Expert-oriented abilities vs. novice-oriented abilities: An alternative account of epistemic authority

Episteme 15 (4):476-498 (2018)
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Abstract
According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones than they are in some domain. Christoph J├Ąger (2016) has recently raised several objections to her view. By contrast, I argue that both theories fail to adequately capture what epistemic authority is, and I offer an alternative account grounded in the abilities that different kinds of authorities are required to possess.
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Archival date: 2017-04-19
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