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  1. added 2016-11-03
    Advice Seeking Network Structures and the Learning Organization.Jarle Aarstad, Marcus Selart & Sigurd Troye - 2011 - Problems and Perspectives in Management 9 (2):44-51.
    Organizational learning can be described as a transfer of individuals’ cognitive mental models to shared mental models. Employees, seeking the same colleagues for advice, are structurally equivalent, and the aim of the paper is to study if the concept can act as a conduit for organizational learning. It is argued that the mimicking of colleagues’ advice seeking structures will induce structural equivalence and transfer the accuracy of individuals’ cognitive mental models to shared mental models. Taking a dyadic level of analysis (...)
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  2. added 2014-03-22
    Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects.Mark Collier - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1 and 2):155-170.
    In Book I, part iv, section 2 of the Treatise, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume presents two different answers to the question of how we come to believe in the continued existence of unperceived objects. He rejects his first answer shortly after its formulation, and the remainder of the section articulates an alternative account of the development of the belief. The account that Hume adopts, however, is susceptible to a number of insurmountable objections, which motivates a reassessment (...)
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  3. added 2014-01-21
    Reduction and Levels of Explanation in Connectionism.John Sutton - 1995 - In P. Slezak, T. Caelli & R. Clark (eds.), Perspectives on cognitive science: theories, experiments, and foundations. Ablex. pp. 347-368.
    Recent work in the methodology of connectionist explanation has I'ocrrsccl on the notion of levels of explanation. Specific issucs in conncctionisrn hcrc intersect with rvider areas of debate in the philosophy of psychology and thc philosophy of science generally. The issues I raise in this chapter, then, are not unique to cognitive science; but they arise in new and important contexts when connectionism is taken seriously as a model of cognition. The general questions are the relation between levels and the (...)
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  4. added 2008-12-31
    Connectionist Rules: A Rejoinder to Horgan and Tienson's Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Kenneth Aizawa - 1999 - Acta Analytica 22 (22):59-85.
    This paper has a two-fold aim. First, it reinforces a version of the "syntactic argument" given in Aizawa (1994). This argument shows that connectionist networks do not provide a means of implementing representations without rules. Horgan and Tlenson have responded to the syntactic argument in their book and in another paper (Horgan & Tlenson, 1993), but their responses do not meet the challenge posed by my formulation of the syntactic argument. My second aim is to describe a kind of cognitive (...)
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