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Giovanna Colombetti
University of Exeter
  1. Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind.Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1157-1176.
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines, and develop phenomenological (...)
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  2. Affective Affordances and Psychopathology.Joel Krueger & Giovanna Colombetti - 2018 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (18):221-247.
    Self-disorders in depression and schizophrenia have been the focus of much recent work in phenomenological psychopathology. But little has been said about the role the material environment plays in shaping the affective character of these disorders. In this paper, we argue that enjoying reliable (i.e., trustworthy) access to the things and spaces around us — the constituents of our material environment — is crucial for our ability to stabilize and regulate our affective life on a day-today basis. These things and (...)
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  3. The Feeling Body: Towards an Enactive Approach to Emotion.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2008 - In W. F. Overton, U. Müller & J. L. Newman (eds.), Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved (...)
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  4. Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion.Giovanna Colombetti - 2013 - In S. J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
    The theory of autopoiesis is central to the enactive approach. Recent works emphasize that the theory of autopoiesis is a theory of sense-making in living systems, i.e. of how living systems produce and consume meaning. In this chapter I first illustrate (some aspects of) these recent works, and interpret their notion of sense-making as a bodily cognitive- emotional form of understanding. Then I turn to modern emotion science, and I illustrate its tendency to over-intellectualize our capacity to evaluate and understand. (...)
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  5.  43
    The Embodied and Situated Nature of Moods.Giovanna Colombetti - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1437-1451.
    In this paper I argue that it is misleading to regard the brain as the physical basis or “core machinery” of moods. First, empirical evidence shows that brain activity not only influences, but is in turn influenced by, physical activity taking place in other parts of the organism. It is therefore not clear why the core machinery of moods ought to be restricted to the brain. I propose, instead, that moods should be conceived as embodied, i.e., their physical basis should (...)
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  6. Editorial: Affectivity Beyond the Skin.Giovanna Colombetti, Joel Krueger & Tom Roberts - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:1-2.
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  7. From Affect Programs to Dynamical Discrete Emotions.Giovanna Colombetti - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):407-425.
    According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions. This paper discusses some of these criticisms, and argues that they do not undermine the claim that emotions are discrete. This paper also presents some works in dynamical affective science, and argues that to conceive of discrete emotions as self-organizing and softly assembled patterns of various processes accounts more (...)
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  8.  33
    Are Emotional States Based in the Brain? A Critique of Affective Brainocentrism From a Physiological Perspective.Giovanna Colombetti & Eder Zavala - 2019 - Biology and Philosophy 34 (5):45.
    We call affective brainocentrism the tendency to privilege the brain over other parts of the organism when defining or explaining emotions. We distinguish two versions of this tendency. According to brain-sufficient, emotional states are entirely realized by brain processes. According to brain-master, emotional states are realized by both brain and bodily processes, but the latter are entirely driven by the brain: the brain is the master regulator of bodily processes. We argue that both these claims are problematic, and we draw (...)
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  9. Reply to Barrett, Gendron & Huang.Giovanna Colombetti - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):439 – 442.
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  10.  19
    Complexity as a New Framework for Emotion Theories.Giovanna Colombetti - 2003 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 1 (1).
    In this paper I suggest that several problems in the study of emotion depend on a lack of adequate analytical tools, in particular on the tendency of viewing the organism as a modular and hierarchical system whose activity is mainly constituted by strictly sequential causal events. I argue that theories and models based on this view are inadequate to account for the complex reciprocal influences of the many ingredients that constitute emotions. Cognitive processes, feelings and bodily states are so subtly (...)
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  11. Il corpo E il vissuto affettivo: Verso un approccio «enattivo» allo studio delle emozioni.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2008 - Rivista di Estetica 37:77-96.
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