Aristotle on Comparison

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 61:103-142 (2022)
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Abstract

Many contemporary philosophers hold that comparison requires a common, monistic ‘covering value’, and Aristotle is often described as a forerunner of this view. This paper reconsiders that claim. First, its textual warrant is substantially weaker than has been thought. Philosophically, moreover, Aristotle’s theory of non-synonymous predication allows for comparisons to be made using the special kind of non-synonymous terms that he calls pros hen legomenon, literally those ‘said with reference to a single thing.’ His favourite example is ‘healthy’ as said of food, organisms, and medical procedures: these various senses are not entirely synonymous, yet are not simply unconnected. This has significant implications. Aristotle famously holds that goodness is species-specific, and it would then seem that species cannot be ranked according to how good they are. Yet Aristotle does—frequently—rank species. The paper shows us that he is not, pace other scholars, thereby caught in a contradiction.

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Elena Comay del Junco
University of Connecticut

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