Epistemic truth and excluded middle

Theoria 64 (2-3):243-282 (1998)
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Abstract
Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution.
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1998
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References found in this work BETA
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Quine, Willard V. O.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Dummett, Michael A. E.
The Seas of Language.Dummett, Michael

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