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  1. Liberal Perfectionism and Quong’s Internal Conception of Political Liberalism.Paul Billingham - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):79-106.
    Debates between political liberals and liberal perfectionists have been reinvigorated by Jonathan Quong’s Liberalism Without Perfection. In this paper I argue that certain forms of perfectionism can rebut or evade Quong’s three central objections – that perfectionism is manipulative, paternalistic, and illegitimate. I then argue that perfectionists can defend an ‘internal conception’ of perfectionism, parallel in structure to Quong’s ’internal conception’ of political liberalism, but with a different conception of the justificatory constituency. None of Quong’s arguments show that his view (...)
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  2. Neutrality and the Social Contract.Ian J. Carroll - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):134-150.
    Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of (...)
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  3. Autonomy-Minded Anti-Perfectionism.Ben Colburn - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:233-241.
    John Patrick Rudisill purports to identify various problems with my argument that the state promotion of autonomy is consistent with anti-perfectionism, viz., that it falsely pretends to be novel, is unacceptably counterintuitive because too restrictive and too permissive, and that it deploys a self-defeating formal apparatus. I argue, in reply, that my argument is more novel than Rudisill gives me credit for; that properly understood my anti-perfectionism implies neither the implausible restrictions nor the unpalatable permissions that Rudisill claims; and that (...)
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  4. Autonomy-Minded Anti-Perfectionism: Novel, Intuitive, and Sound.Ben Colburn - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:233-241.
    John Patrick Rudisill purports to identify various problems with my argument that the state promotion of autonomy is consistent with anti-perfectionism, viz., that it falsely pretends to be novel, is unacceptably counterintuitive because too restrictive and too permissive, and that it deploys a self-defeating formal apparatus. I argue, in reply, that my argument is more novel than Rudisill gives me credit for; that properly understood my anti-perfectionism implies neither the implausible restrictions nor the unpalatable permissions that Rudisill claims; and that (...)
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  5. In Defence of Comprehensive Liberalism.Ben Colburn - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 2 (1):17-29.
    In Liberalism without Perfection Jonathan Quong defends a form of political liberalism; that is, a political philosophy that answers ‘no’ to both the following questions: 1. Must liberal political philosophy be based in some particular ideal of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical beliefs? 2. Is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some activities, ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the basis (...)
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  6. Anti-Perfectionisms and Autonomy.Ben Colburn - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):247-256.
    I provide support for a liberal political philosophy that is fully committed to the state promotion of autonomy, and which also counts Anti-perfectionism amongst its other commitments. I do so by defending it against the serious charge that it is prima facie self-contradictory. After all, Anti-perfectionism appears to demand that the state refrain from promoting any value – it looks as though that must preclude the promotion of autonomy, if the latter is conceived of as a value. I argue that (...)
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  7. Forbidden Ways of Life.Ben Colburn - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):618-629.
    I examine an objection against autonomy-minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and William Galston, that it rules out ways of life which do not themselves value freedom or autonomy. This objection is incorrect, because one need not value autonomy in order to live an autonomous life. Hence autonomy-minded liberalism need not rule out such ways of life. I suggest a modified objection which does work, namely that autonomy-minded liberalism must rule out ways of life that could (...)
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  8. Is the Debate Between Rawlsians and Liberal Perfectionists About Aesthetics?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Does the debate between Rawlsians and liberal perfectionists boil down to the following: for liberal perfectionists, the government should fund aesthetic projects that are in good taste; for Rawlsians, the government should be neutral on the aesthetic value of anything? If so, liberal perfectionists are committed to the view that there is objective aesthetic value. In this paper, I argue that within the Rawlsian system is a thesis that is difficult to reconcile with objectivity about aesthetics.
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  9. Value Neutrality and the Ranking of Opportunity Sets.Michael Garnett - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):99-119.
    I defend the idea that a liberal commitment to value neutrality is best honoured by maintaining a pure cardinality component in our rankings of opportunity or liberty sets. I consider two challenges to this idea. The first holds that cardinality rankings are unnecessary for neutrality, because what is valuable about a set of liberties from a liberal point of view is not its size but rather its variety. The second holds that pure cardinality metrics are insufficient for neutrality, because liberties (...)
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  10. Liberal Neutrality: Constructivist, Not Foundationalist.Lendell Horne - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):151-158.
    In defending the principle of neutrality, liberals have often appealed to a more general moral principle that forbids coercing persons in the name of reasons those persons themselves cannot reasonably be expected to share. Yet liberals have struggled to articulate a non-arbitrary, non- dogmatic distinction between the reasons that persons can reasonably be expected to share and those they cannot. The reason for this, I argue, is that what it means to “share a reason” is itself obscure. In this paper (...)
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  11. Norms, Narratives, and Politics.Luke William Hunt - 2018 - Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal 101 (2):173-86.
    This essay considers how legal and philosophical ideals relate to contemporary politics. While political commentary is often concerned with descriptive analysis of public affairs, this essay pursues normative analysis of emerging trends in public life. The essay’s underlying theme is that “liberal” states—such as the United States—from time to time become illiberal by departing from the basic legal and philosophical norms of that tradition. Although it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions while in the moment, the tentative conclusion is that (...)
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  12. Something to Die For. The Individual as Interruption of the Political in Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political.Marin Lavinia - 2016 - Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 60 (2):311–325.
    This article aims to question the anti-individualist stance in Carl Schmitt's concept of the political by uncovering the historical bias of Schmitt's anti-individualism, seen here as one of the main driving forces behind his argument. For Schmitt, the political can take place only when a collectivity is able to declare war to another collectivity on the basis of feeling existentially threatened by the latter. As such, Schmitt's framework implies the inescapable possibility of war, as the condition which makes possible the (...)
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  13. Something to Die For. The Individual as Interruption of the Political in Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political.Marin Lavinia - 2016 - Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 60 (2):311–325.
    This article aims to question the anti-individualist stance in Carl Schmitt's concept of the political by uncovering the historical bias of Schmitt's anti-individualism, seen here as one of the main driving forces behind his argument. For Schmitt, the political can take place only when a collectivity is able to declare war to another collectivity on the basis of feeling existentially threatened by the latter. As such, Schmitt's framework implies the inescapable possibility of war, as the condition which makes possible the (...)
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  14. An Epistemic Argument in Support of Liberal Neutrality.Mariano Garreta Leclercq - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):187-201.
    My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contex- tual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a (...)
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  15. Beyond Equality of What: Sen and Neutrality.Christopher Lowry - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):226-235.
    This paper looks at the intersection of three issues in liberal theory: the metric of advantage, neutrality vs. perfectionism, and justice and disability. I argue that Sen's capability approach has implications for neutrality vs. perfectionism that demand a reconception of that debate. I draw out these implications to defend a third position, which I call 'public value liberalism'. Measuring effective freedom in terms of capability requires a public ranking of valuable activities and states of being, which ultimately puts Sen's view (...)
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  16. Introduction : Sur la neutralité libérale / On Liberal Neutrality.Roberto Merrill & Geneviève Rousselière - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):130-133.
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  17. Perfectionism, Economic (Dis)Incentives, and Political Coercion.Oran Moked - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):214-225.
    May a government attempt to improve the lives of its citizens by promoting the activities it deems valuable and discouraging those it disvalues? May it engage in such a practice even when doing so is not a requirement of justice in some strict sense, and even when the judgments of value and disvalue in question are likely to be subject to controversy among its citizens? These questions have long stood at the center of debates between political perfectionists and political neutralists. (...)
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  18. Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls' Political Liberalism Versus Gaus' Justificatory Liberalism.Enzo Rossi - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (1):9-25.
    Public justification-based accounts of liberal legitimacy rely on the idea that a polity’s basic structure should, in some sense, be acceptable to its citizens. In this paper I discuss the prospects of that approach through the lens of Gerald Gaus’ critique of John Rawls’ paradigmatic account of democratic public justification. I argue that Gaus does succeed in pointing out some significant problems for Rawls’ political liberalism; yet his alternative, justificatory liberalism, is not voluntaristic enough to satisfy the desiderata of a (...)
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  19. Tolérance et neutralité : incompatibles ou complémentaires ?Marc Rüegger - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):175-186.
    La tolérance et la neutralité sont habituellement considérées comme des réponses interchangeables ou du moins complémentaires à des situations de conflit et de désaccord moral. Malgré cette association traditionnelle, plusieurs auteurs ont récemment contesté la complémentarité, voire même la compatibilité, de ces deux notions. Cet article examine tout d’abord deux arguments qui visent à établir l’incompatibilité de la tolérance et de la neutralité. Il montre ensuite que si ces arguments ne sont pas probants, en ce sens qu’ils ne parviennent pas (...)
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  20. Indiscriminate Mass Surveillance and the Public Sphere.Titus Stahl - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (1):33-39.
    Recent disclosures suggest that many governments apply indiscriminate mass surveillance technologies that allow them to capture and store a massive amount of communications data belonging to citizens and non-citizens alike. This article argues that traditional liberal critiques of government surveillance that center on an individual right to privacy cannot completely capture the harm that is caused by such surveillance because they ignore its distinctive political dimension. As a complement to standard liberal approaches to privacy, the article develops a critique of (...)
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  21. Are Cities Illiberal? Municipal Jurisdictions and the Scope of Liberal Neutrality.Patrick Turmel - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):202-213.
    One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regard- less of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number (...)
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  22. Perfectionist Liberalisms and the Challenge of Pluralism.Mats Volberg - 2015 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 8:113-127.
    Based on Steven Wall's work I take perfectionism in political philosophy to include two components: the objective good and the non-neutral state. Some perfectionist theories aim to be liberal. But given the objective good component perfectionism seems to be unable to accommodate the commitment to value pluralism found in liberalism, this is what I call the challenge of pluralism. The perfectionist reply is to claim that their objective good can also be plural and thus there is no conflict. My aim (...)
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  23. Acceptable Risk.Cory Wimberly - 2015 - In The SAGE Encyclopedia of Economics and Society. SAGE.
    Perhaps the topic of acceptable risk never had a sexier and more succinct introduction than the one Edward Norton, playing an automobile company executive, gave it in Fight Club: “Take the number of vehicles in the field (A), multiply it by the probable rate of failure (B), and multiply the result by the average out of court settlement (C). A*B*C=X. If X is less than the cost of the recall, we don’t do one.” Of course, this dystopic scene also gets (...)
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  24. Neutrality as a Twofold Concept.Alexa Zellentin - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):159-174.
    Under the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral towards its citizens’ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality – neutrality of impact, neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory (...)
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