Meta-Externalism vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500 (2013)
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Abstract
We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta- internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation.
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2013
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Archival date: 2012-07-25
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Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.

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Intuitions in Philosophical Semantics.Cohnitz, Daniel & Haukioja, Jussi

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2012-07-25

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