On the metaphysics of species

Philosophy of Science 71 (2):156-173 (2004)
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Abstract
This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional "species problem," in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals. I develop the idea that species names are rigid designators and show how this provides additional motivation for SAI.
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Archival date: 2016-08-25
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.

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Citations of this work BETA
When Traditional Essentialism Fails.Wilson, Robert A.; Barker, Matthew J. & Brigandt, Ingo
A Pragmatic Approach to the Possibility of de-Extinction.Slater, Matthew H. & Clatterbuck, Hayley
Species as a Process.Rieppel, Olivier

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