We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta- internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the (...) study of the reference relation. (shrink)

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation, may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering (...) an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot. (shrink)

Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgement is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgement is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgements to doxastic dispositions, which (...) are related to motivation in a fairly tenuous sense. It is also argued that this approach currently lacks a plausible and informative account of the nature and workings of these doxastic dispositions, and, hence, an explanation of the range of phenomena internalist theses typically set out to explain. The most promising route for developing such an account, based on recent expressivist work, is investigated and found inadequate for the task. (shrink)

Metaepistemology may be partly characterized as the study of the nature, aims, methods and legitimacy of epistemology. Given such a characterization, most epistemological views and theories have an important metaepistemological aspect or, at least, a number of more or less explicit metaepistemological commitments. Metaepistemology is an important area of philosophy because it exemplifies that philosophy must serve as its own meta-discipline by continuously reflecting critically on its own methods and aims. Even though philosophical methodology may be regarded as a (...) branch of epistemology, epistemology itself is as much in need of metaphilosophical examination as other core disciplines of philosophy. Moreover, metaepistemology is important because it bears significantly on first-order epistemological questions. Indeed, many of the most prominent contemporary debates in philosophy have a distinctly metaepistemological aspect. For example, the debates between rationalists and empiricists do not only concern the nature of cognition of specific areas – perception, arithmetic, logic and so forth – but also general metaepistemological questions about whether it is realistic and desirable that epistemology be naturalized. Likewise, the debates between epistemic internalists and externalists include metaepistemological debates about whether the proper focus for epistemology should be the cognizer’s rational perspective or some more objective property of the cognizer’s epistemic position. Similarly, the debates concerning the relationship between folk epistemology and epistemological theorizing include metaepistemological debates about how empirical data concerning folk epistemology should impact epistemology itself. Each of these debates provides an example of how first-order epistemological issues are deeply connected, and sometimes inseparable from, metaepistemological considerations. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to display and debate the main interpretive and philosophical claims defended by Simon Robertson in his Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics. Robertson presents innovative and stimulating arguments that might interest primarily readers willing to better understand the Nietzschean moral theory and researchers interested in broader issues of contemporary moral theory, particularly in the analytic tradition. The author covers the main debates in the area, taking sides in disputes going on in normative theory, metaethics, moral (...) psychology and Nietzschean studies. Robertson mobilizes a set of interpretive and (purely) philosophical arguments, which deliver to the reader a final picture of Nietzsche’s perfectionist ideal. It is a theoretically consistent ideal that can be endorsed as a relevant alternative in the contemporary landscape of ethical theories. This alternative involves a powerful critique of the normative authority of morality, a sentimentalist moral psychology, a conception of the good life that combines the goods of excellence and flourishing, a modest conception of normativity that brings together internalist and externalist elements, and, finally, an irrealist metaethics that differs both from realism (which presupposes ontologically robust normative properties)and from reformist views (such as fictionalism and non-cognitivism). The article reconstructs Robertson's main arguments in favour of this set of claims, seeking to assess (1) to what extent they are convincing, both in their philosophical and interpretive ambitions and (2) how capable his methodological choices are to address critical challenges. (shrink)

The fact of evolution raises important questions for the position of moral realism, because the origin of our moral dispositions in a contingent evolutionary process is on the face of it incompatible with the view that our moral beliefs track independent moral truths. Moreover, this meta-ethical worry seems to undermine the normative justification of our moral norms and beliefs. If we don’t have any grounds to believe that the source of our moral beliefs has any ontological authority, how can (...) our moral judgments be justified in an objective way? In this chapter, I argue that while traditional moral realism is untenable in the light of evolution, normative justification should not be handed the same fate. It is precisely in the fact that moral norms and beliefs are grounded in evolved, innate and therefore universally shared intuitions that those norms and beliefs can be objective-for-us. Such an internalist justification allows us to differentiate moral right from wrong, not because some feature of the external world forces us to acknowledge this, but because our moral nature forces us to project this moral judgment on the world. What’s more, guided by this innate moral compass we can both assess and realize moral progress. (shrink)

This article responds to the two replies, published in this issue, to my article “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have It, We Can’t Get It, and We Should Be Very, Very Sad,” published in the first issue of this journal. In the first reply, Turp, Hollinshead, and Rowe present an internalist challenge to my account of value, and a relational conception of the self as a challenge to my premise that leading a life includes everything you do and aim at within (...) the project, effort, or enterprise of living and leading a life. I respond to the internalist challenge by showing it does not succeed in inserting values into acts. I respond to the relational conception of the self by noting that, regardless of the nature of the self, the project of leading a life includes all the things you do and aim at within that project, effort, or enterprise. Thus, we can accept a relational account of the self and allow for other-regarding values but that does not change the location of our pursuit of those values: they remain located within the meta-project of leading a life, leaving the meta-project of leading and living a life with nowhere to reach for a point. In the second reply, Cowan argues against feeling sad about life’s pointlessness. In response, I argue that sad facts warrant sadness. I further argue that there are reasons other than happiness to value truth, including the very, very sad truth about the ultimate pointlessness of our lives. (shrink)

Abstract This chapter addresses the meta-ethical and psychological implications of Murdoch’s epistemic internalism—her claim that moral responsiveness is a condition of reliable and accurate moral evaluations. Part 1 examines Murdoch’s view that moral judgments feature a quasi-experiential phenomenology analogous to that of certain perceptual ones. Focussing on the phenomenology of our perception-based judgments of certain aspectual properties (e.g., pictorial and musical ones) it argues that such judgments support both Murdoch’s analogy and the internalism she takes it to (...) imply. In Part 2 this chapter considers Murdoch’s internalism as a psychological thesis, assessing it in view of several empirical studies of psychopathic subjects. It argues that the psychopath’s distinctive complex of cognitive and motivational deficits supports Murdoch’s conviction that moral judgment and moral motivation are interdependent. Just as Murdoch believed, many of our ordinary, non-pathological moral beliefs seem to be the natural progeny of our responsiveness to other persons, and so inherit the intrinsic power that others have to move us. (shrink)

This paper raises a dilemma for Skorupski’s meta-normative outlook in The Domain of Reasons and explores some escape routes, recommending a more thoroughgoing Kantianism as the best option. §1 argues that we cannot plausibly combine Skorupski’s spontaneity-based epistemology of normativity with his cognition-independent view of normative truth. §§2–4 consider whether we should keep the epistemology and revise the metaphysics, opting for constructivism. While Skorupski’s negative case for his spontaneity-based epistemology is found wanting, it is suggested that a better argument (...) for keeping the epistemology and switching to Kantian constructivism can be given from a thesis he finds appealing—viz., ‘cognitive internalism’. While this premise is not, it is argued, obviously true, the view it supports does provide a good way to undergird Skorupski’s most interesting rationale for his reasons-first approach. (shrink)

What my suggestion rules out – if it is right – is the project of using some thesis about the conative or cognitive nature of motivation to argue for some thesis in meta-ethics. [...] facts about human motivation can be captured equally well with conativist or cognitivist language. And if that is true, then nothing about motivation either implies or rules out internalist moral realism.

Cunoașterea și informațiile (abordate în ansamblu sau în componentele lor distincte) sunt o preocupare majoră pentru tehnologia informației, sisteme de informații, știința informației și activitatea de informații în general. Procesul obţinerii, prelucrării şi analizei informaţiilor este o preocupare majoră pentru societatea actuală. În acest scop se folosesc procedee şi tehnici specifice pentru culegerea sau generarea de informaţii, prelucrarea acestora prin analiză şi sinteză, generarea de predicţii şi strategii, transmisia şi prezentarea informaţiilor factorilor de decizie, şi stocarea lor. Analiza informațiilor poate (...) fi caracterizată ca o intreprindere epistemologică, care urmărește să dezvolte o înțelegere clară a produselor cunoașterii. Perspectiva lui Polanyi despre cunoaștere servește unor considerații epistemologice fundamentale privind cunoașterea ca produs. Conceptul acesta de cunoaștere personală contribuie la o înțelegere mai profundă a cunoașterii. Perspectiva inversează ierarhia tradițională epistemologică. Cea mai mare provocare ar putea fi aceea de a convinge analiștii, conducerea și clienții lor de avantajele metodelor analitice structurale. O introducere treptată și naturală a acestor metode în fluxul obișnuit de procese și produse de informații ar putea fi mai eficientă decât realinierea la scară largă a gândirii. "Spațiul" activităților de informații s-a extins de la guverne ca actori statali la actori non-statali precum ONG-uri, instituții transnaționale și corporații, firme private și grupuri de interese și presiuni reprezentând comunități, concepte și ideologii diverse. Procesul de luare a deciziilor a devenit dispersat și granular. Actuala "democratizare" a serviciilor de informații are un impact major asupra colectării și analizei informațiilor, și a procesului decizional, determinând serviciile de informații să devină mai transparente, să ia în considerație dezbaterile publice a acțiunilor lor și să fie nevoite, uneori, să le justifice public. Un domeniu de care pot beneficia serviciile de informații este cel al managementului cunoașterii, implicat într-o dezbatere riguroasă asupra conceptelor, teoriilor și abordărilor cunoașterii și utilizării acestora. Noua paradigmă a serviciilor de informații impune schimbări majore la nivel organizațional și de pregătire a profesioniștilor pentru a înțelege și adopta noile concepte și tehnologii. -/- CUPRINS -/- Introducere 1 Cunoaștere - Definirea cunoașterii în filozofie - Comunicarea cunoașterii - Cunoașterea situată - Cunoașterea parțială - Cunoașterea științifică - 1.1 Ontologia - - Prezentare generală - - - Unele întrebări fundamentale - - - Concepte - - - Tipuri - - Istorie - - - Originile - - - - Parmenide și monismul - - - - Pluralismul ontologic - - - - Platon - - Ontologia în știință - - Alte subiecte ontologice - - - Formațiuni ontologice - - - Certitudine ontologică și epistemologică - - - Corpul și mediul, care pun la îndoială semnificația ființei - - - Ontologie și limbă - - - Ontologie și geografia umană - - - Realitate și actualitate - 1.2 Epistemologia - - Context și semnificație - - Cunoașterea - - - Cunoașterea că, cunoașterea cum și cunoașterea directă - - - Credință - - - Adevăr - - - Justificare - - - Problema lui Gettier - - - Externalism și internalism - - - Problema valorii - 1.3 Metodologii - - Prezentare generală - - - Procesul - - - - Formularea unei întrebări - - - - Ipoteza - - - - Predicția - - - - Testarea - - - - Analiza - - - Alte componente - - - - Replicarea - - - - Examinarea externă - - - - Înregistrarea și partajarea datelor - - Investigații științifice - - - Proprietățile cercetării științifice - - - Credințe și prejudecăți - - Elementele metodelor științifice idealizate - - Elemente ale metodei științifice - - - Caracterizări - - - Incertitudine - - - Definire - - - Dezvoltarea ipotezelor - - - Predicții din ipoteze - - - Experimente - - - Evaluare și îmbunătățire - - - Confirmarea - - Modele de cercetare științifică - - - Modelul clasic - - - Modelul ipotetico-deductiv - - - Modelul pragmatic - - Știința sistemelor complexe - 1.4 Hermeneutica - - Etimologie - - Hermeneutica filosofică - - - Hermeneutica modernă - - - - Schleiermacher (1768-1834) - - - - Dilthey (1833-1911) - - - - Heidegger (1889-1976) - - - - Gadamer (1900-2002) și colab. - - - - Noua hermeneutică - - - - Hermeneutica marxistă - - - - Hermeneutica obiectivă - 1.5 Filosofia limbajului - - Subiecte și sub-domenii majore - - - Compoziție și părți - - - Natura sensului - - - Referință - - - Mintea și limba - - - - Înnăscut și învățat - - - - Limba și gândul - - - Interacțiunea socială și limba - - Limbajul și filozofia continentală - - Probleme în filosofia limbajului - - - Imprecizia - - - Problema universalului și a compoziției - - - Natura limbajului - - - Abordări formale versus informale - - - Traducere și interpretare - 1.6 Logica - - Concepte - - Forma logică - 1.7 Filosofia logicii - - Adevăr - - - Purtătorii de adevăr - - - Adevăruri analitice, adevăr logic, valabilitate, consecință logică și implicare - 1.8 Declarații - - Declarația ca o entitate abstractă - 1.9 Dileme - - Utilizarea dilemei în logică - 1.10 Limitările cognitive - - Colin McGinn - - Friedrich Hayek - - John Tyndall - - Noam Chomsky - - Fenomene și obiecte și evenimente care nu se pot simți (numene) - - Noi misterieni - 1.11 Managementul cunoașterii - - Cercetare - - - Dimensiuni - - - Strategii - - - Motivații - 1.12 Ingineria cunoașterii - 1.13 Cunoașterea tacită în activitatea de informații 2 Date - Date, informații, cunoaștere și înțelepciune - În alte domenii - Memoria - - Procese - Înregistrări - 2.1 Referințe - - Etimologie și semnificații - - Semantică - - - Sens - - - Referent absent - - - Semnul lingvistic - - Informatică - - Biblioteci și știința informației - - Psihologie - - Școala - - Lege - - Artă - 2.2 Simboluri - - Etimologie - - Definiții - - Simbolurile și semiotica - - Psihanaliza, retorica și arhetipuri - - Paul Tillich - - Rolul contextului în simbolism - - - Semnificația istorică - - - Context - - Acțiuni simbolice - 2.3 Baze de date - - Baze de date guvernamentale - - - Uniunea Europeană - - Baze de date naționale ADN - 2.4 Metadate - - Definiție - - Identificarea - - - Exemplu - 2.5 Statistici - - Domeniu - - - Statistica matematică - - - Prezentare generală 3 Informații - Abordarea teoriei informației - Ca intrare senzorială - Ca reprezentare și complexitate - Informația ca mesaj - Informația ca determinant al transformărilor - Utilizarea studiului informațiilor - Informații mediate tehnologic - Informații sub forma unor fișiere - Semiotica - 3.1 Teoria informației - - Domeniul de studiu - - Evoluție - - Cantități de informații - - - Entropia unei surse de informații - - - Entropia comună - - - Entropia condițională (echivocă) - - - Informații reciproce (transinformații) - - - Divergența Kullback-Leibler (câștigul de informații) - - - Alte cantități - - Teoria codificării - - - Teoria surselor - - - - Rata - - - Capacitatea canalului - - - - Capacitatea anumitor modele de canale - - Aplicații în alte domenii - - - Utilizări în intelligence și aplicații de secretizare - - - Generarea numerelor pseudoaleatorii - - - Explorarea seismică - - - Semiotica - - - Aplicații diverse - - Unități de informație - - Unități primare - - Unități derivate din biți - - - Octet (byte) - - - Nibble - - - Cuvânt, bloc și pagină - - Exemple de valori - 3.2 Tehnologia informației - - Procesarea datelor - - - Stocarea datelor - - - Regăsirea datelor - - - Transmisia de date - - - Manipularea datelor - - Perspectiva - - - Perspectiva academică - - - Perspectiva etică - 3.3 Confidențialitatea informațiilor - - Tipuri de informații - - - Internet - - - Televiziunea prin cablu - - - Informații medicale - - - Informații financiare - - - Localizarea - - - Informații politice - - - Informații educaționale - - Legalitatea - 3.4 Informații sensibile - - Informații non sensibile - - - Informații publice - - - Informații de rutină în afaceri - - Tipuri de informații sensibile - - - Informații comerciale confidențiale - - - Informații clasificate - - Protecția legală împotriva divulgării neautorizate - - - Informații personale și private - - - Informații de afaceri confidențiale - - - Informații clasificate - - Informații sensibile digitale - 3.5 Informații clasificate - - Clasificări guvernamentale - - Nivele de clasificare - - - Top Secret (TS) - - - Secret - - - Confidențial - - - Resticționat - - - Neclasificat - - Permisul de acces - - Informații compartimentate - - Informații nucleare - - Internațional - - - Clasificările NATO - - - Organizații internaționale - - - Clasificări echivalente în diferite țări - - Clasificarea corporativă - - Protocolul luminii de trafic - 3.6 Tipuri de informații clasificate 4 Activitatea de informații - 4.1 Istoria activității de informații - 4.2 Știința informației - - Fundamente - - - Domeniu de aplicare și abordări - - - Definiții ale științei informației - - - Filozofia informației - - - Ontologie - - Extragerea informațiilor - - Vectori de cercetare și aplicații - - - Accesul la informații - - - Arhitectura informațiilor - - - Managementul informațiilor - - - Extragerea informațiilor - - - Societatea informațională - - - Reprezentarea cunoașterii și raționamentul - 4.3 Ontologia activității de informații - 4.4 Economia informațională - - Valoarea informațiilor - - Informațiile, mecanismul prețurilor și organizațiile - - Asimetria informațională - - - Semnalizare - - - Screening - - Bunuri informaționale - - - Împachetarea - 4.5 Economia informațiilor industriale - 4.6 Managementul informațiilor - - Aspecte teoretice - - - Teorii comportamentale și organizaționale - - - Teoria economică - - Managementul informațiilor strategice - - - Alinierea tehnologiilor și strategiilor de afacere cu managementul informațiilor - - - Un model de portofoliu contemporan pentru informații - - - Competențe pentru gestionarea calității informațiilor - - - Rezumat - - Operaționalizarea managementului informațiilor - - - Gestionarea schimbării necesare - - - Opera timpurie a lui Galbraith - - - Organizații matriceale - - Informații în sursă deschisă - - - Surse deschise pentru informații - - - Definiții pentru OSINT - - - Informații competitive - - - OSINT în afaceri - 4.7 Ciclul de informații - 4.8 Managementul ciclului de informații - - Prezentare generală - - - Definirea intelligence - - - Managementul ciclului de informații - - - Planificarea și prezentarea generală a direcției - - Cerințe - - - Naționale / strategice - - - Militare / operaționale - - Arhitectura intelligence - - - Bugetarea - - - Factori politici - - - Echilibrarea aplicării legii și securitatea națională - - - Public versus privat - - Planificarea colectărilor - - - CCIRM - - Emiterea de ordine și cereri - - - Prioritizare - - Alte subiecte - - - Folosirea politică greșită - - - Intelligence clandestină față de acțiunea sub acoperire - - - - Coordonarea acțiunii HUMINT și a acțiunii sub acoperire - - - - Riscuri și resurse comune - - Eșecurile din ciclul intelligence - - Alte cicluri - - - Bucla Boyd OODA - 4.9 Informațiile în afaceri (Business intelligence) - - Componente - - Istorie - - Depozitarea datelor - - Comparație cu inteligența competitivă - - Comparație cu cercetarea analitică de afaceri - - Aplicații într-o întreprindere - - Prioritizarea proiectelor - - Factori de succes în implementare - - - Suportul afacerii - - - Nevoile afacerii - - - Cantitatea și calitatea datelor disponibile - - Aspect utilizator - - Date semistructurate sau nestructurate - - - Date nestructurate vs. date semistructurate - - - Probleme cu date semistructurate sau nestructurate - - - Utilizarea de metadate - 4.10 Informații competitive - - Dezvoltare istorică - - Tendințe recente - - Domenii similare - - Etica - - Externalizarea - 4.11 Analogii cu alte discipline - - Știința - - Arheologia - - Afaceri - - Medicina 5 Comunitatea - 5.1 Sisteme informaționale - - Prezentare generală - - Tipuri de sisteme informaționale - 5.2 Comunicarea - - Comunicare nonverbală - - Comunicare verbală - - Comunicarea scrisă și dezvoltarea sa istorică - - Comunicare de afaceri - - Comunicare familială - - Comunicarea interpersonală - - Proiectarea comunicării - - Revoluția comunicării informațiilor - - Consultanța - 5.3 Societatea informațională - - Ce este? - - Creșterea informației în societate - - Dezvoltarea modelului societății informaționale - - - Tranziția economică - - Procesarea informațiilor sociale - 5.4 Guvernarea electronică - - Definirea e-guvernării - - Indicele ONU de dezvoltare a e-guvernării - - Exemple de e-guvernare și e-guvernanță - 5.5 Servicii secrete - - Relația dintre serviciile aceleiași țări - 5.6 Epistemologia activității de informații - 5.7 Comunități epistemice - 5.8 Comunități epistemice în UE - - Conceptul comunităților epistemice și limitele sale - - Agenția Europeană de Apărare - - Centrul UE de analiză a informațiilor - - Concluzie 6 Contrainformații - 6.1 Istoria spionajului - - Istoria timpurie - - Europa timpurie modernă - - Secolul al 18-lea - - - Franța - - - Marea Britanie - - - Spionaj industrial - - - Revoluția americană, 1775-1783 - - - Revoluția franceză și războaiele napoleoniene, 1793-1815 - - Secolul al 19-lea - - - Războiul civil american 1861-1865 - - - Informații militare - - - - Austria - - - - Marea Britanie - - - - Franța - - - - Germania - - - - Italia - - - - Rusia - - - Informații navale - - - Contraspionaj - - Secolul 20 - - - Agenții de informații civile - - - Primul Razboi Mondial - - - - Decodarea - - - Revoluția rusă - - - Perioada interbelică - - - - Germania nazistă - - - Al doilea razboi mondial - - - - MI6 în Marea Britanie - - - - MAGIC: SUA sparge codul japonez - - - - OSS în Statele Unite - - - - Contraspionaj - - - Războiul rece - - - Războiul post-rece - - - - Războiul din Irak 2003 - - - - Antiterorism - - - - - Israel - 6.2 Spionajul - - Țintele spionajului - - Metode și terminologie - - - Tehnologii și tehnici - 6.3 Contraspionaj - - Operațiunile de contraspionaj defensive - - - Contra-HUMINT - - - Motivații pentru divulgarea informațiilor și operațiunilor - - Teoria contraspionajului ofensiv - 6.4 Securitatea - - Clasificarea securității - - Concepte de securitate - - Managementul securității în organizații - 6.5 Terorism - - Lupta UE împotriva terorismului - - - Strategia UE - - - - Prevenirea - - - - Protecția - - - - Urmărirea - - - - Răspunsul - 6.6 O teorie a contrainformațiilor - - Definiții concurente - - Serviciile de informații - - - Factorii care determină comportamentul serviciilor de informații - - Contrainformații aplicate - - - Asistență politică - - - Suport operațional - - - Evidențierea documentelor - - Operațiuni de contrainformații - - Contraspionaj - - Domenii de studiu 7 Culegerea de informații - 7.1 Extragerea cunoașterii - - Privire de ansamblu - - Extragerea din surse structurate în RDF - - - Maparea din tabele/vizionări RDB în entități/atribute/valori RDF - - - Mapări complexe ale bazelor de date relaționale RDF - - - XML - - Extracția din surse naturale de limbaj - - - Extracție de informații (EI) tradițională - - - Extracția de informații bazată pe ontologie (EIBO) - - - Învățarea ontologiei - - - Adnotare semantică - - - Instrumente - - Descoperirea de cunoștințe - 7.2 Colectarea de informații umane - - Surse - - Operații de bază HUMINT - - - Pregătirea ofițerilor pentru lucrul în culturi - - - Diferențierea de bază pe tip de subiect - - - Selectarea surselor potențiale - - - Identificare - - - Tipuri de interviuri - - - - Informarea (debriefing) - - - - Interogare - - - Planificarea interviului inițial - - - - Caracteristicile interogatorului (anchetatorilor)â - - - - Sprijinirea nevoilor - - - - Atitudini ale subiectului - - - Planificarea interviurilor suplimentare - - Principii de interogare - - - Raport de construcție - - - Utilizarea înregistratoarelor - - - Lucrul cu interpreți - - Surse recrutate / de încredere - - - Spionaj - - Analiza relațiilor dintre subiecții HUMINT - 7.3 Investigații - - Surse clasice - - - Deducția - - - Inducția - - - Abducția - - Investigații criminale - 7.4 Profilarea infractorilor - 7.5 Informația asimetrică - - Modele de informații asimetrice - - Selecția adversă - - - Semnalizare (Signaling) - - - Investigare (Screening) - - Aplicarea asimetriei de informații în domeniul cercetării - - Surse de asimetrie informațională - - Efectul blogurilor asupra asimetriei informaționale - - Efectul inteligenței artificiale asupra asimetriei informaționale - 7.6 Proiectarea mecanismului - - Intuiția - - Proiectarea - - - Mecanismul - - - Principiul revelației - - - Gradul de implementare - 7.7 Raportul circular - - Exemple specifice - 7.8 Liberul acces la informații 8 Supravegherea - Tipuri - - Calculator - - Telefoane - 8.1 Camere de supraveghere - 8.2 Camere IP - - Standarde - - Avantaje ale camerelor IP - - Dezavantaje potențiale - 8.3 Camere web - - Probleme de intimitate - - Efecte asupra societății moderne - - Utilizări ale camerelor web - - - Monitorizare video pentru îngrijirea copiilor - - - Comerț - - - Apeluri video și videoconferințe - - - Video de securitate - - - Clipuri video și fotografii - - - Dispozitive de control al intrărilor - - Tehnologia camerelor web - 8.4 Supravegherea în IR - - Applicații - - Specificații - - Cum funcționează supravegherea în IR - 8.5 Supravegherea în masă - - Supravegherea în masă în Uniunea Europeană - - - INDECT - - - HIDE - 8.6 Supravegherea aeriană - 8.7 Supravegherea calculatoarelor - - Emanații - - Policeware - 8.8 Interceptarea convorbirilor telefonice - - Aspecte legale - - Supravegherea electronică a telefoanelor - 8.9 Identificarea automată și captura de date (AIDC) - 8.10 Captarea datelor din documente tipărite - - Cele mai cunoscute tipuri de aplicații - - - ABBYY - - - Accusoft - - - AnyDoc Software - - - Cvision Technologies - - - Expervision - - - I.R.I.S. Group - - - LEADTOOLS - - - Nuance Communications - - - PSIGEN Software - 8.11 Ingineria securității - - Calificări - - Atitudini privind securitatea - - Practici de bază - - Subdomenii - 8.12 Securitatea calculatoarelor - - Securitate prin proiectare - 8.13 Biometria - - Sisteme biometrice adaptive - - Direcții noi de dezvoltare - - - Accesul în rețele publice - - Supravegherea biometrică - - Funcționalitatea biometrică 9 Analiza informațiilor - Prezentare generală - Metoda analitică - - Stabilirea obiectivelor pentru o analiză de informații - - - Fii îndrăzneț și cinstit - - - Acord privind conținutul - - - Orientarea spre clienți - - - Orientarea spre colegi - - Organizând ceea ce aveți - Natura analizei - - Tipuri de raționament - - - Inducție: căutarea cauzalității - - - Deducția: aplicarea generalului - - - Intuiția instruită - - - Metoda științifică - - Metode de analiză - - - Analiza oportunităților - - - Analiza cuiului de siguranță - - - Analiza ipotezelor concurente - - - Analogie - Procesul analitic - - Definirea problemei - - Generarea de ipoteze - - Determinarea nevoilor de informații și colectarea de informații - - Evaluarea surselor - - Evaluarea ipotezelor (teste) - - Producția și ambalarea - - Evaluarea colegială - - Feedback de la client și evaluarea producției - Nu uitați niciodată utilizatorul final - 9.1 Conceptualizarea funcțiilor analizei de informații - 9.2 Metodologii în analiza informațiilor - 9.3 Euristica în analiza de informații - - Puterea de expertiză - - Paradoxul de expertiză - - Sarcinile analiștilor de informații - - Pro și contra echipelor - - Tehnologii - - Metodologii analitice - - Euristica - 9.4 Raționamentul inductiv - - Raționamentul inductiv vs. raționamentul deductiv - - Critici - - - Prejudecăți - - Tipuri de raționament inductiv - - - Generalizare - - - Silogismul statistic - - - Inducția simplă - - - Argumentul din analogie - - - Inferența cauzală - - - Predicția - - Inferența bayesiană - - Inferența inductivă - 9.5 Evaluarea informațiilor - - Procesul de evaluare a informațiilor - - Ciclul informațiilor centrice specifice - - Evaluarea informațiilor criminale - - - Utilizarea de Armata SUA - - - Procesul CRIMINT - - Analiza informațiilor criminale - 9.6 Abordarea orientată spre țintă a ciclului de informații - - Analiza orientată pe țintă - - - Procesul de intelligence - - Crearea modelului - - - Modele în intelligence - - - Surse de informații de intelligence - - - Popularea modelului - - Analiza organizațională - - Aplicarea abordării centrate pe țintă în intelligence - - Critici - 9.7 Analiza ipotezelor competitive - - Proces - - Puncte forte - - Puncte slabe - - - Analiza structurată a ipotezelor concurente - - - Alte abordări ale formalismului - 9.8 Analiza indicatorilor - - Istorie - - Elemente de analiză a indicatorilor - - - Tehnici analitice structurate - - - Cerință - - - Categorii - - - Factori - - - Scenarii - - - Indicatori - - Proces - - Beneficii - - Puncte slabe - - Tehnici analitice structurate înrudite - 9.9 Cuvinte de probabilitate estimativă - - Istorie - - - Informații - - - - Eșecuri de politică și de informații legate de CPE - - Reformele metodologiei - - - Cuantificarea fiabilității sursei și a încrederii analitice - - - Analiza stocastică - - - Standardizare - - - - Experiența Mercyhurst cu CPE standardizate - 9.10 Predicții - - Predicții informale pe bază de ipoteze - - Sondaje de opinie - - Statistici - - Supranaturalul (profeții) - - Predicția în știință - - Finanțe 10 Media și rețele sociale - Studiul - Istoria - Nivele de analiză a rețelelor sociale - - Nivel micro - - Nivel mediu - - Nivel macro - Legături teoretice - - Teorii importate - - Teorii specifice - Decalaje structurale - Clustere de cercetare - - Comunicare - - Comunitate - - Rețele complexe - - Rețele criminale - - Difuzarea inovațiilor - - Demografie - - Sociologia economică - - Sănătate - - Ecologie umană - - Limba și lingvistica - - Rețele literare - - Studii organizatorice - - Capitalul social - - Poziția și beneficiile rețelei - - Media socială - Servicii în rețele sociale - - Impactul social - - Caracteristici tipice - - Caracteristici suplimentare - 10.1 Media socială - - Clasificarea mediei sociale - - - Viralitate - - Bloguri - - Comunicarea prin calculator - - Defăimarea - - Jurnalism - - - Mass media - - Facebook - - Twitter - - YouTube - 10.2 Știri - - Caracteristici - - - Noutatea - - - Marfă - - - Tonul - - - Valoarea de noutate a știrii - - Media de știri - - - Ziare - - - Televiziunea - - - Internet - 10.3 Psihologia mulțimilor - 10.4 Manipularea prin media - - Contexte - - - Activism - - - Publicitate - - - Farsa - - - Propaganda - - - Război psihologic - - - Relații publice - - Tehnici - - - Marketingul motoarelor de căutare - - Profesioniști în conformitate - - - Tehnici - 10.5 Psihologia rețelelor sociale - - Neuroplasticitatea - 10.6 Analiza rețelelor sociale 11 Etica - Definirea eticii - 11.1 Relativismul moral - - Variații - - - Descriptiv - - - - Meta-etic - - - - Normativ - 11.2 Utilitarism - - Etimologie - - Fundal istoric - - - Filozofia chineză - - - Filosofia occidentală - 11.3 Dileme etice - - Exemple de dileme etice - - Răspunsuri la argumente - - Dileme morale - - - Exemple - - - Conceptul - - - Probleme - 11.4 Codul de conduită FBI - 11.5 Meta-etica - - Întrebări meta-etice - - Teoriile semantice - - - Centralism și non-centralism - 11.6 Filosofia dreptului - - Jurisprudență analitică - - Jurisprudența normativă - - Abordări filosofice ale problemelor juridice Încheiere Resurse Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . 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Abstract: The field of artificial general intelligence (AGI) safety is quickly growing. However, the nature of human values, with which future AGI should be aligned, is underdefined. Different AGI safety researchers have suggested different theories about the nature of human values, but there are contradictions. This article presents an overview of what AGI safety researchers have written about the nature of human values, up to the beginning of 2019. 21 authors were overviewed, and some of them have several theories. A (...) theory classification method is suggested, where the theories are judged according to the level of their complexity and behaviorists-internalists scale, as well as the level of their generality-humanity. We suggest that a multiplicity of well-supported theories means that the nature of human values is difficult to define, and some meta-level theory is needed. (shrink)

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen | : This paper explores a novel metaethical theory according to which value judgments express conditional beliefs held by those who make them. Each value judgment expresses the belief that something is the case on condition that something else is the case. The paper aims to reach a better understanding of this view and to highlight some of the challenges that lie ahead. The most pressing of these revolves around the correct understanding of the nature of the relevant (...) cognitive attitudes. It is suggested that the distinction between “dormant attitudes” and “occurrent attitudes” helps us to understand these conditional beliefs. | : Cet article explore une nouvelle théorie méta-éthique selon laquelle les jugements de valeur expriment les croyances conditionnelles des sujets qui les font. Chaque jugement de valeur exprimerait la croyance selon laquelle quelque chose est le cas à la condition que quelque chose d’autre le soit. L’objectif de cet article est de parvenir à une meilleure compréhension de ce point de vue et de souligner certaines de ses difficultés. La plus urgente d’entre elles concerne la compréhension adéquate de la nature des attitudes cognitives pertinentes. Nous suggérons que la distinction entre « attitudes dormantes » et « attitudes occurrentes » permettrait de mieux comprendre les croyances conditionnelles. (shrink)

Taking my cue from Michael Smith, I try to extract a decent argument for non-cognitivism from the text of the Treatise. I argue that the premises are false and that the whole thing rests on a petitio principi. I then re-jig the argument so as to support that conclusion that Hume actually believed (namely that an action is virtuous if it would excite the approbation of a suitably qualified spectator). This argument too rests on false premises and a begged question. (...) Thus the Motivation Argument fails BOTH as an argument for noncognitivism AND as an argument for what Hume actually believed, that moral distinctions are not derived from reason and that moral properties are akin to secondary qualities. So far as the Motivation Argument is concerned, both cognitivists and rationalists can rest easy. Themes: 1) Hume’s Slavery of Reason thesis is only defensible if passions are not only desires but sometimes dispositions to acquire desires (DTADs). 2) A desire for our good on the whole, which Humeans need to posit to fend off apparent counterexamples to the Slavery of Reason Thesis, does not sit well with the Humean theory of how novel desires arise (an objection due originally to Reid). 3) Hume is wrong to suppose that ‘abstract or demonstrative reasoning never influences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects’ as the examples of Russell and Hobbes convincingly demonstrate. This ironic as both Russell and Hobbes subscribed to the Slavery of Reason Thesis. 4) I critique Michael Smith’s critique of motivational externalism. (shrink)

An internalist slogan says that justification depends on internal factors. But which factors are those? This paper examines some common motivations favoring internalism over externalism, and says they are compatible with including dispositional and even past mental states in the internal.

Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to reject or (...) modify motivational internalism. Instead of attempting to diagnose the motivational failure of the amoral agent or restrict the internalist thesis in the face of these examples, I argue that we should critically examine the assumptions that underlie the challenge. Such an examination reveals that the examples smuggle in substantive assumptions that the internalist has no reason to accept. This argument has two important implications for the debate in moral motivation: first, it reveals that the motivational externalist needs a new argumentative strategy; and second, it shows that there is nothing especially problematic about a formulation of the thesis that captures the core internalist intuition that first-person moral judgements are necessarily accompanied by motivation. (shrink)

Internalists face the following challenge: what is it about an agent's internal states that explains why only these states can play whatever role the internalist thinks these states are playing? Internalists have frequently appealed to a special kind of epistemic access that we have to these states. But such claims have been challenged on both empirical and philosophical grounds. I will argue that internalists needn't appeal to any kind of privileged access claims. Rather, internalist conditions are important because of the (...) way in which we expect them to act as causal mediators between states of the world, on the one hand, and our beliefs and actions on the other. (shrink)

According to the ‘Evidential Internalists’, one’s evidence supervenes on one’s non-factive mental states. ‘Evidential Externalists’ deny that, and allow for external factors to determine what evidence one has. After clarifying what Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism entail, and what they are silent on, this chapter provides an opinionated overview of the main arguments and motivations behind Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism. It concludes that Evidential Externalism is a more promising view.

I describe and motivate Rational Internalism, a principle concerning the relationship between motivating reasons (which explain actions) and normative reasons (which justify actions). I use this principle to construct a novel argument against Objectivist theories of normative reasons, which hold that facts about normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of an independently specified class of normative or evaluative facts. I then argue for an alternative theory of normative reasons, the Reasoning View, which is consistent with both Rational (...) class='Hi'>Internalism and one standard motivation for Objectivism. (shrink)

Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as (...) a large majority of subjects were willing to attribute moral understanding to an agent lacking moral motivation. However, our attempts to replicate this study yielded quite different results, and we identified a number of problems with Nichols' experimental paradigm. The results from a series of surveys designed to rule out these problems show that people are more willing to attribute moral understanding than mor.. (shrink)

According to epistemological internalism, the rationality of a belief supervenes purely on "internal facts" about the thinker's mind. But what are "internal facts"? Why does the rationality of a belief supervene on them? The standard answers are unacceptable. This paper proposes new answers. "Internal facts" are facts about the thinker's nonfactive mental states. The rationality of a belief supervenes on such internal facts because we need rules of belief revision that we can follow directly, not by means of following (...) any other rules, and the proximate explanation of any belief revision always consists of such internal facts. (shrink)

One of the most discussed views in metaethics is Moral Internalism, according to which there is a conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation to act. Moral Internalism is regarded to yield the prime argument against Moral Cognitivism and for Moral Non-Cognitivism. In this paper, I investigate the significance of the corresponding claim in metaaesthetics. I pursue two lines of argument. First, I argue that Aesthetic Internalism – the view that there is a conceptually necessary connection (...) between aesthetic value judgments and motivation to act – is mistaken. It follows, I maintain, that the most important argument against Aesthetic Cognitivism, and for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, is flawed, and that the latter view presumably is incorrect. Second, I argue that considerations with regard to Aesthetic Internalism give rise to two normative puzzles with relevance for the normative domain in general. The most plausible solution to these puzzles entails, I maintain, that we need to revise the established view about normative judgments. Moreover, I propose a novel externalist account of aesthetic value judgments. (shrink)

A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the (...) internalist thesis—albeit one that most internalists have adhered to. I show that internalism is entirely compatible with the EMH. This view should prompt us to reconsider the characterization of internalism, and in conclusion I make some brief remarks about how that project might proceed. (shrink)

A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing (...) justifies retaining belief. Then I defend the attempt from dispositionalism, which assigns a justifying role to dispositions, from some key objections. But by drawing on cognitive psychological research I show that, for internalism, the problem of stored beliefs remains. (shrink)

By integrating Bernard Williams’s internalism about reasons with his later thought, this article casts fresh light on internalism and reveals what wider concerns it speaks to. To be consistent with Williams’s later work, I argue, internalism must align with his deference to the phenomenology of moral deliberation and with his critique of ‘moral self-indulgence’. Key to this alignment is the idea that deliberation can express the agent’s motivations without referring to them; and that internalism is not (...) a normative claim, but an example of sense-making from ‘the ethnographic stance’. This leaves a worry over whether moral conviction can coexist with an internalist understanding of reasons. Here too, however, Williams’s later thought provides an answer. Differentiating corrosive from corroborative sense-making, it elucidates how internalism, though not normative, can nonetheless affect our confidence in reason statements, thereby informing how we deliberate and how we address those whose motivations differ from our own. (shrink)

The meta-ethical commitments of folk respondents – specifically their commitment to the objectivity of moral claims – have recently become subject to empirical scrutiny. Experimental findings suggest that people are meta-ethical pluralists: There is both inter- and intrapersonal variation with regard to people’s objectivist commitments. What meta-ethical implications, if any, do these findings have? I point out that current research does not directly address traditional meta-ethical questions: The methods used and distinctions drawn by experimenters do not (...) perfectly match those of meta-ethicists. However, I go on to argue that, in spite of this mismatch, the research findings should be of interest to moral philosophers, including meta-ethicists. Not only do these findings extend the field of moral psychology with new data and hypotheses, but they also provide tentative evidence that touches on the adequacy of theses in moral semantics and moral metaphysics. Specifically, they put pressure on argum... (shrink)

Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can (...) be correct, as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. -/- My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address. (shrink)

Both motivational internalism and externalism need to explain why sometimes moral judgments tend to motivate us. In this paper, I argue that Dreier’ second-order desire model cannot be a plausible externalist alternative to explain the connection between moral judgments and motivation. I explain that the relevant second-order desire is merely a constitutive requirement of rationality because that desire makes a set of desires more unified and coherent. As a rational agent with the relevant second-order desire is disposed towards coherence, (...) she will have some motivation to act in accordance with her moral judgments. Dreier’s second-order desire model thus collapses into a form of internalism and cannot be a plausible externalist option to explain the connection between moral judgments and motivation. (shrink)

In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual’s justification for a belief is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the contents of her beliefs are true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer’s justification for beliefs acquired through testimony is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons to think that the contents of the speaker’s testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons are (...) alike with respect to what they have justification to believe. Testimony should be thought no different: hearers that are alike with respect to reflectively accessible reasons to think that a speaker’s testimony is true are alike with respect to their justification for beliefs based upon that testimony. But it has been recently argued that this view faces powerful counterexamples. So the central question is this: assuming that a hearer can acquire justification to believe a proposition through the testimony of a speaker, can epistemic internalism provide the resources to explain how such justification is possible? My aim in this paper is to address these counterexamples, and in so doing, defend epistemic internalist accounts of testimony. (shrink)

According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma – (...) phenomenal conservatism, BonJour’s classical foundationalism, and Fumerton’s classical foundationalism. I argue that, of these three, only the last seems to avoid getting impaled on one or the other horn of the dilemma. I end by responding to some concerns with Fumerton’s account. (shrink)

Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition is compatible with (...) “internalism” about rationality, and with a form of “pragmatic encroachment” on the conditions of rational outright belief. An interpretation is given of this definition, and especially of the sense of ’because’ that it involves. On this interpretation, this definition entails that both safety and adherence are necessary conditions on knowledge; it supports a kind of contextualism about terms like ‘knowledge’; and it provides resources to defend safety, adherence, and contextualism, against some recent objections. (shrink)

I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence.

Judgment internalism about evaluative judgments is the view that there is a necessary internal connection between evaluative judgments and motivation understood as desires. The debate about judgment internalism has reached a standoff some time ago. In this paper, I outline a new argument for judgment internalism. This argument does not rely on intuitions about cases, but rather it has the form of an inference to the best explanation. I argue that the best philosophical explanations of how we (...) know what we desire require that judgment internalism is true, which gives us a good reason to believe that judgment internalism is true. (shrink)

An astonishing volume and diversity of evidence is available for many hypotheses in the biomedical and social sciences. Some of this evidence—usually from randomized controlled trials (RCTs)—is amalgamated by meta-analysis. Despite the ongoing debate regarding whether or not RCTs are the ‘gold-standard’ of evidence, it is usually meta-analysis which is considered the best source of evidence: meta-analysis is thought by many to be the platinum standard of evidence. However, I argue that meta-analysis falls far short of (...) that standard. Different meta-analyses of the same evidence can reach contradictory conclusions. Meta-analysis fails to provide objective grounds for intersubjective assessments of hypotheses because numerous decisions must be made when performing a meta-analysis which allow wide latitude for subjective idiosyncrasies to influence its outcome. I end by suggesting that an older tradition of evidence in medicine—the plurality of reasoning strategies appealed to by the epidemiologist Sir Bradford Hill—is a superior strategy for assessing a large volume and diversity of evidence. (shrink)

In our thought, we employ rules of inference and belief-forming methods more generally. For instance, we (plausibly) employ deductive rules such as Modus Ponens, ampliative rules such as Inference to the Best Explanation, and perceptual methods that tell us to believe what perceptually appears to be the case. What explains our entitlement to employ these rules and methods? This chapter considers the motivations for broadly internalist answers to this question. It considers three such motivations—one based on simple cases, one based (...) on a general conception of epistemic responsibility, and one based on skeptical scenarios. The chapter argues that none of these motivations is successful. The first two motivations lead to forms of internalism—Extreme Method Internalism and Defense Internalism—that are too strong to be tenable. The third motivation motivates Mental Internalism (Mentalism), which does not fit with plausible accounts of entitlement. (shrink)

According to internalism about rationality, the ir/rationality of a subject depends only on how things appear from her subjective perspective. According to culpabilism, rationality is a normative standard such that violations of rationality are (at least sometimes) blameworthy. According to a classical line of reasoning, culpabilism entails internalism. I argue that, to the contrary, culpabilism entails that internalism is false. The internalist cannot accommodate the possibility of culpable irrationality.

Philosophers are divided over moral internalism, the claim that moral judgement entails some motivation to comply with that judgement. Against moral internalism, externalists defend the conceptual coherence of scenarios in which an individual makes genuine moral judgements but is entirely unmoved by them. This is amoralist skepticism and these scenarios can be called amoralist scenarios. While the coherence of amoralist scenarios is disputed, philosophers seem to agree that the coherence of amoralist scenarios is not affected by whether the (...) amoralist is described as having moral knowledge or mere belief. But recent experimental research challenges this assumption. When evaluating amoralist scenarios, people’s intuitions lean towards externalism when the amoralist is described as knowing that X is morally wrong, whereas people’s intuitions lean towards internalism when the amoralist is described as believing that X is morally wrong. Call this the factivity effect. In this paper, I argue that the factivity effect is unlikely to be explained as an experimental artifact and that as a consequence, the traditional dispute over moral internalism and amoralist skepticism may need a major overhaul. The results of three studies testing the factivity effect provide support for this thesis. Implications of these results for the traditional debate over moral internalism are discussed. (shrink)

This companion is aimed at specialists and non-specialists in the philosophy of mind and features 13 commissioned research articles on core topics by leading figures in the field. My contribution is on internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. I.

In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a strong version of internalism is able to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the notion that people who suffer from certain mental conditions need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, a weaker form of internalism avoids this difficulty, but fails to explain the mentioned conception concerning (...) moral language and motivation. Moreover, I argue that externalism in conjunction with a pragmatic claim which employs Grice’s concept of generalized conversational implicature is able to account for both these conceptions and that it consequently avoids the internalist dilemma. Thus, there is reason to think that this view is preferable to internalism. (shrink)

Standard motivational internalism is the claim that by a priori or conceptual necessity, a psychological state is a moral opinion only if it is suitably related to moral motivation. Many philosophers, the authors of this paper included, have assumed that this claim is supported by intuitions to the effect that amoralists—people not suitably related to such motivation—lack moral opinions proper. In this paper we argue that this assumption is mistaken, seeming plausible only because defenders of standard internalism have (...) failed to consider the possibility that our own actual moral practice as a whole is one where moral opinions fail to motivate in the relevant way. To show this, we present a cynical hypothesis according to which the tendency for people to act in accordance with their moral opinions ultimately stems from a desire to appear moral. This hypothesis is most likely false, but we argue, on both intuitive and methodological grounds, that it is conceptually possible that it correctly describes our actual moral opinions. If correct, this refutes standard motivational internalism. Further, we propose an explanation of why many have seemingly internalist intuitions. Such intuitions, we argue, stem from the fact that standard amoralist cases allow (or even suggest) that we apprehend the putative moral opinions of amoralists as radically different from how we understand actual paradigmatic moral opinions. Given this, it is reasonable to understand them as not being moral opinions proper. However, since these intuitions rest on substantial a posteriori assumptions about actual moral opinions, they provide no substantial a priori constraints on theories of moral judgment. (shrink)

This chapter first surveys general issues in the epistemic internalism / externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. -/- The second part of the chapter will examine the internalism / externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief.

Justin Fisher (2007) has presented a novel argument designed to prove that all forms of mental internalism are false. I aim to show that the argument fails with regard to internalism about phenomenal experiences. The argument tacitly assumes a certain view about the ontology of phenomenal experience, which (inspired by Alva Noe) I call the “snapshot conception of phenomenal experience.” After clarifying what the snapshot conception involves, I present Fisher with a dilemma. If he rejects the snapshot conception, (...) then his argument against phenomenal internalism collapses. But if he embraces the snapshot conception, then internalists may argue that in light of the snapshot conception, their view is not so implausible—and that if Fisher still disagrees, he owes us an argument that shows why phenomenal internalism is false even given the snapshot conception. I conclude the paper by showing that Fisher cannot escape my criticism by adjusting his argument so that it no longer depends on the snapshot conception. (shrink)

A popular evidentialist argument against pragmatism is based on reason internalism: the view that a normative reason for one to φ must be able to guide one in normative deliberation whether to φ. In the case of belief, this argument maintains that, when deliberating whether to believe p, one must deliberate whether p is true. Since pragmatic considerations cannot weigh in our deliberation whether p, the argument concludes that pragmatism is false. I argue that evidentialists fail to recognize that (...) the question whether to φ is essentially the question whether one should φ. Furthermore, the question of whether one should believe p can be answered on pragmatic grounds. The internalist argument turns out to favor pragmatism. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt at exploring the possibility of reconciling the two interpretations of biolinguistics which have been recently projected by Koster(Biolinguistics 3(1):61–92, 2009). The two interpretations—trivial and nontrivial—can be roughly construed as non-internalist and internalist conceptions of biolinguistics respectively. The internalist approach boils down to a conception of language where language as a mental grammar in the form of I-language grows and functions like a biological organ. On the other hand, under such a construal consistent with Koster’s (Biolinguistics (...) 3(1):61-92, 2009), the non-internalist version does not necessarily have to be externalist in nature; rather it is a matter of mutual reinforcement of biology and culture under the rubric of a co-evolutionary dynamics. Here it will be argued that the apparent dichotomy between these two conceptions of biolinguistics can perhaps be resolved if we have a richer synthesis that accounts for both internalism and non-internalism. (shrink)

Many classically valid meta-inferences fail in a standard supervaluationist framework. This allegedly prevents supervaluationism from offering an account of good deductive reasoning. We provide a proof system for supervaluationist logic which includes supervaluationistically acceptable versions of the classical meta-inferences. The proof system emerges naturally by thinking of truth as licensing assertion, falsity as licensing negative assertion and lack of truth-value as licensing rejection and weak assertion. Moreover, the proof system respects well-known criteria for the admissibility of inference rules. (...) Thus, supervaluationists can provide an account of good deductive reasoning. Our proof system moreover brings to light how one can revise the standard supervaluationist framework to make room for higher-order vagueness. We prove that the resulting logic is sound and complete with respect to the consequence relation that preserves truth in a model of the non-normal modal logic _NT_. Finally, we extend our approach to a first-order setting and show that supervaluationism can treat vagueness in the same way at every order. The failure of conditional proof and other meta-inferences is a crucial ingredient in this treatment and hence should be embraced, not lamented. (shrink)

What is the connection between reasons and motives? According to Reasons Internalism there is a non-trivial conceptual connection between normative reasons and the possibility of rationally accessing relevant motivation. Reasons Internalism is attractive insofar as it captures the thought that reasons are for reasoning with and repulsive insofar as it fails to generate sufficient critical distance between reasons and motives. Rather than directly adjudicate this dispute, I extract from it two generally accepted desiderata on theories of normative reasons (...) and argue that a new theory can satisfy both. The new theory locates part of the meaning of normative reason statements in their role in normative discussion. It generates a view of the connection between reasons and motives that is distinct from Reasons Internalism, yet distinctively in its spirit. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAccording to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that p (...) supervenes upon his internal reasons for thinking that the speaker's testimony that p is true. Recently, however, several objections have been raised against this view. In this paper, I present an argument providing intuitive support for internalism about the epistemology of testimony. Moreover, I also defend the argument against three recent objections offered by Stephen Wright in a couple of recent papers. The upshot of my discussion is that external conditions do make an epistemic difference when it comes to our testimonial beliefs, but that they cannot make any difference with respect to their justificatory status – i.e., they are justificationally irrelevant. (shrink)

In this paper we set out a view on which internalist proper basicality is secured by sensory experience.

How, if at all, consciousness can be part of the physical universe remains a baffling problem. This article outlines a new, developing philosophical theory of how it could do so, and offers a preliminary mathematical formulation of a physical grounding for key aspects of the theory. Because the philosophical side has radical elements, so does the physical-theory side. The philosophical side is radical, first, in proposing that the productivity or dynamism in the universe that many believe to be responsible for (...) its systematic regularities is actually itself a physical constituent of the universe, along with more familiar entities. Indeed, it proposes that instances of dynamism can themselves take part in physical interactions with other entities, this interaction then being “meta-dynamism” (a type of meta-causation). Secondly, the theory is radical, and unique, in arguing that consciousness is necessarily partly constituted of meta-dynamic auto-sensitivity, in other words it must react via meta-dynamism to its own dynamism, and also in conjecturing that some specific form of this sensitivity is sufficient for and indeed constitutive of consciousness. The article proposes a way for physical laws to be modified to accommodate meta-dynamism, via the radical step of including elements that explicitly refer to dynamism itself. Additionally, laws become, explicitly, temporally non-local in referring directly to quantity values holding at times prior to a given instant of application of the law. The approach therefore implicitly brings in considerations about what information determines states. Because of the temporal non-locality, and also because of the deep connections between dynamism and time-flow, the approach also implicitly connects to the topic of entropy insofar as this is related to time. (shrink)