Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects

Hume Studies 25 (1 and 2):155-170 (1999)
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In Book I, part iv, section 2 of the Treatise, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume presents two different answers to the question of how we come to believe in the continued existence of unperceived objects. He rejects his first answer shortly after its formulation, and the remainder of the section articulates an alternative account of the development of the belief. The account that Hume adopts, however, is susceptible to a number of insurmountable objections, which motivates a reassessment of his original proposal. This paper defends a version of Hume's initial explanation of the belief in continued existence and examines some of its philosophical implications.
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.Bates, David (ed.)
.McClelland, J. L. & Rumelhart, D. E. (eds.)

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