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  1. added 2019-06-05
    Embedding Irony and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction.Mihaela Popa-Wyatt - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):674-699.
    This paper argues that we need to re-think the semantics/pragmatics distinction in the light of new evidence from embedding of irony. This raises a new version of the old problem of ‘embedded implicatures’. I argue that embedded irony isn’t fully explained by solutions proposed for other embedded implicatures. I first consider two strategies: weak pragmatics and strong pragmatics. These explain embedded irony as truth-conditional content. However, by trying to shoehorn irony into said-content, they raise problems of their own. I conclude (...)
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  2. added 2019-06-05
    Homophonic Prejudices.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - Critica 40 (120):67-84.
    I critically discuss some aspects of Mark Sainsbury's Reference without Referents, from an otherwise sympathetic viewpoint. My objections focus on the adequacy of the truth-conditional framework that Sainsbury presupposes. I argue that, as semantic theories, truth-conditional accounts are both too ambitious, and too austere to be fully explanatory, and that both problems have consequences for an account of reference. The latter problem has to do with the difficulties to capture in a truth-conditional framework the descriptive contribution of indexicals and, in (...)
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  3. added 2019-04-22
    Discourse and Method.Ethan Nowak & Eliot Michaelson - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-20.
    Stojnić et al. (2013, 2017) argue that the reference of demonstratives is fixed without any contribution from the extra-linguistic context. On their `prominence/coherence' theory, the reference of a demonstrative expression depends only on its context-independent linguistic meaning. Here, we argue that Stojnić et al.’s striking claims can be maintained in only the thinnest technical sense. Instead of eliminating appeals to the extra-linguistic context, we show how the prominence/coherence theory merely suppresses them. Then we ask why one might be tempted to (...)
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  4. added 2019-04-11
    The Use of the Binding Argument in the Debate About Location.Dan Zeman - 2017 - In Sarah-Jane Conrad & Klaus Petrus (eds.), Meaning, Context and Methodology. Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 191-212.
    In this paper I inquire into the methodological status of one of the arguments that have figured prominently in contemporary debates about the semantics of a variety of expressions, the so-called “Binding Argument”. My inquiry is limited to the case of meteorological sentences like “It is raining”, but my conclusion can be extended to other types of sentences as well. Following Jason Stanley, I distinguish between three interpretations of the argument. My focus is on the third, weakest interpretation, according to (...)
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  5. added 2019-04-11
    Overcoming the Obstacles to the Relativity of Truth.Dan Zeman - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2):232-241.
    This is a reply to Tomas Marvan's paper "Obstacles to the Relativity of Truth", published in the same issue, in which I attempt to provide an interpretation of the relativist schema "x is true relative to y" by understanding x as ranging over propositions and y as ranging over circumstances of evaluation, as in the familiar Kaplanian picture of semantics. I then answer some of Marvan's worries and reject certain views considered relativist on the basis that they are, in fact, (...)
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  6. added 2019-01-04
    Do We Need Dynamic Semantics?Karen S. Lewis - 2014 - In Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 231-258.
    I suspect the answer to the question in the title of this paper is no. But the scope of my paper will be considerably more limited: I will be concerned with whether certain types of considerations that are commonly cited in favor of dynamic semantics do in fact push us towards a dynamic semantics. Ultimately, I will argue that the evidence points to a dynamics of discourse that is best treated pragmatically, rather than as part of the semantics.
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  7. added 2018-09-06
    Talking About Trees and Truth-Conditions.Reinhard Muskens - 2001 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (4):417-455.
    We present Logical Description Grammar (LDG), a model ofgrammar and the syntax-semantics interface based on descriptions inelementary logic. A description may simultaneously describe the syntacticstructure and the semantics of a natural language expression, i.e., thedescribing logic talks about the trees and about the truth-conditionsof the language described. Logical Description Grammars offer a naturalway of dealing with underspecification in natural language syntax andsemantics. If a logical description (up to isomorphism) has exactly onetree plus truth-conditions as a model, it completely specifies thatgrammatical (...)
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  8. added 2018-08-17
    Polysemy and Co-Predication.Marina Ortega AndrÉs & Agustin Vicente - forthcoming - Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics.
    Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We (...)
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  9. added 2018-06-16
    Two Switches in the Theory of Counterfactuals.Ivano Ciardelli, Linmin Zhang & Lucas Champollion - 2018 - Linguistics and Philosophy (6).
    Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: (...)
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  10. added 2018-04-03
    Putting Inferentialism and the Suppositional Theory of Conditionals to the Test (Second Dissertation, Psychology).Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Freiburg
    This dissertation is devoted to empirically contrasting the Suppositional Theory of conditionals, which holds that indicative conditionals serve the purpose of engaging in hypothetical thought, and Inferentialism, which holds that indicative conditionals express reason relations. Throughout a series of experiments, probabilistic and truth-conditional variants of Inferentialism are investigated using new stimulus materials, which manipulate previously overlooked relevance conditions. These studies are some of the first published studies to directly investigate the central claims of Inferentialism empirically. In contrast, the Suppositional Theory (...)
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  11. added 2018-03-19
    The Notion of Truth in Natural and Formal Languages.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    For any natural (human) or formal (mathematical) language L we know that an expression X of language L is true if and only if there are expressions Γ of language L that connect X to known facts. -/- By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that evaluate to neither True nor False.
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  12. added 2018-03-09
    Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory.Sean Crawford - forthcoming - Topoi:1-19.
    The paper presents a new theory of perceptual demonstrative thought, the property-dependent theory. It argues that the theory is superior to both the object-dependent theory (Evans, McDowell) and the object-independent theory (Burge).
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  13. added 2018-01-15
    Truth-Theoretic Semantics and Its Limits.Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - Argumenta (3):21-38.
    Donald Davidson was one of the most influential philosophers of the last half of the 20th century, especially in the theory of meaning and in the philosophy of mind and action. In this paper, I concentrate on a field-shaping proposal of Davidson’s in the theory of meaning, arguably his most influential, namely, that insight into meaning may be best pursued by a bit of indirection, by showing how appropriate knowledge of a finitely axiomatized truth theory for a language can put (...)
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  14. added 2017-07-21
    Deflating the Determination Argument.Jared Henderson - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):167-177.
    This article argues for the compatibility of deflationism and truth-conditional semantic theories. I begin by focusing on an argument due to Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk, and William Lycan for incompatibility, arguing that their argument relies on an ambiguity between two senses of the expression ‘is at least.’ I go on to show how the disambiguated arguments have different consequences for the deflationist, and argue that no conclusions are established that the deflationist cannot accommodate. I then respond to some objections and (...)
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  15. added 2017-05-06
    Descriptions and Non-Doxastic Attitude Ascriptions.Wojciech Rostworowski - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1311-1331.
    This paper addresses a certain objection to the quantificational theory of definite descriptions. According to this objection, the quantificational account cannot provide correct interpretations of definite descriptions embedded in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions and therefore ought to be rejected. In brief, the objection says that the quantificational theory is committed to the view that a sentence of the form “The F is G” is equivalent to the claim that there is a unique F and it is G, while the ascription (...)
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  16. added 2017-05-01
    Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics.Justin Khoo & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Noûs:109-143.
    When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences, it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences. This inference then plays a key role in a now-standard argument against certain theories (...)
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  17. added 2017-03-27
    Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge of Truth-Conditions.Chase Wrenn - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (3):355-370.
    What do you know when you know what a sentence means? According to some theories, understanding a sentence is, in part, knowing its truth-conditions. Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk, and William Lycan have defended such theories on the grounds of an “epistemic determination argument”. That argument turns on the ideas that understanding a sentence, along with knowledge of the non-linguistic facts, suffices to know its truth-value, and that being able to determine a sentence’s truth-value given knowledge of the non-linguistic facts is (...)
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  18. added 2016-09-30
    The Antinomy of the Variable: A Tarskian Resolution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (3):137-170.
    Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ (...)
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  19. added 2016-09-27
    Expressivism by Force.Seth Yalcin - forthcoming - In D. Fogal, D. Harris & M. Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts. Oxford University Press.
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  20. added 2016-09-19
    Reference and Extension.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & James McGilvray - 2010 - In P. C. Horgan (ed.), The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of the Language Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
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  21. added 2016-09-10
    The Lying Test.Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):470-499.
    As an empirical inquiry into the nature of meaning, semantics must rely on data. Unfortunately, the primary data to which philosophers and linguists have traditionally appealed—judgments on the truth and falsity of sentences—have long been known to vary widely between competent speakers in a number of interesting cases. The present article constitutes an experiment in how to obtain some more consistent data for the enterprise of semantics. Specifically, it argues from some widely accepted Gricean premises to the conclusion that judgments (...)
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  22. added 2016-08-22
    Lexical Flexibility, Natural Language, and Ontology.Christopher A. Vogel - 2016 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):1-44.
    The Realist that investigates questions of ontology by appeal to the quantificational structure of language assumes that the semantics for the privileged language of ontology is externalist. I argue that such a language cannot be (some variant of) a natural language, as some Realists propose. The flexibility exhibited by natural language expressions noted by Chomsky and others cannot obviously be characterized by the rigid models available to the externalist. If natural languages are hostile to externalist treatments, then the meanings of (...)
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  23. added 2016-08-03
    Davidson’s Account Of Truth And Fictional Meaning.Michael Bourke - 2012 - Praxis 3 (2):1-27.
    Fictional and non-fictional texts rely on the same language to express their meaning; yet many philosophers in the analytic tradition would say, with reason, that fictional texts literally make no truth claims, or more modestly that the rhetorical and literary devices to which fiction and non-fiction writers alike have recourse are unconnected to truth or have no propositional content. These related views are associated with a doctrine in the philosophy of language, most notably advanced by the late Donald Davidson, which (...)
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  24. added 2016-07-27
    Generalized Quantifiers: Logic and Language.Duilio D'Alfonso - 2011 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 9 (No. 1):85-94.
    The Generalized Quantifiers Theory, I will argue, in the second half of last Century has led to an important rapprochement, relevant both in logic and in linguistics, between logical quantification theories and the semantic analysis of quantification in natural languages. In this paper I concisely illustrate the formal aspects and the theoretical implications of this rapprochement.
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  25. added 2016-07-18
    Truth in the Theory of Meaning.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - In Kirk Ludwig & Ernest Lepore (eds.), A Companion to Donald Davidson (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy). Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 175-190.
    This chapter reviews interpretations of Davidson's project in the theory of meaning and argues against a variety of views according to which Davidson intended to reduce meaning to some variety of truth conditions or replace the project of giving a theory of meaning with a theory of truth, and in support of interpreting him as offering an indirect way of achieving the goals of the traditional project by appeal to knowledge of facts about a semantic theory of truth for the (...)
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  26. added 2016-07-18
    The Truth About Moods.Kirk Ludwig - 1997 - ProtoSociology 10:19-66.
    Assertoric sentences are sentences which admit of truth or falsity. Non-assertoric sentences, imperatives and interrogatives, have long been a source of difficulty for the view that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as the core of a theory of meaning. The trouble for truth-theoretic semantics posed by non-assertoric sentences is that, prima facie, it does not make sense to say that imperatives, such as 'Cut your hair', or interrogatives such as 'What time is it?', are truth (...)
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  27. added 2016-05-12
    Truth Ascriptions, Falsity Ascriptions, and the Paratactic Analysis of Indirect Discourse.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2015 - Logique Et Analyse (232):527-534.
    This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumptions regarding the adequacy of the kind of semantic theory he (...)
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  28. added 2016-02-02
    Tensed Meaning.Heather Dyke - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:65-81.
    If, as the new B-theory of time maintains, tensed sentences have tenseless truth conditions, it follows that it is possible for two sentence-tokens to have the sametruth conditions but different meanings. This conclusion forces a rethink of the traditional identification of truth conditions with meaning. There is an aspect of the meanings of tensed sentences that is not captured by their truth conditions, and that has so far eluded explanation. In this paper I intend to locate, examine, and explain this (...)
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  29. added 2016-01-26
    Two Notions of Logical Form.Andrea Iacona - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (12):617-643.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of the two roles. (...)
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  30. added 2016-01-12
    Does the Expressive Role of ‘True’ Preclude Deflationary Davidsonian Semantics?Steven Gross - 2015 - In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 47-63.
    Can one combine Davidsonian semantics with a deflationary conception of truth? Williams argues, contra a common worry, that Davidsonian semantics does not require truth-talk to play an explanatory role. Horisk replies that, in any event, the expressive role of truth-talk that Williams emphasizes disqualifies deflationary accounts—at least extant varieties—from combination with Davidsonian semantics. She argues, in particular, that this is so for Quine's disquotationalism, Horwich's minimalism, and Brandom's prosententialism. I argue that Horisk fails to establish her claim in all three (...)
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  31. added 2015-11-18
    Tempered Pragmatism.Ian Rumfitt - forthcoming - In Cheryl Misak & Huw Price (eds.), Pragmatism in the Long Twentieth Century: Proceedings of the 2014 Dawes Hicks Symposium. British Academy.
    This paper assesses the prospects of a pragmatist theory of content. I begin by criticising the theory presented in D.H. Mellor’s essay ‘Successful Semantics’. I then identify problems and lacunae in the pragmatist theory of meaning sketched in Chapter 13 of Dummett’s The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. The prospects are brighter, I contend, for a tempered pragmatism, in which the theory of content is permitted to draw upon irreducible notions of truth and falsity. I sketch the shape of such a (...)
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  32. added 2015-09-30
    Review of "Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications", Edited by John MacFarlane. [REVIEW]Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):95-98.
    This is a book review of John MacFarlane's "Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.".
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  33. added 2015-09-14
    Borg’s Minimalism and the Problem of Paradox.Mark Pinder - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries. De Gruyter. pp. 207-230.
    According to Emma Borg, minimalism is (roughly) the view that natural language sentences have truth conditions, and that these truth conditions are fully determined by syntactic structure and lexical content. A principal motivation for her brand of minimalism is that it coheres well with the popular view that semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a minimal semantic theory. In this paper, I argue that the liar paradox presents a serious problem for this principal motivation. Two lines of response (...)
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  34. added 2015-07-20
    The Structure of Semantic Competence: Compositionality as an Innate Constraint of The Faculty of Language.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (4):375–413.
    This paper defends the view that the Faculty of Language is compositional, i.e., that it computes the meaning of complex expressions from the meanings of their immediate constituents and their structure. I fargue that compositionality and other competing constraints on the way in which the Faculty of Language computes the meanings of complex expressions should be understood as hypotheses about innate constraints of the Faculty of Language. I then argue that, unlike compositionality, most of the currently available non-compositional constraints predict (...)
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  35. added 2015-05-19
    Instrument Metapher: Das Guanzhuibian Im Licht der Manuskriptforschung (English Summary).Viatcheslav Vetrov - 2015 - LIT.
    A summary of my book on Western metaphor theories in the work of a prominent Chinese intellectual Qian Zhongshu. Qian's scepticism of metaphysics is discussed against the background of a global "post-modern" metaphor discourse in which metaphor is increasingly divested of its once important metaphysical qualities.
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  36. added 2015-04-02
    Anaphoric Deflationism and Theories of Meaning.David Löwenstein - 2010 - In Theodora Achourioti, Edgar Andrade & Marc Staudacher (eds.), Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference. Meaning and Truth. Amsterdam, October 1-3, 2009. ILLC Publications. pp. 52-66.
    It is widely held that truth and reference play an indispensable explanatory role in theories of meaning. By contrast, so-called deflationists argue that the functions of these concepts are merely expressive and never explanatory. Robert Brandom has proposed both a variety of deflationism — the anaphoric theory —, and a theory of meaning — inferentialism — which doesn’t rely on truth or reference. He argues that the anaphoric theory counts against his (chiefly referentialist) rivals in the debate on meaning and (...)
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  37. added 2015-03-30
    Dual Content Semantics, Privative Adjectives and Dynamic Compositionality.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2015 - Semantics and Pragmatics 8 (7):1-53.
    This paper defends the view that common nouns have a dual semantic structure that includes extension-determining and non-extension-determining components. I argue that the non-extension-determining components are part of linguistic meaning because they play a key compositional role in certain constructions, especially in privative noun phrases such as "fake gun" and "counterfeit document". Furthermore, I show that if we modify the compositional interpretation rules in certain simple ways, this dual content account of noun phrase modification can be implemented in a type-driven (...)
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  38. added 2014-07-29
    What is Literal Meaning?John-Michael Kuczynski - 2014 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 46 (1-4).
    The meaning of morpheme (a minimal unit of linguistic significance) cannot diverge from what it is taken to mean. But the meaning of a complex expression can diverge without limit from what it is taken to mean, given that the meaning of such an expression is a logical consequence of the meanings of its parts, coupled with the fact that people are not infallible ratiocinators. Nonetheless, given Chomsky’s distinction between competence (ability) and performance (ability to deploy ability), what a complex (...)
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  39. added 2014-05-09
    The Green Leaves and the Expert: Polysemy and Truth-Conditional Variability.Agustin Vicente - 2015 - Lingua 157:54-65.
    Polysemy seems to be a relatively neglected phenomenon within philosophy of language as well as in many quarters in linguistic semantics. Not all variations in a word’s contribution to truth-conditional contents are to be thought as expressions of the phenomenon of polysemy, but it can be argued that many are. Polysemous terms are said to contribute senses or aspects to truth-conditional contents. In this paper, I will make use of the notion of aspect to argue that some apparently wild variations (...)
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  40. added 2014-04-02
    Maps and Meaning.Ben Blumson - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:123-128.
    It's possible to understand an infinite number of novel maps. I argue that Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi's compositional semantics of maps cannot explain this possibility, because it requires an infinite number of semantic primitives. So the semantics of maps is puzzlingly different from the semantics of language.
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  41. added 2014-03-26
    Davidson, First-Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics.Steven Gross - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press. pp. 228-48.
    Donald Davidson aims to illuminate the concept of meaning by asking: What knowledge would suffice to put one in a position to understand the speech of another, and what evidence sufficiently distant from the concepts to be illuminated could in principle ground such knowledge? Davidson answers: knowledge of an appropriate truth-theory for the speaker’s language, grounded in what sentences the speaker holds true, or prefers true, in what circumstances. In support of this answer, he both outlines such a truth-theory for (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-16
    Meaning Without Analyticity: Essays on Logic, Language and Meaning.H. G. Callaway - 2008 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Meaning without Analyticity draws upon the author’s essays and articles, over a period of 20 years, focused on language, logic and meaning. The book explores the prospect of a non-behavioristic theory of cognitive meaning which rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction, Quinean behaviorism, and the logical and social-intellectual excesses of extreme holism. Cast in clear, perspicuous language and oriented to scientific discussions, this book takes up the challenges of philosophical communication and evaluation implicit in the recent revival of the pragmatist tradition—especially those (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-12
    The Logical Vs. The Ontological Understanding of Conditions.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):129-137.
    According to the truth-functional analysis of conditions, to be ‘necessary for’ and ‘sufficient for’ are converse relations. From this, it follows that to be ‘necessary and sufficient for’ is a symmetric relation, that is, that if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is a necessary and sufficient condition for P. This view is contrary to common sense. In this paper, I point out that it is also contrary to a widely accepted ontological view of conditions, (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-11
    Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious.Steven Gross - 2010 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication.
    This paper motivates two bases for ascribing propositional semantic knowledge (or something knowledgelike): first, because it’s necessary to rationalize linguistic action; and, second, because it’s part of an empirical theory that would explain various aspects of linguistic behavior. The semantic knowledge ascribed on these two bases seems to differ in content, epistemic status, and cognitive role. This raises the question: how are they related, if at all? The bulk of the paper addresses this question. It distinguishes a variety of answers (...)
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  45. added 2014-03-06
    On Truth-Functionality.Daniel J. Hill & Stephen K. Mcleod - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):628-632.
    Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is immune from the counterexamples that Schnieder proposes and is (...)
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  46. added 2013-11-14
    Logical Form.Miguel Hoeltje - 2013 - In Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), A Companion to Donald Davidson (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy). Blackwell.
    Donald Davidson contributed to the discussion of logical form in two ways. On the one hand, he made several influential suggestions on how to give the logical forms of certain constructions of natural language. His account of adverbial modification and so called action-sentences is nowadays, in some form or other, widely employed in linguistics (Harman (forthcoming) calls it "the standard view"). Davidson's approaches to indirect discourse and quotation, while not as influential, also still attract attention today. On the other hand, (...)
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  47. added 2013-10-05
    Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2013 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4):445-452.
    This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
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  48. added 2012-12-24
    Outline for a Truth-Conditional Semantics for Tense.Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Tense, Time and Reference. MIT Press. pp. 49-105.
    Our aim in the present paper is to investigate, from the standpoint of truth-theoretic semantics, English tense, temporal designators and quantifiers, and other expressions we use to relate ourselves and other things to the temporal order. Truth-theoretic semantics provides a particularly illuminating standpoint from which to discuss issues about the semantics of tense, and their relation to thoughts at, and about, times. Tense, and temporal modifiers, contribute systematically to conditions under which sentences we utter are true or false. A Tarski-style (...)
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  49. added 2012-08-20
    Semantic Minimalism.Agustin Vicente & Fernando Martinez-Manrique - 2010 - Oxford Bibliographies On-Line.
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  50. added 2012-07-10
    A Never-Ending Story.Ben Blumson - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):111-120.
    Take a strip of paper with 'once upon a time there'‚ written on one side and 'was a story that began'‚ on the other. Twisting the paper and joining the ends produces John Barth’s story Frame-Tale, which prefixes 'once upon a time there was a story that began'‚ to itself. I argue that the ability to understand this sentence cannot be explained by tacit knowledge of a recursive theory of truth in English.
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