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  1. added 2018-06-26
    James' Pragmatic Account of Intentionality and Truth.Henry Jackman - 1998 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 34 (1):155-181.
    William James presents a preference-sensitive and future-directed notion of truth that has struck many as wildly revisionary. This paper argues that such a reaction usually results from failing to see how his accounts of truth and intentionality are intertwined. James' forward-looking account of intentionality (or "knowing") compares favorably the 'causal' and 'resemblance-driven' accounts that have been popular since his day, and it is only when his remarks about truth are placed in the context of his account of intentionality that they (...)
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  2. added 2018-02-26
    Logic, Logical Form and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - forthcoming - Analysis:anx165.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of (...)
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  3. added 2018-01-12
    Williams’s Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality.Matthieu Queloz - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18 (17):1-20.
    In Truth and Truthfulness, Bernard Williams sought to defend the value of truth by giving a vindicatory genealogy revealing its instrumental value. But what separates Williams’s instrumental vindication from the indirect utilitarianism of which he was a critic? And how can genealogy vindicate anything, let alone something which, as Williams says of the concept of truth, does not have a history? In this paper, I propose to resolve these puzzles by reading Williams as a type of pragmatist and his genealogy (...)
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  4. added 2017-05-09
    Brandom, Robert. From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. Pp. 289. $35.00. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):808-816.
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  5. added 2017-04-27
    O Componente Pragmatista do Perspectivismo Nietzscheano.Pietro Gori - 2016 - Estudos Nietzsche 7 (2):85-101.
    During his late period, Nietzsche focused on the problem of the “value of truth”, since according to him it plays an important role on Western culture and its anthropology. That reflection had been influenced by some outcomes of the late-nineteenth century scientific research, and can be therefore compared with other strategies that, during those years, faced the relativism implied in modern epistemology, e.g. William James’s Pragmatism. This paper aims to explore the pragmatic feature of Nietzsche’s investigation on truth. As will (...)
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  6. added 2016-12-28
    Philosophical Commitments, Empirical Evidence, and Theoretical Psychology.Allen Pamela - 2015 - Theory and Psychology 25 (1):03-24.
    The philosophical or theoretical commitments informing psychological research are sometimes characterized, even by theoretical psychologists themselves, as nonempirical, outside the bounds of methodological consideration, and/or nonrational. We argue that this characterization is incoherent. We illustrate our concern by analogy with problematic appeals to Kuhn’s work that have been influential in theoretical psychology. Following the contemporary pragmatist tradition, we argue that our philosophical/theoretical commitments are part of our larger webs of belief, and that for any of these beliefs to have meaning (...)
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  7. added 2016-08-12
    The Nature of Truth.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, Robert James M. Boyles, Mark Anthony Dacela & Victorino Raymundo Lualhati - 2013 - In Leni Garcia (ed.), Exploring the Philosophical Terrain. C&E Publishing. pp. 38–50.
    This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the problems (...)
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  8. added 2016-06-03
    On Alethic Functionalism’s (Absurdly?) Wide Applicability.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):29-39.
    Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch’s “one and many” strategy to other debates, I try to show how his argumentative steps can be used to solve — not just the controversy pertaining to truth — but any controversy that surrounds a “What is X?” question.
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  9. added 2015-12-23
    Debate on the Notion of Truth in the Phil Sci (科学哲学中有关科学真理性的争论)).Xinli Wang & 王 新力 - 1988 - Developments in Philosophy of China (国内哲学动态) (115):9-15.
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  10. added 2015-11-07
    Epistemic Theories of Truth: The Justifiability Paradox Investigated.Vincent C. Müller & Christian Stein - 1996 - In C. Martínez Vidal, U. Rivas Monroy & L. Villegas Forero (eds.), Verdad: Lógica, Representatión y Mundo. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. pp. 95-104.
    Epistemic theories of truth, such as those presumed to be typical for anti-realism, can be characterised as saying that what is true can be known in principle: p → ◊Kp. However, with statements of the form “p & ¬Kp”, a contradiction arises if they are both true and known. Analysis of the nature of the paradox shows that such statements refute epistemic theories of truth only if the the anti-realist motivation for epistemic theories of truth is not taken into account. (...)
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  11. added 2014-10-11
    World Navels.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2014 - Cartouche of the Canadian Cartographic Association 89:15-21.
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  12. added 2014-04-02
    Nietzsche on Truth: A Pragmatic View?Pietro Gori - 2013 - In Renate Reschke (ed.), Nietzscheforschung. Akademie Verlag.
    In this paper I deal with Nietzsche's theory of knowledge in the context of 19th century epistemology. In particular, I argue that, even though Nietzsche shows the ontological lack of content of truths (both on the theoretic and on the moral plane), he nevertheless leaves the space for a practical use of them, in a way that can be compared with William James' pragmatism. I thus deal with Nietzsche's and James' concept of "truth", and show their relationship with some outcomes (...)
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  13. added 2014-03-27
    Epistemic Truth and Excluded Middle.Cesare Cozzo - 1998 - Theoria 64 (2-3):243-282.
    Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution.
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  14. added 2014-03-13
    Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability.Glen Hoffmann - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):287-299.
    The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true if and only if it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by James Van Cleve (1996) and Terrence Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally illegitimate in a similar sense that unsophisticated epistemic (...)
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  15. added 2012-12-05
    Truth, Reference, and Realism: Putnam's Challenge.Allen Porter - manuscript
    The question of truth is perhaps a perennial question of philosophy. Is truth “merely” epistemological, a function of contingent human practices and conventions, or should we adopt a stonger, metaphysical conception of truth along realist lines, understood as correspondence with objectively existing reality? In this paper I examine a famous debate in the analytic philosophy of language that hinges on the status of truth – specifically, the challenge to traditional or metaphysical realism posed by Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic argument and the (...)
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  16. added 2012-06-11
    A Wittgensteinian Argument Against Pluralism of Truth.Francois-Igor Pris - manuscript
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