Moral Enhancement Can Kill

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


There is recent empirical evidence that personal identity is constituted by one’s moral traits. If true, this poses a problem for those who advocate for moral enhancement, or the manipulation of a person’s moral traits through pharmaceutical or other biological means. Specifically, if moral enhancement manipulates a person’s moral traits, and those moral traits constitute personal identity, then it is possible that moral enhancement could alter a person’s identity. I go a step further and argue that under the right conditions, moral enhancement can constitute murder. I then argue that these conditions are not remote.

Author's Profile

Parker Crutchfield
Western Michigan University School Of Medicine


Added to PP

675 (#19,309)

6 months
146 (#17,125)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?