have so far done little to address, is that even if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, it is puzzling how God could possibly know them. I defuse this worry by sketching a plausible model of the mechanics of middle knowledge which draws on William Alston’s direct acquaintance account of divine knowledge.
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  21. What Are the Odds That Everyone is Depraved?Scott Hill - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):299-308.
    Why does God allow evil? One hypothesis is that God desires the existence and activity of free creatures but He was unable to create a world with such creatures and such activity without also allowing evil. If Molinism is true, what probability should be assigned to this hypothesis? Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because there are an infinite number of possible people and because we have no reason to suppose that such creatures will choose (...)
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  22.  55
    Banez’s Big Problem: The Ground of Freedom.James Dominic Rooney - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (1):91-112.
    While many philosophers of religion are familiar with the reconciliation of grace and freedom known as Molinism, fewer by far are familiar with that position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e., Banezianism). My aim is to clarify a serious problem for the Banezian: how the Banezian can avoid the apparent conflict between a strong notion of freedom and apparently compatibilist conclusions. The most prominent attempt to defend Banezianism against compatibilism was (in)famously endorsed by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Even (...)
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  23. Prospettive del molinismo nel dibattito contemporaneo sull’onniscienza divina.Damiano Migliorini - 2015 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 44:71-106.
    Over the past four decades, the issue of the relationship between divine omniscience and human freedom has been the subject of a great debate in the context of Analytic Philosophy of Religion. Many authors have contributed to the debate by formulating some ‘solutions’, taking inspiration from the thought of classical authors (e.g. Boethius, Aquinas, Ockham). One of these, is inspired by Luis de Molina’s thought. The Author, therefore, aims to present the main theoretical thesis of this solution, following the development (...)
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  24.  50
    Stumping Freedom: Divine Causality and the Will.James Dominic Rooney, Op - 2015 - New Blackfriars 96 (1066):711-722.
    The problems with grace and free will have prompted long-standing theological conflicts, chiefly revolving around certain disagreements over the nature of divine causality in respect to the free will's of creatures and His foreknowledge of free acts. Eleonore Stump offers a new interpretation of divine action on the will that holds God only acts by way of formal causality and that human cooperation with grace is only by way of "quiescence." I argue that this account lacks coherence in certain important (...)
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  25.  34
    Beyond Dordt and De Auxiliis The Dynamics of Protestant and Catholic Soteriology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.Jordan Ballor, Matthew Gaetano & David S. Sytsma (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
    Beyond Dordt and ‘De Auxiliis’ explores post-Reformation inter-confessional theological exchange on soteriological topics including predestination, grace, and free choice. These doctrines remained controversial within confessional traditions after the Reformation, as Dominicans and Jesuits and later Calvinists and Arminians argued about these critical issues in the Augustinian theological heritage. Some of those involved in condemning Arminianism at the Synod of Dordt (1618-1619) were inspired by Dominican followers of Thomas Aquinas in Spain who had recently opposed the vigorous defense of free choice (...)
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  26. Counterfactuals of Divine Freedom.Yishai Cohen - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (3):185-205.
    Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God’s will. As a result, I argue that the Molinist God fails to satisfy an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, and thus she cannot rationally deliberate about which world to actualize.
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  27. Best Feasible Worlds: Divine Freedom and Leibniz’s Lapse.Justin Mooney - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):219-229.
    William L. Rowe’s argument against divine freedom has drawn considerable attention from theist philosophers. One reply to Rowe’s argument that has emerged in the recent literature appeals to modified accounts of libertarian freedom which have the result that God may be free even if he necessarily actualizes the best possible world. Though in many ways attractive, this approach appears to lead to the damning consequence of modal collapse i.e., that the actual world is the only possible world. But appearances can (...)
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  28.  28
    Contingency, Free Will, and Particular Providence.DAvid Torrijos Castrillejo - 2021 - Religions 12.
    The results from contemporary science, especially the theory of evolution and quantum physics, seem to favor process theology. Moreover, the evil committed by free will leads some theologians to reduce divine action in order to prevent God from being responsible for evil. Thus, among those who defend a particular providence, Molinism finds many followers. This article first argues that contemporary science does not constrain us to deny particular providence. Second, it criticizes the implicitly deterministic character of Molinism. Thirdly, (...)
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  29. Predestinación y libertad. Escritos en torno a la controversia de auxiliis.Domingo Báñez & David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2021 - Pamplona: EUNSA.
    Edition of the opuscules by D. Báñez on De auxiliis controversy. There is the critical edition of three manuscripts and the first Spanish annotated translation of the opuscules. The Latin text is disposed together with the translation. An introduction situates the opuscules in its systematic and historical context.
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  30. Response to Richard M. Gale's Review of the Book God, the Best, and Evil.Bruce Langtry - manuscript
    Richard M.Gale reviewed my book in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews in May 2009. The overall conclusion of my reply is that although Gale repeatedly claims that the book is defective, his review has not identified any genuine defects.
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  31. Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.
    Peter van Inwagen famously offers a version of the luck objection to libertarianism called the ‘Rollback Argument.’ It involves a thought experiment in which God repeatedly rolls time backward to provide an agent with many opportunities to act in the same circumstance. Because the agent has the kind of freedom that affords her alternative possibilities at the moment of choice, she performs different actions in some of these opportunities. The upshot is that whichever action she performs in the actual-sequence is (...)
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  32.  40
    Báñez frente a Suárez acerca de la libertad.David Torrijos Castrillejo - 2021 - Bajo Palabra. Revista de Filosofía 25:179-199.
    On several occasions, Báñez considered Suárez the main supporter of the Molinist doctrine along with Molina himself. According to Báñez, the main mistake of Molinism is its misunderstanding of freedom. This led him to refine his personal Thomistic theory of freedom. Free will is radically in the intellect and formally in the will. Intellect is the root of freedom because the most important indifference is found in the object, whose connection with the end is understood as not necessary. The (...)
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  33. L’Ockhamismo Nel Dibattito Analitico Contemporaneo Sull’Onniscienza Divina. Un Bilancio.Damiano Migliorini - 2015 - Laurentianum 56:33-86.
    Over the past three decades, the issue of the relationship between divine omniscience and human freedom has been the subject of great debate. Inside it, were compared many authors and many “solutions”. One of these is the one that is inspired by Ockham’s thought. The author, therefore, aims to present the main theoretical nodes of this solution, following the development that it has had in the various publications about this question. The author also tries to show its limits, to make (...)
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  34. Atonement’s Axiological Boundaries.Yishai Cohen - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (3):177-195.
    According to the Felix Culpa Theodicy, worlds containing atonement and incarnation are of such great value that God is justified in actualizing such a world, despite all of the moral evil that has accompanied it. Focusing upon Alvin Plantinga’s articulation of this theodicy, I argue against FCT on the basis of normative ethical considerations. On the one hand, the deontic status of at least some actions depends upon the consequences of those actions. On the other hand, the existence of atonement (...)
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  35.  67
    Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implications.Adeboye Godwin - manuscript
    Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implications Abstract The divine foreknowledge-freewill dilemma has been the focus of much recent philosophico-theological discourse, even though the problem is centuries old. In the attempt to solve the dilemma, there have been some modifications on the traditional definition of divine foreknowledge. Some of the philosophical attempts to solve the dilemma include Molinism, Boethianism, Ochamism, Opentheism and others. While these attempts are noteworthy, their basic flaws lie in their methodologies (...)
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  36.  77
    Tomás de Vío, Cayetano. Sobre la providencia y el hado.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2018 - Revista Española de Teología 78:459-500.
    Spanish translation of Cajetan’s commentary on quaestiones 22 and 116 of the first part of the 'Summa'. The translator precedes the text of Cajetan with a broad introduction in which he compares the views of the author with the interpretation of the same problems by Báñez in the context of the 'De Auxiliis' controversy. According to the translator, Báñez would have been more faithful to the thought of Saint Thomas than Cajetan. However, the core of the contribution of this great (...)
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  37.  68
    La moción divina ante la contingencia y la libertad de las creaturas según santo Tomás y Domingo Báñez.Torrijos-Castrillejo David - 2020 - Scripta Fulgentina 30:39-64.
    Against an interpretation of Saint Thomas Aquinas’s thought that understands the divine motion of the created will only providing a generic impulse to it, in this article is defended that God moves specifically for every good choice. This motion doesn’t prevent at all the contingency of creatures and neither freedom of choice. Is also shown how Báñez’s thought is quite faithful to Saint Thomas in this and doesn’t intend anything else but simply to make it known and defend it from (...)
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  38. Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implication.Adeboye Godwin Oriyomi - manuscript
    Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implications Abstract The divine foreknowledge-freewill dilemma has been the focus of much recent philosophico-theological discourse, even though the problem is centuries old. In the attempt to solve the dilemma, there have been some modifications on the traditional definition of divine foreknowledge. Some of the philosophical attempts to solve the dilemma include Molinism, Boethianism, Ochamism, Opentheism and others. While these attempts are noteworthy, their basic flaws lie in their methodologies (...)
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