Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory

Sean Crawford

Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory

Topoi 39 (2):439-457 (2020)

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Abstract

The paper presents a new theory of perceptual demonstrative thought, the property-dependent theory. It argues that the theory is superior to both the object-dependent theory (Evans, McDowell) and the object-independent theory (Burge).

Keywords

perceptual demonstrative thought Tyler Burge Gareth Evans John McDowell object-dependent thought truth conditional semantics de re belief perceptual content

Categories

Context and Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

De Re Belief in Philosophy of Mind

Object-Dependent Contents in Philosophy of Mind

The Contents of Perception, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

Truth-Conditional Theories in Philosophy of Language

Varieties of Content Externalism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

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ISBN(s)

DOI

10.1007/s11245-017-9537-x

PhilPapers/Archive ID

CRAPDT

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Archival date: 2018-03-09
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