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  1. Why Does AI Lie So Much? The Problem Is More Deep Rooted Than You Think.Mir H. S. Quadri - 2024 - Arkinfo Notes.
    The rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, particularly in natural language processing, have brought to light a critical challenge, i.e., the semantic grounding problem. This article explores the root causes of this issue, focusing on the limitations of connectionist models that dominate current AI research. By examining Noam Chomsky's theory of Universal Grammar and his critiques of connectionism, I highlight the fundamental differences between human language understanding and AI language generation. Introducing the concept of semantic grounding, I emphasise the need for (...)
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  2. Intelligence, from Natural Origins to Artificial Frontiers - Human Intelligence vs. Artificial Intelligence.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2024 - Bucharest, Romania: MultiMedia Publishing.
    The parallel history of the evolution of human intelligence and artificial intelligence is a fascinating journey, highlighting the distinct but interconnected paths of biological evolution and technological innovation. This history can be seen as a series of interconnected developments, each advance in human intelligence paving the way for the next leap in artificial intelligence. Human intelligence and artificial intelligence have long been intertwined, evolving in parallel trajectories throughout history. As humans have sought to understand and reproduce intelligence, AI has emerged (...)
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  3. Deep learning and synthetic media.Raphaël Millière - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-27.
    Deep learning algorithms are rapidly changing the way in which audiovisual media can be produced. Synthetic audiovisual media generated with deep learning—often subsumed colloquially under the label “deepfakes”—have a number of impressive characteristics; they are increasingly trivial to produce, and can be indistinguishable from real sounds and images recorded with a sensor. Much attention has been dedicated to ethical concerns raised by this technological development. Here, I focus instead on a set of issues related to the notion of synthetic audiovisual (...)
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  4. Advice seeking network structures and the learning organization.Jarle Aarstad, Marcus Selart & Sigurd Troye - 2011 - Problems and Perspectives in Management 9 (2):44-51.
    Organizational learning can be described as a transfer of individuals’ cognitive mental models to shared mental models. Employees, seeking the same colleagues for advice, are structurally equivalent, and the aim of the paper is to study if the concept can act as a conduit for organizational learning. It is argued that the mimicking of colleagues’ advice seeking structures will induce structural equivalence and transfer the accuracy of individuals’ cognitive mental models to shared mental models. Taking a dyadic level of analysis (...)
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  5. (1 other version)The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A comprehensive introduction to the Language of Though Hypothesis (LOTH) accessible to general audiences. LOTH is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in (...)
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  6. Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects.Mark Collier - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1 and 2):155-170.
    In Book I, part iv, section 2 of the Treatise, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume presents two different answers to the question of how we come to believe in the continued existence of unperceived objects. He rejects his first answer shortly after its formulation, and the remainder of the section articulates an alternative account of the development of the belief. The account that Hume adopts, however, is susceptible to a number of insurmountable objections, which motivates a reassessment (...)
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  7. Reduction and levels of explanation in connectionism.John Sutton - 1995 - In P. Slezak, T. Caelli & R. Clark (eds.), Perspectives on Cognitive Science, Volume 1: Theories, Experiments, and Foundations. Ablex Publishing. pp. 347-368.
    Recent work in the methodology of connectionist explanation has I'ocrrsccl on the notion of levels of explanation. Specific issucs in conncctionisrn hcrc intersect with rvider areas of debate in the philosophy of psychology and thc philosophy of science generally. The issues I raise in this chapter, then, are not unique to cognitive science; but they arise in new and important contexts when connectionism is taken seriously as a model of cognition. The general questions are the relation between levels and the (...)
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  8. (1 other version)Representations without Rules, Connectionism and the Syntactic Argument.Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3).
    This paper has a two-fold aim. First, it reinforces a version of the "syntactic argument" given in Aizawa (1994). This argument shows that connectionist networks do not provide a means of implementing representations without rules. Horgan and Tlenson have responded to the syntactic argument in their book and in another paper (Horgan & Tlenson, 1993), but their responses do not meet the challenge posed by my formulation of the syntactic argument. My second aim is to describe a kind of cognitive (...)
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