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  1. Modifying the Environment or Human Nature? What is the Right Choice for Space Travel and Mars Colonisation?Maurizio Balistreri & Steven Umbrello - manuscript
    As space travel and intentions to colonise other planets are becoming the norm in public debate and scholarship, we must also confront the technical and survival challenges that emerge from these hostile environments. This paper aims to evaluate the various arguments proposed to meet the challenges of human space travel and extraterrestrial planetary colonisation. In particular, two primary solutions have been present in the literature as the most straightforward solutions to the rigours of extraterrestrial survival and flourishing: (1) geoengineering, where (...)
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  2. The Ethics of Genetic Enhancement: Key Concepts and Future Prospects.Jonathan Anomaly & Tess Johnson - forthcoming - In The Ethics of Human Enhancement. London: Routledge Press.
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  3. Space Travel Does Not Constitute a Condition of Moral Exceptionality. That Which Obtains in Space Obtains Also on Earth!Maurizio Balistreri & Steven Umbrello - forthcoming - Medicina E Morale.
    There is a growing body of scholarship that is addressing the ethics, in particular, the bioethics of space travel and colonisation. Naturally, a variety of perspectives concerning the ethical issues and moral permissibility of different technological strategies for confronting the rigours of space travel and colonisation have emerged in the debate. Approaches ranging from genetically enhancing human astronauts to modifying the environments of planets to make them hospitable have been proposed as methods. This paper takes a look at a critique (...)
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  4. Moral Enhancement, Acquired Virtue, and Theism: A Response to Brummett and Crutchfield.Nicholas Colgrove, Derek McAllister & Burke Rea - 2022 - Bioethics 1 (Online First):1-8.
    Recently, Brummett and Crutchfield advanced two critiques of theists who object to moral enhancement. First, a conceptual critique: theists who oppose moral enhancement commonly do so because virtue is thought to be acquired only via a special kind of process. Enhancement does not involve such processes. Hence, enhancement cannot produce virtue. Yet theists also commonly claim that God is perfectly virtuous and not subject to processes. If virtue requires a process and God is perfectly virtuous without a process, however, then (...)
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  5. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Respect Post-Persons.Ethan Terrill - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies 31 (1):1-14.
    Advocates of the Respect Model of moral status have expressed skepticism about the possibility that radically enhanced persons will have a higher threshold of moral status over non-radically enhanced persons. While several philosophers have already argued that advocates of the Respect Model of moral status should recognize such a possibility in a world with radically enhanced persons, I make room for a stronger claim: advocates of the Respect Model of moral status should not only recognize the possibility of higher thresholds (...)
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  6. Revisiting Moral Bioenhancement and Autonomy.Ji-Young Lee - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):529-539.
    Some have claimed that moral bioenhancement undermines freedom and authenticity – thereby making moral bioenhancement problematic or undesirable – whereas others have said that moral bioenhancement does not undermine freedom and authenticity – thereby salvaging its ethical permissibility. These debates are characterized by a couple of features. First, a positive relationship is assumed to hold between these agency-related concepts and the ethical permissibility of moral bioenhancement. Second, these debates are centered around individualistic conceptions of agency, like free choice and authenticity, (...)
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  7. Can Neurointerventions Communicate Censure? (And So What If They Can’T?).David Birks - 2018 - In David Birks & Thomas Douglas (eds.), Treatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    According to some philosophers, a necessary condition of morally permissible punishment is that it communicates deserved censure for the offender’s wrongdoing. The author calls this the Communicative Condition of punishment. The chapter considers whether the use of mandatory crime-preventing neurointerventions is compatible with the Communicative Condition. The author argues that it is not. If we accept the Communicative Condition, it follows that it is impermissible to administer mandatory neurointerventions on offenders as punishment. The author then considers whether it is permissible (...)
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  8. Supplementing Virtue: The Case for a Limited Theological Transhumanism.Adam M. Willows - 2017 - Theology and Science 15 (2):177-187.
    This paper considers the prospect of moral transhumanism from the perspective of theological virtue ethics. I argue that the pursuit of goodness inherent to moral transhumanism means that there is a compelling prima facie case for moral enhancement. However, I also show that the proposed enhancements would not by themselves allow us to achieve a life of virtue, as they appear unable to create or enhance prudence, the situational judgement essential for acting in accordance with virtue. I therefore argue that (...)
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  9. Moral Patiency Partially Grounds Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi - manuscript
    This paper argues that, although moral agency and moral patiency are distinct concepts, we have pro tanto normative reasons to ascribe some moral agency to all moral patients. Assuming a practice-focused approach, moral agents are beings that participate in moral responsibility practices. When someone is a participant, we are warranted to take a participant stance toward them. Beings who lack moral agency are instead accounted for by an objective stance. As such, they are assumed to be exempted from moral responsibility (...)
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