Dualism, Monism, Physicalism

Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85 (2000)
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Abstract
Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism , but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena or it must give an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms . There is little reason to call a view which is not reductive in either of these senses “physicalism”. If reduction is rejected, then a non-physicalist form of monism is still available, which may be called “emergentism”
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References found in this work BETA
Mental Events.Davidson, Donald
There is No Question of Physicalism.Crane, Tim & Mellor, D. H.

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2009-01-28

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