Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469 (2009)
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Abstract
It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content.
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Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.

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2009-01-28

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