Moral Enhancement Can Kill

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584 (2018)
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There is recent empirical evidence that personal identity is constituted by one’s moral traits. If true, this poses a problem for those who advocate for moral enhancement, or the manipulation of a person’s moral traits through pharmaceutical or other biological means. Specifically, if moral enhancement manipulates a person’s moral traits, and those moral traits constitute personal identity, then it is possible that moral enhancement could alter a person’s identity. I go a step further and argue that under the right conditions, moral enhancement can constitute murder. I then argue that these conditions are not remote.
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First archival date: 2018-06-10
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