Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations

Journal of Philosophy 112 (11):600-626 (2015)
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I argue that normative requirements should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known
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