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  1. added 2018-12-29
    The Value of Consciousness: A Propaedeutic.Uriah Kriegel - manuscript
    Recent work within such disparate research areas as the epistemology of perception, theories of well-being, applied ethics (especially medical ethics and animal ethics), normative ethics, theories of understanding in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of consciousness has featured disconnected discussions of a single underlying question: What is the value of consciousness? The purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical framework in which this question could be addressed systematically and clearly, as well as to explore (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-24
    Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being.Luke Roelofs & Jed Buchanan - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    Some philosophical theories of consciousness imply consciousness in things we would never intuitively think are conscious—most notably, panpsychism implies that consciousness is pervasive, even outside complex brains. Is this a reductio ab absurdum for such theories, or does it show that we should reject our original intuitions? To understand the stakes of this question as clearly as possible, we analyse the structured pattern of intuitions that panpsychism conflicts with. We consider a variety of ways that the tension between this intuition (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-10
    Philosophy and Science, the Darwinian-Evolved Computational Brain, a Non-Recursive Super-Turing Machine & Our Inner-World-Producing Organ.Hermann G. W. Burchard - 2016 - Open Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):13-28.
    Recent advances in neuroscience lead to a wider realm for philosophy to include the science of the Darwinian-evolved computational brain, our inner world producing organ, a non-recursive super- Turing machine combining 100B synapsing-neuron DNA-computers based on the genetic code. The whole system is a logos machine offering a world map for global context, essential for our intentional grasp of opportunities. We start from the observable contrast between the chaotic universe vs. our orderly inner world, the noumenal cosmos. So far, philosophy (...)
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  4. added 2018-09-06
    Aap zoekt zin. Waarom wij bewustzijn, vrije wil, cultuur e religie hebben. ISVW, 2014.Pouwel Slurink - 2014 - Leusden, the Netherlands: ISVW.
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  5. added 2018-07-09
    ID + MD = OD Towards a Fundamental Algorithm for Consciousness.Thomas McGrath - manuscript
    The Algorithm described in this short paper is a simplified formal representation of consciousness that may be applied in the fields of Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. -/- Click on the download link to read full essay...
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  6. added 2018-05-16
    The Many Streams in Ralph Pred’s Onflow. [REVIEW]Anderson Weekes - 2006 - Chromatikon: Annales de la Philosophie En Procès / Yearbook of Philosophy in Process 2:227-244.
    This study of Ralph Pred’s Onflow (MIT Press, 2005) expands on Pred’s arguments and raises doubts about the viability of phenomenology. Showing that Pred’s method is indeed phenomenological, I validate his interpretations of William James as phenomenologist and his critique of John Searle in light of James, which documents the extent to which the role of habit in the constitution of experience is neglected by philosophers. In explaining habit, however, Pred himself reverts to non-phenomenological models drawn from James’ postulate of (...)
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  7. added 2018-05-01
    Consciousness.Anezka Kuzmicova - forthcoming - In Leah Price & Matthew Rubery (eds.), Further Reading. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter revisits three common ideas about how consciousness works when we read fiction. Firstly, I contest the notion that the reading consciousness is a container of sorts, containing a circumscribed amount of textual stimulus. Secondly, I argue against the view that readers abstract their personal concerns away in reading, and that they do so with benefit. Thirdly, I show how the reading consciousness encompasses rather than excludes the physical situation and environment of reading. For each idea revisited, I discuss (...)
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  8. added 2018-03-19
    Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  9. added 2018-03-12
    Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science Since 1980.Elizabeth Schier & John Sutton - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. New York: Springer.
    If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. Jack Smart’s chapter in this volume, along with an outstanding series of briefer essays in A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a), effectively describe the naturalistic realism of Australian philosophy (...)
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  10. added 2018-02-17
    Adaptive Diversity and Misbelief.Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):516.
    Although it makes some progress, McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) proposal is limited because (1) the argument for adaptive misbelief is not new, (2) arguments overextend the evidence provided, and (3) the alleged sufficient conditions are not as prohibitive as suggested. We offer alternative perspectives and evidence, including individual differences research, indicating that adaptive misbeliefs are likely much more widespread than implied.
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  11. added 2018-02-12
    The Problem of the Self.Cosmin Visan - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 5 (11):1145-1151.
    Consciousness presents us with many aspects. In trying to explain consciousness, one may be tempted to address only the problem of qualia, as for example explaining color red. But can this attempt be done on its own without somehow taking into account also the subject of experience? In this paper, we will concentrate in addressing the problem of the Self without any reference to any particular quale. The best place where the Self can be analyzed is at a point where (...)
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  12. added 2018-01-10
    Why Biology is Beyond Physical Sciences?Bhakti Niskama Shanta & Bhakti Vijnana Muni - 2016 - Advances in Life Sciences 6 (1):13-30.
    In the framework of materialism, the major attention is to find general organizational laws stimulated by physical sciences, ignoring the uniqueness of Life. The main goal of materialism is to reduce consciousness to natural processes, which in turn can be translated into the language of math, physics and chemistry. Following this approach, scientists have made several attempts to deny the living organism of its veracity as an immortal soul, in favor of genes, molecules, atoms and so on. However, advancement in (...)
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  13. added 2017-12-08
    Theories of Consciousness & Death.Gregory Nixon (ed.) - 2016 - New York, USA: QuantumDream.
    What happens to the inner light of consciousness with the death of the individual body and brain? Reductive materialism assumes it simply fades to black. Others think of consciousness as indicating a continuation of self, a transformation, an awakening or even alternatives based on the quality of life experience. In this issue, speculation drawn from theoretic research are presented. -/- Table of Contents Epigraph: From “The Immortal”, Jorge Luis Borges iii Editor’s Introduction: I Killed a Squirrel the Other Day, Gregory (...)
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  14. added 2017-10-23
    From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 3).Jeffrey White - forthcoming - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers.
    This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by forecasting (...)
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  15. added 2017-09-05
    The Legacy Conference: Report on The Science of Consciousness Conference, La Jolla, California, 2017.Gregory Nixon - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (9-10):253-277.
    The ‘Toward a Science of Consciousness’ conference – which has now become ‘The Science of Consciousness’ conference – recently (June 5-10, 2017) took place instead at the receptive venue of the Hyatt Regency in La Jolla, California. It was well-planned and organized, which is extraordinary considering that it had to be organized all over again within a month or two when the original Shanghai location was cancelled. Things ran smoothly at La Jolla and it was well attended for an odd-year, (...)
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  16. added 2017-03-15
    Breaking the Grip of Materialism (Review of Unsnarling the World-Knot). [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1998 - New Scientist (2137).
    David Ray Griffin does not fully come to terms with the fact that science has already abandoned the narrow materialist view of bits of matter pushing each other around. Even as early as Newton's law of gravitation, and most obviously with quantum physics, science has embraced the view that the world consists of relationships (often described as laws) between different types of processes and states.
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  17. added 2016-11-01
    The Three Circles of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), The Sense of Mineness. Oxford University Press.
    A widespread assumption in current philosophy of mind is that a conscious state’s phenomenal properties vary with its representational contents. In this paper, I present (rather dogmatically) an alternative picture that recognizes two kinds of phenomenal properties that do not vary concomitantly with content. First, it admits phenomenal properties that vary rather with attitude: what it is like for me to see rain is phenomenally different from what it is like for me to remember (indistinguishable) rain, which is different again (...)
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  18. added 2016-10-31
    Människan; den medvetna biologiska maskinen.Robin Ernstsson - manuscript
    I detta dokument ger jag mina teorier, idéer och förklaringar till hur jag tror att medvetandet fungerar, vad det är och varför vi har det. Enligt mig är alla levande varelser bara biologiska maskiner, skulpterade av evolutionen för att bli så anpassad som möjligt till den miljö som de befinner sig i. Allt fungerar på ett speciellt sätt, det går att förklaras och förstås, det finns ingen magi, och medvetandet är inget undantag, det finns där av en anledning.
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  19. added 2016-06-13
    Consciousness and Morality.Joshua Shepherd & Neil Levy - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    It is well known that the nature of consciousness is elusive, and that attempts to understand it generate problems in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, psychology, and neuroscience. Less appreciated are the important – even if still elusive – connections between consciousness and issues in ethics. In this chapter we consider three such connections. First, we consider the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding an entity’s moral status. Second, we consider the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding moral responsibility for action. (...)
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  20. added 2016-04-06
    Not-I/Thou: The Other Subject of Art and Architecture.Gavin Keeney - 2014 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Not-I/Thou: The Other Subject of Art and Architecture is a series of essays delineating the gray areas and black zones in present-day cultural production. Part One is an implicit critique of neo-liberal capitalism and its assault on the humanities through the pseudo-scientific and pseudo-empirical biases of academic and professional disciplines, while Part Two returns to apparent lost causes in the historical development of modernity and post-modernity, particularly the recourse to artistic production as both a form of mnemonics and periodic (and (...)
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  21. added 2016-03-25
    Time, Experience, and Descriptive Experience Sampling.John Sutton - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):118-129.
    This rich book, the best I’ve read in consciousness studies, offers more at each encounter. It was a brilliant idea to evaluate Hurlburt’s Descriptive Experience Sampling method through concrete sceptical enquiry by Schwitzgebel, whose role as open-minded but hard-nosed interlocutor makes the debate an intriguing, even gripping read. The radically different views about introspective reports held by the two authors are put to the test in the concrete context of ‘an examination, in unprecedented detail, of random moments of one person’s (...)
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  22. added 2016-03-23
    (2016) Meister Eckhart, der "Seelengrund", und das Verständnis von Bewusstsein.Alfred Gierer - manuscript
    An English translation of the essay is included in the download. In diesem Essay geht es um ein religionsfreundliches Selbst- und Weltverständnis, das die Reichweite der menschlichen Vernunft ebenso wie deren intrinsische Grenzen achtet. In dem weiten Feld wählen wir hier Betrachtungen des mittelalterlichen Philosophen und Theologen Meister Eckhart aus, beginnen aber mit einigen Grundthesen zur Beziehung von Wissenschaft, menschlichem Bewusstsein und Religion. Modern science led to a far reaching understanding of the natural order, and yet it does not, in (...)
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  23. added 2016-03-06
    Three Philosophical Problems About Consciousness.Nicholas Maxwell - 2002 - Ethical Record 107 (4):3-11.
    I am inclined to think that there are three basic philosophical problems that arise in connection with consciousness. (1) Existence. Why does sentience or consciousness exist at all? Why are we not zombies? (2) Intelligibility. Granted that consciousness exists, what is it? How is it to be explained and understood? On the face of it, there could be no greater mystery than that brains should somehow produce, or be, our states of awareness, our thoughts, feelings, perceptions and desires. What is (...)
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  24. added 2016-02-25
    Mind in Life. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (4):615-619.
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  25. added 2016-02-25
    Action in Perception. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht & Ulrike Pompe - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (2):250-254.
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  26. added 2015-12-02
    Science, Religion and Basic Biological Issues That Are Open to Interpretation.Alfred Gierer - 2009 - English Translation Of: Preprint 388, Mpi for History of Science.
    This is an English translation of my essay: Alfred Gierer Wissenschaft, Religion und die deutungsoffenen Grundfragen der Biologie. Mpi for the History of Science, preprint 388, 1-21, also in philpapers. Range and limits of science are given by the universal validity of physical laws, and by intrinsic limitations, especially in self-referential contexts. In particular, neurobiology should not be expected to provide a full understanding of consciousness and the mind. Science cannot provide, by itself, an unambiguous interpretation of the natural order (...)
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  27. added 2015-10-30
    Phenomenal Concepts.Kati Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  28. added 2015-10-25
    (2015) Scientific Rationality, Human Consciousness, and Pro-Religious Ideas.Alfred Gierer - manuscript
    The essay discusses immanent versus transcendent concepts in the context of the art of living, as well as the understanding of human consciousness in the context of religion. Science provides us with a far reaching understanding of natural processes, including biological evolution, but also with deep insights into its own intrinsic limitations. This is consistent with more than one interpretation on the “metatheoretical“, that is on the philosophical and cultural level, including liberal, enlightened forms of religion as well as agnostic (...)
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  29. added 2015-09-23
    What Are the Dimensions of the Conscious Field?Luke Roelofs - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):88-104.
    I analyse the meaning of a popular idiom among consciousness researchers, in which an individual's consciousness is described as a 'field'. I consider some of the contexts where this idea appears, in particular discussions of attention and the unity of consciousness. In neither case, I argue, do authors provide the resources to cash out all the implications of field-talk: in particular, they do not give sense to the idea of conscious elements being arrayed along multiple dimensions. I suggest ways to (...)
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  30. added 2015-08-26
    On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:67-74.
    Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish. Laudably, Tye attempts to defend the latter claim rather than resting content with the counter-intuitiveness of the associated image. However, I show that his defense is problematic in several ways, and ultimately that it still amounts to no more than an appeal (...)
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  31. added 2015-08-26
    Internalism and the Snapshot Conception of Phenomenal Experience: A Reply to Fisher.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):652-664.
    Justin Fisher (2007) has presented a novel argument designed to prove that all forms of mental internalism are false. I aim to show that the argument fails with regard to internalism about phenomenal experiences. The argument tacitly assumes a certain view about the ontology of phenomenal experience, which (inspired by Alva Noe) I call the “snapshot conception of phenomenal experience.” After clarifying what the snapshot conception involves, I present Fisher with a dilemma. If he rejects the snapshot conception, then his (...)
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  32. added 2015-08-26
    Anarchism and the Beats.Ed D'Angelo - 2012 - In Sharin Elkholy (ed.), The Philosophy of the Beats. The University Press of Kentucky. pp. 227-242.
    The paper charts both the interpersonal connections between historical anarchist figures and the beat poets as well as the philosophical similarities between them. Almost all the beat poets were anarchists, though their politics was secondary to their attempts to transform consciousness. Among the anarchists, the romantic socialist Gustav Landauer, who was especially popular in post-war American anarchist circles, came closest to the political perspective of the beat poets. Like the beats, Landauer was a poet, a pacifist, an anarchist, a communitarian, (...)
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  33. added 2015-08-26
    Aangeboren belevingsstructuren, intenties en symbolen.P. Slurink - 1993 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 85 (1):128-137.
    This paper was published in an issue of the ANTW, Dutch General Journal of Philosophy, dedicated to the work of Paul Churchland. It criticizes Churchland for neglecting the relationships of animals to their environments and their innate subjectivity, which guides them through their environment. The concept of an emotional a priori is introduced, 'the innate structures of experience', analogue to Kant's cognitive a priori. Subjectivity is an evolved property which enables organisms to adapt their genetic interests to a particular environment.
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  34. added 2015-02-05
    Phenomenal Specificity.Tony Cheng - 2014 - Dissertation, University College London
    The essay is a study of phenomenal specificity. By ‘phenomenal’ here we mean conscious awareness, which needs to be cashed out in detail throughout the study. Intuitively, one dimension of phenomenology is along with specificity. For example it seems appropriate to say that one’s conscious awareness in the middle of the visual field is in some sense more specific than the awareness in the periphery under normal circumstances. However, it is difficult to characterise the nature of phenomenal specificity in an (...)
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  35. added 2015-02-05
    Consciousness and the Flow of Attention.Tony Cheng - 2012 - Dissertation, City University of New York, Graduate Center
    Visual phenomenology is highly elusive. One attempt to operationalize or to measure it is to use ‘cognitive accessibility’ to track its degrees. However, if Ned Block is right about the overflow phenomenon, then this way of operationalizing visual phenomenology is bound to fail. This thesis does not directly challenge Block’s view; rather it motivates a notion of cognitive accessibility different from Block’s one, and argues that given this notion, degrees of visual phenomenology can be tracked by degrees of cognitive accessibility. (...)
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  36. added 2015-01-31
    If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, Then People Are Less Responsible Than We Think.Gregg Caruso - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):49-60.
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  37. added 2015-01-31
    Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):7-15.
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  38. added 2015-01-30
    Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science.Robert Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):43-81.
    Pictures are 2D surfaces designed to elicit 3D-scene-representing experiences from their viewers. In this essay, I argue that philosophers have tended to underestimate the relevance of research in vision science to understanding the nature of pictorial experience. Both the deeply entrenched methodology of virtual psychophysics as well as empirical studies of pictorial space perception provide compelling support for the view that pictorial experience and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same psychological, explanatory kind. I also show that an empirically informed (...)
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  39. added 2014-11-07
    Consciousness and Mental Qualities for Auditory Sensations.Adriana Renero - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):179-204.
    The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts (...)
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  40. added 2014-04-02
    The Many Streams in Ralph Pred’s Onflow: A Review Essay.Anderson Weekes - 2006 - Chromatikon II. Annuaire de la Philosophie En Procès - Yearbook of Philosophy in Process 2:229-246.
    This study of Ralph Pred’s Onflow (MIT Press, 2005) expands on Pred’s arguments and raises doubts about the viability of phenomenology. Showing that Pred’s method is indeed phenomenological, I validate his interpretations of William James as phenomenologist and his critique of John Searle in light of James, which documents the extent to which the role of habit in the constitution of experience is neglected by philosophers. In explaining habit, however, Pred himself reverts to non-phenomenological models drawn from James’ postulate of (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-11
    Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious.Steven Gross - 2010 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication.
    This paper motivates two bases for ascribing propositional semantic knowledge (or something knowledgelike): first, because it’s necessary to rationalize linguistic action; and, second, because it’s part of an empirical theory that would explain various aspects of linguistic behavior. The semantic knowledge ascribed on these two bases seems to differ in content, epistemic status, and cognitive role. This raises the question: how are they related, if at all? The bulk of the paper addresses this question. It distinguishes a variety of answers (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-09
    Understanding How Experience "Seems".Thomas Raleigh - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):67-78.
    I argue against one way of understanding the claim that how one’s visual experience “seems” provides support for the naïve-realist theory and weighs against sense-data theories . If my argument is correct, and we abandon this way of understanding how experience “seems”, we would lose one reason for favouring naïve-realism at the start of the dialectic of the traditional problem of perception. En route, I distinguish diff erent ways of understanding the transparency of experience, consider how to make sense of (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-06
    Review of David Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW]Pär Sundström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (1):80-86.
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  44. added 2014-03-05
    Having It Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly.Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.
    I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...)
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  45. added 2013-03-30
    Clock System or Cloud System?: Applying Popper's Metaphor to the Study of Human Consciousness.Hillary S. Webb - 2012 - Paranthropology 3 (4).
    The question of what human consciousness “is,” how it “works,” and what it “does” is currently being approached by myriad fields of study, each with their own particular goals and research techniques. But despite the undeniably complex nature of this enigmatic phenomenon, the prevailing scientific and institutional paradigm seems to imply that only quantitative, experimentally focused approaches are a worthy means of illuminating “truth” about human consciousness. -/- In this paper, I begin by borrowing Popper’s metaphor of “clock systems” versus (...)
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  46. added 2013-03-14
    Human and Machine Consciousness as a Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis Mechanism.Richard Loosemore - 2012 - In Pei Wang & Ben Goertzel (eds.), Theoretical Foundations of Artificial General Intelligence. Springer. pp. 283--304.
    To solve the hard problem of consciousness we observe that any cognitive system of suffi- cient power must get into difficulty when it tries to analyze consciousness concepts, because the mechanism that does the analysis will “bottom out” in such a way as to make the sys- tem declare these concepts to be both real and ineffable. Rather than use this observation to dismiss consciousness as an artifact, we propose a unifying interpretation that allows consciousness to be explicable at a (...)
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  47. added 2013-01-21
    Individual Consciousness.Roderick Malcolm MacLeod - manuscript
    If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these consciousnesses, one's own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular consciousness. But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context to be specified. This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately (...)
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  48. added 2012-11-14
    Which Systems Are Conscious?Mark F. Sharlow - manuscript
    This document consists primarily of an excerpt (chapter 14) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. In that excerpt, the author uses the concept of subjective fact developed earlier in the book to address a question about consciousness: which physical systems (organisms or machines) are conscious? (This document depends heavily upon the concept of subjective fact developed in From Brain to Cosmos. Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to (...)
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  49. added 2012-05-07
    In Defense of Panpsychism.William Meacham - manuscript
    Presents in outline form a logical argument for Panpsychism, the idea that everything has an aspect of psyche or mind to it.
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  50. added 2011-02-25
    Editorial: Time & Experience: Twins of the Eternal Now?Gregory M. Nixon - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (5):482-489.
    In what follows, I suggest that, against most theories of time, there really is an actual present, a now, but that such an eternal moment cannot be found before or after time. It may even be semantically incoherent to say that such an eternal present exists since “it” is changeless and formless (presumably a dynamic chaos without location or duration) yet with creative potential. Such a field of near-infinite potential energy could have had no beginning and will have no end, (...)
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