Singular Thought

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Abstract
A singular thought can be characterized as a thought which is directed at just one object. The term ‘thought’ can apply to episodes of thinking, or to the content of the episode (what is thought). This paper argues that episodes of thinking can be just as singular, in the above sense, when they are directed at things that do not exist as when they are directed at things that do exist. In this sense, then, singular thoughts are not object-dependent.
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2011
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CRAST-3
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Archival date: 2016-09-28
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References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
The Varieties of Reference.Antony, Louise M.; Evans, Gareth & McDowell, John
Word and Object.Quine, Willard Van Orman
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.

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Citations of this work BETA
Perceptual Particularity.Schellenberg, Susanna

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2011-04-03

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