How Transparent is Disgust?

European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1810-1823 (2017)
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Abstract

According to the so-called transparency thesis, what is disgusting in nature cannot but be disgusting in art. This paper critically discusses the arguments that have been put forward in favour of the transparency thesis, starting with Korsmeyer's (2011) sensory view of disgust. As an alternative, it offers an account of the relationship between disgust and representation that explains, at least in part, whatever truth there is in the transparency thesis. Such an account appeals to a distinction between object-centric and situation-centric emotions.

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Filippo Contesi
Universitat de Barcelona

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