Journal of Philosophical Research 37:233-241 (2012)
AbstractJohn Patrick Rudisill purports to identify various problems with my argument that the state promotion of autonomy is consistent with anti-perfectionism, viz., that it falsely pretends to be novel, is unacceptably counterintuitive because too restrictive and too permissive, and that it deploys a self-defeating formal apparatus. I argue, in reply, that my argument is more novel than Rudisill gives me credit for; that properly understood my anti-perfectionism implies neither the implausible restrictions nor the unpalatable permissions that Rudisill claims; and that my formal apparatus is innocent of the flaws imputed to it.
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