Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?

In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer. pp. 307-25 (2018)
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Abstract
Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well- placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences). In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of credences and the notion of probability involved in their treatment. I argue that the notion of probability in question can only be an epistemic (or evidential) kind of probability. I conclude that the resulting theory will be incompatible with Reliabilism in one important respect: it cannot deliver on the reductivist promise of Reliabilism. I also argue that attention to the justification of basic beliefs reveals limitations in the Evidentialist framework as well. The theory that results from the right combination of Evidentialism and Reliabilism, therefore, is neither Evidentialist nor Reliabilist.
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Archival date: 2018-12-28
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Time and Chance.Albert, David
Evidentialism.Feldman, Richard & Conee, Earl

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