Adaptive diversity and misbelief

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):516 (2009)
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Abstract

Although it makes some progress, McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) proposal is limited because (1) the argument for adaptive misbelief is not new, (2) arguments overextend the evidence provided, and (3) the alleged sufficient conditions are not as prohibitive as suggested. We offer alternative perspectives and evidence, including individual differences research, indicating that adaptive misbeliefs are likely much more widespread than implied.

Author's Profile

Adam Feltz
Michigan Technological University

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