Moral Enhancement Can Kill
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584 (2018)
Abstract
There is recent empirical evidence that personal identity is constituted by one’s moral traits. If true, this poses a problem for those who advocate for moral enhancement, or the manipulation of a person’s moral traits through pharmaceutical or other biological means. Specifically, if moral enhancement manipulates a person’s moral traits, and those moral traits constitute personal identity, then it is possible that moral enhancement could alter a person’s identity. I go a step further and argue that under the right conditions, moral enhancement can constitute murder. I then argue that these conditions are not remote.
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2018-06-05
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2018-06-05
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391 ( #20,175 of 71,165 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #17,307 of 71,165 )
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