Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations

Journal of Philosophy 112 (11):600-626 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I argue that normative requirements should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
COMNRA
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-12-28
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Why Be Rational?Kolodny, Niko
Ifs and Oughts.Kolodny, Niko & MacFarlane, John
Conditionals.Kratzer, Angelika

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
A Plea for Falsehoods.Comesaña, Juan

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-05-12

Total views
91 ( #28,899 of 43,722 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #28,045 of 43,722 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.