The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs

Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685 (1989)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The belief puzzles (Hesperus, Cicero, Pierre) involve reports about two different notions. So the analysis gets the puzzling truth values right.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CRITPA-5
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-12-28
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Classical Opacity.Michael Caie, Jeremy Goodman & Harvey Lederman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 111 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
701 ( #3,380 of 41,622 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #17,829 of 41,622 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.