From affect programs to dynamical discrete emotions

Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):407-425 (2009)
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Abstract

According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions. This paper discusses some of these criticisms, and argues that they do not undermine the claim that emotions are discrete. This paper also presents some works in dynamical affective science, and argues that to conceive of discrete emotions as self-organizing and softly assembled patterns of various processes accounts more naturally than traditional Discrete Emotion Theory for the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions

Author's Profile

Giovanna Colombetti
University of Exeter

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