To What Extent Must Creatures Return to the One?

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 10:270-278 (2022)
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Abstract

This chapter begins by highlighting the role of necessary emanation in allowing for goodness to be diffused without involving anything contingent or external. It then argues that, while Timothy O’Connor’s position avoids modal collapse, it may imply divine coercion. O’Connor suggests that God, in order to properly manifest God’s goodness, must create creatures capable of divine union and give them everything required to make their enjoyment as perfect and infinite as it can be. This view is in danger of making God’s salvific acts required, rather than gratuitous. The difficulty is not unique to O’Connor. Any position on which created things are capable of sharing in infinite goodness faces this tension. Such views can imply both that God must create a universe containing creatures capable of infinite enjoyment and that, within such a universe, the return of all things to God must be as complete, infinite, and encompassing as possible

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Caleb Cohoe
Metropolitan State University of Denver

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