Adaptive diversity and misbelief
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):516 (2009)
Abstract
Although it makes some progress, McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) proposal is limited because (1) the argument for adaptive misbelief is not new, (2) arguments overextend the evidence provided, and (3) the alleged sufficient conditions are not as prohibitive as suggested. We offer alternative perspectives and evidence, including individual differences research, indicating that adaptive misbeliefs are likely much more widespread than implied.
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Archival date: 2015-12-29
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2012-08-31
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334 ( #22,652 of 69,040 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #56,059 of 69,040 )
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