Ethics

Explícita o implícitamente la relación entre poder y valor ha estado muy presente en la historia del pensamiento filosófico-político. Debido a que el poder, en cualquiera de sus formas, tiende siempre a normar y regular la convivencia y actividad conjunta entre grupos humanos, cualquier reflexión filosófica sobre su naturaleza habrá de cuestionarse, directa o indirectamente, el asunto de su racionalidad ética, de su vínculo con los valores humanos. Al mismo tiempo, pensar los valores debe conducir, tarde o temprano, a relacionarlos (...) con el poder. En otras palabras, al tema en cuestión que nos ocupa puede (y debe) arribarse tanto desde una reflexión inicialmente centrada en el asunto del poder, como desde el estudio de los valores. Sin embargo ha sido mucho más frecuente la primera línea de desplazamiento reflexivo que la segunda. Tres ejemplos nos servirían para mostrar lo anterior: un pensador clásico de la Modernidad como Rousseau, uno de los representantes ilustres del pensamiento contemporáneo como Foucault y un intelectual mucho más cercano a nuestro contexto como Luis Villoro. (shrink)

This chapter defends the view that manipulated behaviour is explained by an injustice. Injustices that explain manipulated behaviour need not involve agential features such as intentionality. Therefore, technology can manipulate us, even if technological artefacts like robots, intelligent software agents, or other ‘mere tools’ lack agential features such as intentionality. The chapter thus sketches a comprehensive account of manipulated behaviour related to but distinct from existing accounts of manipulative behaviour. It then builds on that account to defend the possibility that (...) we are being manipulated by technology. (shrink)

Are we being manipulated online? If so, is being manipulated by online technologies and algorithmic systems notably different from human forms of manipulation? And what is under threat exactly when people are manipulated online? This volume provides philosophical and conceptual depth to debates in digital ethics about online manipulation. The contributions explore the ramifications of our increasingly consequential interactions with online technologies such as online recommender systems, social media, user-friendly design, micro-targeting, default-settings, gamification, and real-time profiling. The authors in this (...) volume address four broad and interconnected themes: • What is the conceptual nature of online manipulation? And how, methodologically, should the concept be defined? • Does online manipulation threaten autonomy, freedom, and meaning in life, and if so, how? • What are the epistemic, affective, and political harms and risks associated with online manipulation? • What are legal and regulatory perspectives on online manipulation? The Philosophy of Online Manipulation brings these various considerations together to offer philosophically robust answers to critical questions concerning our online interactions with one another and with autonomous systems. It will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in moral philosophy, digital ethics, philosophy of technology, and the ethics of manipulation. (shrink)

What is recognition and why is it so important? This book develops a synoptic conception of the significance of recognition in its many forms for human persons by means of a rational reconstruction and internal critique of classical and contemporary accounts. The book begins with a clarification of several fundamental questions concerning recognition. It then reconstructs the core ideas of Fichte, Hegel, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth and utilizes the insights and conceptual tools developed across these chapters for (...) developing a case for the universal importance of recognition for humans. It argues in favour of a universalist anthropological position, unusual in the literature on recognition, that aims to construe a philosophically sound basis for a discourse of common humanity, or of a shared human life-form for which moral relations of recognition are essential. This synthetic conception of the importance of recognition provides tools for articulating deep intuitions shared across cultures about what makes human life and forms of human co-existence better or worse, and thus tools for mutual understanding about the deepest shared concerns of humanity, or of what makes us all human persons despite our differences. -/- Recognition and the Human Life-Form will appeal to readers interested in philosophical anthropology, social and political philosophy, critical theory, and the history of philosophy. It also provides ideas and conceptual tools for fields such as anthropology, education, disability studies, international relations, law, politics, religious studies, sociology, and social research. (shrink)

Subjectivists claim that the absence of a theological or metaphysical grounding to moral judgements renders them all as simply statements about our subjective wants and preferences. Leslie Allan argues that the subjectivists' case rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of moral objectivity. He presents the view that subjectivists mistakenly counterpoise the ideal of moral objectivity with the expression of individual preferences. Being objective in moral deliberation, Allan argues, should be regarded instead as the antithesis of parochial and biased reasoning. (...) This account of moral objectivity, he concludes, makes sense of a long-standing universalist tradition in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Life is pointless. That’s not okay. I show that. I argue that a point is a valued end and that, as agents, it makes sense for us to want our efforts and enterprises to have a point. Valued ends provide justifying reasons for our acts, efforts, and projects. I further argue that ends lie separate from the acts and enterprises for which they provide a point. Since there can be no end external to one’s entire life since one’s life includes (...) all of one’s ends, leading and living one’s life as a whole cannot have a point. Finally, I argue that since we live our lives and structure our living­a­human­life efforts both in parts and as a whole, it is fitting to be sad to recognize that leading and living a life is pointless. My discussion helps make sense of the literature that frequently talks around this topic but often does so vaguely and indirectly. (shrink)

Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via a threat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Haji’s argument requires not only that we embrace an ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle, but also that we adopt the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’. I argue that we have little reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deontic morality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (...) principle alone. I argue that despite what look like initially compelling reasons why we might suppose that this weaker conclusion is similarly destructive to deontic morality, we actually have good reason to doubt that it has any practical relevance for moral deliberation at all. (shrink)

In this short essay, we sketch a theory of faith that features resilience in the face of challenges to relying on those in whom you have faith. We argue that it handles a variety of both religious and secular faith-data, e.g., the value of faith in relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness, how the Christian and Hebrew scriptures portray pístis and ʾĕmûnāh, and the character of faith as it is often expressed in popular secular venues.

Heuristička propulzivnost bioetike u posljednjih trideset godina potaknula je na značajno proširenje područnog opsega: na metodološkom planu razvoj je obilježen kretanjem od disciplinarnosti do transdisciplinarnosti, a na problemskom planu od biotehničkih izazova do mišljenja cjeline živog svijeta. Međutim, bioetička ispitivanja još uvijek u obzir ne uzimaju probleme iz humanističke i prirodoznanstvene kozmologije, čak ni u sklopu projekta integrativne bioetike, što je izrazito problematično s obzirom na važnost njihovih jezgri znanja. Razvijanje ljudskog društva prema objedinjavanju s prostorom izvan planeta Zemlje te (...) čvrsta povezanost fenomena života s osnovnom ustrojstvom i dinamikom pojmljivog svemira poziva na pripremno usmjeravanje pozornosti na bioetičke i društveno–znanstvene probleme u kojima kozmološki elementi nose važnu ulogu. Cilj je ovoga članka ponuditi istraživačko gledište u kozmobioetike kao ispomoći u daljnjem proširenju spoznajne senzibilnosti za istinu o kompleksnosti (društvenog) bivstvovanja na Zemlji i oko nje. Obrada problema zasniva se na multidisciplinarnoj komunikaciji relevantnih jezgri znanja metodom klasičnog filozofijskog izlaganja. (shrink)

Before it succumbed to political censorship in Croatia in 1974 and afterward, a movement known as praxis philosophy reached its pinnacle as a critical response to the conceptually and socially corrupted dialectical and historical materialism which dominated the former Yugoslavian region. Two of the most prominent philosophers of "praxis movement" – Milan Kangrga and Gajo Petrović – the Praxists – remained to be an inspirational source for junior and senior scholars to date. Recently, a debate was initiated regarding the value (...) of "praxis philosophy", and has notably produced a series of assessments that were atypical in comparison to virtually all previous reviews. The praxis movement was scorned by many commentators who concluded that Praxists were logically inconsistent and that their errors were covered up by too abstract, confusing concepts that lacked proper articulation. Among other things, it was significantly pointed out that their philosophical investigations neither had nor will have any useful application in our society. In this paper, I offer (1) a refutation of these conclusions by (2) describing the structure of praxis philosophy, thus far absent from praxis studies. My ultimate objective was to show that Praxists intentionally developed an alternative philosophical thought to subdue the type of thinking which is fundamental for sterile criticism, and thus I aimed to explain that Praxists self-consciously chose to oppose the approach they were accused of neglecting. Their central idea was to send a message opposite of what their recent criticists think they failed to do. (shrink)

This study aims to (1) to describe moral messages that are packaged in metaphors in international children's narrative, (2) to analyze moral messages that are packaged in metaphors in international children's narrative, and (3) to encode the metaphors used in international children's narrative. This research uses theme analysis. The research data in this study are the form of phrases, clauses, and sentences that contain moral messages. The data source of this research is children's narrative on the internet. This research produces (...) findings that metaphors used to package moral messages in children's films consist of nine forms, namely 1) animal metaphors (2) everyday metaphors,(3) situation metaphors, (4) natural metaphors, (5) symbolic metaphors, (6) association metaphor, (7) diverse metaphor, (8) environment metaphor and (9) landscape metaphor. The conclusion of this study is the moral message for learning materials in elementary schools delivered in the form of children's narrative that are packaged in the form of metaphors. (shrink)

Metaphysics and ethics are two distinct fields in academic philosophy. The object of metaphysics is what is, while the object of ethics is what ought to be. Necessitarianism is a modal doctrine that appears to obliterate this neat distinction. For it is commonly assumed that ought (at least under normal circumstances) implies can. But if necessitarianism is true then I can only do what I actually do. Hence what I ought to do becomes limited to what I in fact do. (...) This is one widespread way of construing the danger that necessitarianism poses for ethics. There is, however, another way in which this collapse of what is with what ought to be can be construed. One could think of what is as already being what ought to be, of the two being one. On this picture, everything that is, is already valuable. In this thesis I explore the theory that being is intrinsically valuable. I do so by investigating the philosophy of perfection present in the works of the early modern rationalist Spinoza. For in his philosophy of perfection, I argue, we find being and value to be perfectly aligned. Hence, my reading challenges a widespread interpretation, according to which (ontological) perfection is divested of normativity in Spinozism. The position that all being is intrinsically valuable since it is perfect may be thought to be incompatible with human perfectionism. For what room can there be for human progress toward an ideal of perfection if all that exists, is necessarily perfect? The goal of the thesis is to respond to this question by providing a systematic interpretation of the metaphysics of human perfectibility in Spinoza’s philosophy. In order to achieve this goal, I undertake two tasks. First, I examine Spinoza’s multi-faceted philosophy of perfection. I distinguish between ontological and teleological perfection. Moreover, I argue that since Spinoza maintains that everything is perfect to the extent that it is, perfection shoulders the role of a transcendental within his system. In order to highlight the normative significance of transcendental perfection, I compare Spinoza’s thought with the transcendental theory of the good in Thomas Aquinas. In addition, I distinguish between ontological and speculative perfection. Speculative perfection is conscious awareness of ontological perfection. Second, I show how infinity plays an essential role in Spinoza’s ethics by indicating how we, by availing ourselves of this notion, are able to acquire a perspective on reality from which its ontological perfection may be discovered. On this basis, I am able to demonstrate the (relatively understudied) ethical and soteriological importance of Spinoza’s conception of infinity. I argue that it is because (a) Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is speculative, and because (b) one will be able to establish the (ontological) perfection of things by deducing it from the divine essence only when one considers this essence absolutely infinite, that (c) the absolute infinity of the divine essence plays a significant role in Spinoza’s account of human perfection as consisting in conscious awareness of the value of all being. (shrink)

This article aims to provide an a posteriori argument from love for the Trinity. A reformulation of the argument from love is made by proposing a novel version of the argument that is situated within an objective, empirical, natural theological framework. Reformulating the argument in this specific manner will enable it to ward of an important objection that is often raised against it, and ultimately render this argument of great use in establishing the necessity of the Trinity.

每本书都能有自己的一个名字，这实在是一件有趣且意味深长的事情。 这本书的名字，《存在或上帝 —— 对西方意识形态的建设性批判》，虽然长了点，但同样不失其有趣与意味深长。 书名中所谓的“西方意识形态”，指的是起源于西方世界，贯穿于西方历史，激发并引导了神学、哲学、数学、逻辑、艺术、科学、心理、经济、社会、环境、政治和军事等不同方面的理论和实践活动在西方的出现和发展，并造 就了西方人生活现状的那些最根本的理想或信念。 “对西方意识形态的批判”意味着，在本书作者看来，那些最根本的理想或信念并不完美，并不自洽，而且，不仅有必要也同样有可能变得更完美。 “对西方意识形态的建设性批判”则意味着，本书的重点并不是“批判”而是“建设”。这种建设性批判，主要涉及到两个极为重要的理想或信念的不自洽和不完美，其中一个是“存在”，另一个便是“上帝”。 至于书名中的“存在或上帝”，说的不仅是“存在”和“上帝” 的不自洽、不完美，说的不仅是使这两个概念更完美的必要性与可能性，说的不仅是使它们同一或统一的可能性与必要性，同时亦向读者提示了贯彻本书始终的那个基本方法或那条基本思路：在一切之间，有一切之存在。 无论是远在过去还是时至今日，对于许多西方人来说，“存在”与“上帝”这两个概念，既是一切问题之问题，又是一切答案之答案，不仅涉及到他们的过去，更涉及到了他们的未来。换句话说，“存在”与“上帝”所涉及到的 绝非仅仅只是人们所面对的那个世界，同样涉及到那个世界所面对的人本身，绝非仅仅只涉及到那个世界所承负着的“非我”，同样涉及到人们所承负着的那个“自我”，涉及到，我们每个人用“非我”为自己的“自我”所做的 每一件事情，涉及到了“自我”与“非我”的关系，特别是自由与必然之间的关系。 由此可见，这问题和答案绝非仅仅只是向西方人提出，亦绝非只应由西方人给出。对每个和所有人来说，这都同样有可能成为一个问题，我们又都以某种方式在给出一份自己的答案。甚至可以说，任何一种人生，人生中的任何一 件大事或小事，所留下的，无一不是这个问题，亦无一不是对这个问题的回答。 作为对这个问题的提出和对那个答案的探索，本书的第一章讨论了“存在”，最后一篇附录的文章讨论了“上帝”，而在它们之间的八个章节和所有附录的文章中，通过对宇宙、生命、生物、心灵、自我、人和社会的本体论理解 ，讨论的则是“自由” ，特别是“自由”与“平等”之间的相互依存，因为只有通过自由与平等的相互依存，“存在”与“上帝”方才能得以完美自洽，方才能回归于彼此。 通过这些讨论，本书顺便还介绍了两种尚且不为大多数西方人所知所行的自由，源于平等的自由和超越平等的自由。 因为存在或上帝既成就又超越了我们已有的一切知识，无论这知识是语言、哲学、逻辑、数学还是科学，所以，本书在内容和方法上同样既尊重它们又不为之所限。这种对现存全部知识既尊重又不为之所限的态度和做法，固然是 对形而上传统的继承，固然在自由主义中有其思想根源，亦可以说是本书作者对爱因斯坦所说“想象比知识更重要”那句话的理解、证明、实践和发扬光大。 既尊重又要超越一切知识，对任何人来说都不是一件容易做到的事情，但也同样不是一件不可能的事情。本书将一步一步地向读者解释并证明这一道理，证明这不仅符合存在或上帝的本性，也正是存在或上帝一直以来的所作所为 。 也许，无论是过去还是未来，无论是在西方还是在东方，只有当理解这本性和那所作所为之后，一个人才有可能最终走出自己，才有可能成就自己的真实与自由，人类才有可能最终走出柏拉图所说的那个洞穴，才有可能既生活在 存在的真实无妄之中，也生活在上帝的自由自在之中。 .

My journey here is a complete mystery; I didn't choose to come here, I can't remember anything, and I have no say in whether I stay or leave this planet.

Reading Derrida Margins of Philosophy - Irfan Ajvazi.

Se trata de una reflexión que indaga en torno a la naturaleza de las relaciones posibles entre el ejercicio de la dominación política y los valores morales. El discurso justificador del poder, de raíces axiológicas, es revisado desde por lo menos tres miradores. El primero es el de Juan Jacobo Rousseau, el segundo el de Michael Foucault y, finalmente, el de Luis Villoro. La idea es encontrar la clave a un viejo y espinoso tema de la moral pública: la legitimidad (...) objetiva de los valores superiores al interés particular. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus -Irfan Ajvazi.

The philosophy of ‘karma’ is a doctrine to consider being the foundation stone of the entire Indian Philosophical outlook. The Bhagavad Gita is most beloved scripture of Indian thought and one of the prime chapters of this scripture is the ‘law of karma’. According to it, every man profit from what he does and suffers from what he does. Karmayoga is mainly based on niskam-karma but not the mere renunciation of Karma. We have to give up the attachment and the (...) fruit regarding the action. So, the action is our Svadharma, fruit or result is not our concern. The Gita said that the nature of Karma was natural, inherent in man’s existence and everybody has to work. Hence an attempt is made here to discuss the law of karma as considered by the Bhagavad Gita. (shrink)

The problem of evil has always haunted theologians and philosophers. Throughout the course of this paper I will peruse the concepts of evil put forth by Spinoza and Plotinus. These two notions of evil have many similarities, yet there are some vital distinctions between the two. Plotinus and Spinoza both had rather unique views on the concept of evil that seemed to be ahead of their time in many ways. These two philosophers’ outlook on the notion of evil departs from (...) the classical theological perspective on evil. This departure from this classical line of reasoning is extremely significant for our modern-day outlook on the concept of evil. Therefore, perusing their ideas of evil will prove worthwhile. The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast these notions of evil and highlight their similarities and differences. Ultimately, by examining and connecting Spinoza’s and Plotinus’ way of dealing with the problem of evil, I hope to present the reader with a sound alternative route to the problem of evil. (shrink)

Heidegger’s Being and Time - Irfan Ajvazi.

Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception - Irfan Ajvazi.

Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception - Irfan Ajvazi.

The Philosophy of Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit - Irfan Ajvazi.

The Philosophy of Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit - Irfan Ajvazi.

The Deconstruction of Philosophy : The Spectres of Jacques Derrida - Irfan Ajvazi.

Nietzsche and the Nietzschean Philosophy of Morality - Irfan Ajvazi.

Die Moralphilosophie des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts hat mit Konsequentialismus, Deontologie, Kontraktualismus und Tugendethik nicht nur höchst einflussreiche Theorieparadigmen produktiv weiterentwickelt, sondern auch eine Reihe wichtiger neuer Probleme aufgeworfen. Der vorliegende Band versammelt zentrale Beiträge der analytischen Moralphilosophie, u. a. von David Gauthier, Shelly Kagan, Frances Kamm, Thomas Nagel, Michael Slote, Christine Swanton und Susan Wolf, die für ein Verständnis gegenwärtiger Diskussionen in der normativen Ethik unabdingbar sind. -/- Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort Einleitung: Analytische Moralphilosophie der Gegenwart -/- 1. Konsequentialismus Shelly Kagan: (...) Ein Plädoyer gegen die Alltagsmoral Peter Railton: Entfremdung, Konsequentialismus und die Anforderungen der Moral -/- 2. Deontologie Thomas Nagel: Ethik William David Ross: Was macht richtige Handlungen richtig? -/- 3. Kontraktualismus David Gauthier: Warum Kontraktualismus? Thomas Scanlon: Die Struktur des Kontraktualismus -/- 4. Tugendethik Christine Swanton: Eine tugendethische Theorie des richtigen Handelns Michael Slote: Akteursbasierte Tugendethik -/- 5. Moralische Aggregation John Taurek: Zählt die Anzahl? Frances M. Kamm: Aggregation und zwei moralphilosophische Methoden -/- 6. Das Prinzip der Doppelwirkung Jonathan Bennett: Vorhergesehene Nebenwirkungen vs. beabsichtigte Folgen Ralph Wedgwood: Zur Verteidigung der Lehre von der Doppelwirkung -/- 7. Moralische Rechte H. L. A. Hart: Gibt es natürliche Rechte? Joseph Raz: Über die Beschaffenheit von Rechten -/- 8. Moralischer Zufall Thomas Nagel: Moralischer Zufall Susan Wolf: Die Moral des moralischen Zufalls. (shrink)

فى هذا الكتاب رؤية مفهومية جديدة تعرف بإسلامية المعرفة. وتهدف إلى إعادة تشكيل العقل المسلم عن طريق إعادة بناء المفاهيم الأساسية في النسق المعرفي الإسلامي. وهذا يتطلب توضيحا دلاليا للمفاهيم، وتحليلا لبنيتها، وكشفا عما يصيبها من تحريف وتشويه. ويقدم الكتاب طرائق جديدة للتعامل مع مفاهيم جوهرية مثل الشرعية، والتجديد، والتنمية، مفاهيم القرآن، مفاهيم السنة، ودراسة العبث بالمفاهيم.

This paper clarifies the significance of philosophy for traditional societies and modern societies and their evolution. In this paper ethics is the mainstream philosophy which studies and analyses the values of both the traditional societies and modern ones. This paper is only the ethical study of the traditional values and modern values. There are three ways to philosophize societies as traditional and modern: Ethical perspective, economical and theological, but this paper deals only with the ethical approach. Philosophers from ancient to (...) modern era played an important part in the transformation of traditional into modern. Morality and religion changed the mind of the nations towards development and ethical progress. In this article ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, modern philosophy and others religious philosophies of India, china, and Muslim philosophies exercised key attempts to study traditional societies and modern societies. This paper highlights the factors that are responsible for the vices in traditional societies and also the elements that are productive for the promotion of modern societies. (shrink)

Reading Gramsci and Reading Althusser A Philosophy for Dialectical Materialism -Irfan Ajvazi.

Many contemporary moral theories accept and rely upon a singular (often unstated) premise. Contractualisms, traditionally construed rights theories and Millian utilitarianisms all accept a uniquely indefensible claim about the nature of the moral value of rationality. As a result, these moral theories are, despite their differences, equally and seriously marked for reliance on what I will call "the rationality premise". In this work I explain how it is that said reliance guarantees that a theory is impervious to demonstration of soundness. (...) My conclusion deals a serious blow to any theory which relies on the aforementioned premise. (I elsewhere defend an "alternative rights theory" which does not turn on the unique value of rationality, or reason. The work at hand provides the groundwork necessary to a move away from longstanding insistence on human superiority in the carving out of moral theory. (shrink)

Repeating Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

针对价值抉择难题存在不同的解决模式，以比较的视野检视几种有代表性 的模式，可以更加直观地展示它们的优缺点，从相对意义上凸显出当下存在的更为有效的 解决方案。 首先是罗蒂的自我实现与公民同胞等量齐观模式，此模式过于依赖个人与社 会两个领域的简单区分，同时也低估了不同诉求之间的张力；其次是伯林的不同价值体系 非此即彼模式，此模式夸大了不同价值体系的截然对立，错误地认为互有张力的价值不能 在同一价值体系里共存；最后是更具可行性的儒道互补模式，此模式重新解读儒道互补， 通过价值配置的方式解决了不可通约价值之间的张力问题，它允许多元价值体系的共存 和互补，从而有助于相辅相成地达成个人生活与社会的和谐。.

本文对文化的价值多样性进行多元的理解，集中阐述和讨论“文化的价值组合配置”(cultural configurations of values)概念。主要包括以下几个要点：(1)在世界的各种文化中，人类的价值有不同的表现形式，但其基本价值是相似的，甚至相同的。(2)人类的各种基本价值之间不但有互相促进的关系，也有相互矛盾、相互竞 争、相互冲突的关系。(3)一种文化类型提供对相互冲突的价值的一种处理方式。不同的文化形成其各自的价值组合与配置。这种价值的配置与其社会环境相适应，是其文化的核心部分。文化差异性的一个重要方面就是，尽管 所有文化共有这些基本价值，但是他们会给予这些价值不同的权重，形成不同的价值配置形式。(4)有时在同一个社会里，会存在若干“亚文化”，会有不同的价值配置。随着时间的推移，文化和社会都会有改变。虽然它们在 价值组合配置普世化上可能永远无法达成一致，但是它们之间的共同价值为和平共处提供了基础。.

The paper argues that the moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is unified by a complex conception of reason that imposes consistency norms of both rationality and reasonableness. Hobbes’s conceptions of rightness as reciprocity, and moral goodness as sociability belong to an original and attractive moral theory that is neither teleological nor classically deontological, nor as interpreters have variously argued, subjectivist, contractarian, egoist, or dependent on divine command.

With this article, the author argues that in reality nothing is or isn’t itself, that everything is both a relative proof and an absolute proof of God’s existence, and that our language, such as “nature” or “god”, is the only obstacle between Nature and God.

Se realiza un análisis de las identidades desde una perspectiva axiológica y se valora el papel de la educación en el fomento preservación de las identidades. La educación constituye el mecanismo fundamental para la conformación de una identidad propia, proceso que conduce no sólo al autorreconocimiento del individuo como personalidad única e irrepetible, sino también al sentimiento de pertenencia a grupos humanos que van desde los más particulares hasta los más universales. Las identidades presuponen la asunción colectiva de valores comunes (...) y el sentimiento de pertenencia a una comunidad y, por lo tanto, una actitud subjetiva compartida. (shrink)

The growing appreciation of the global environmental crisis has generated what should have been a predictable response: those with power are using it to appropriate for themselves the world’s diminishing resources, augmenting their power to do so while further undermining the power of the weak to oppose them. In taking this path, they are at the same time blocking efforts to create forms of society that would be ecologically sustainable. If there is one word that could bring into focus what (...) is wrong with this response it is ‘democracy’. Democracy means power in the hands of the people, which, by definition, means opposition to the concentration of power. It is inconceivable that if we had genuine democracy, where people were fully informed of the issues, they would not choose to share the burdens of scarcity and organize to live in accordance with the limits of their environment. Yet the notion of democracy is problematic. Those striving to concentrate power are pursuing this in the name of democracy. They have identified democracy with the imposition of free markets and the freedom of people to use their wealth to dominate others. In this paper I will show how process philosophy provides the basis for justifying and further developing the traditional notion of democracy to counter this reformed notion, providing a vision of a democratic form of society that could address environmental problems. To achieve this, I will argue, it is necessary to reformulate the grand narrative of civilization on the basis of human ecology, a science which, construing humans as participants in a creative nature, can replace economics as the master science for formulating public policy. (shrink)

In one of his arguments for taking compassion to be the basis of morality, Schopenhauer offers a thought experiment involving two characters: Titus and Caius. The 'Titus Argument,' as I call it, has been misunderstood by many of Schopenhauer's readers, but is, I argue, worthy of attention by contemporary ethicists and metaethicists. In this chapter, I clarify the argument's structure, methodology, and its key philosophical move, drawing comparisons with Newton's experimental methodology in optics and Raimond Gaita's moral parodies.

From the earliest times, American ethics, the rules for the moral \& intellectual life of the West, used to be founded upon the two principles of self-reliance and good neighborliness. Here we consider the underlying functions of neural brain circuits, organic structures that have evolved adaptively by Darwinian rules subject to selection pressure. In the left brain resides our self-reliant private Ego, making plans, launching initiatives. Your public Ego dwells in the right brain, looking around, meeting with your friendly neighbor. (...) A main component is our bilateral interior cosmos, providing us with all the detailed information about our environment as well as the universe at large. (shrink)

The current global COVID-19 pandemic has led to a deep and multidimensional crisis across all sectors of society. As countries contemplate their mobility and social-distancing policy restrictions, we have a unique opportunity to re-imagine the deliberative frameworks and value priorities in our food systems. Pre-pandemic food systems at global, national, regional and local scales already needed revision to chart a common vision for sustainable and ethical food futures. Re-orientation is also needed by the relevant sciences, traditionally siloed in their disciplines (...) and without adequate attention paid to how the food system problem is variously framed by diverse stakeholders according to their values. From the transdisciplinary perspective of food ethics, we argue that a post-pandemic scheme focused on bottom-up, regional, cross-sectoral and non-partisan deliberation may provide the re-orientation and benchmarks needed for not only more sustainable, but also more ethical food futures. (shrink)

In the evolution of Chinese and Western literatures, the emphasis on the "strength" of "courage" is gradually given to the "mind" of "courage", that is the intention of the Agent. The connotation of Chinese and Western traditional thoughts of "courage" reflected in the distinction between the "physical courage" and "moral courage". Philosophers distinguish moral courage from physical courage, which does not seem to be clear and complete. Moral courage however as moral elements have been distinguished from "courage as a virtue". (...) The behavior of "moral courage" must be "supernormal behavior", which is the embodiment of moral choice and moral practice in a specific situation. The Agent of "moral courage" has particularity, the behavior itself is in a certain situation, and the behavioral consequences show severe. (shrink)