Turning the Tables: How Neuroscience Supports Interactive Dualism

Mind and Matter 21 (2):219-239 (2023)
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Abstract

Physicalists typically believe that neurophysiology has refuted the thesis that non-physical minds can interact with the brain. In this paper, I argue that it is precisely a closer look at the neurophysiology of volitional actions that suggests otherwise. I start with a clarification of how the present inquiry relates to the main argument for physicalism, and how the most common alternative views relate to the findings of my study. I then give a brief overview of the neurophysiological research about volitional actions, finding that there is no research specifically directed at the pertinent question. I proceed by pointing out what it would take for a complete physical explanation of volitional actions to be true: namely a complete physical explanation of the increase in the firing rate of the neurons with which the sequence leading up to volitional actions starts. Since no dedicated research about this question is available, I offer a study of the known mechanisms of neuronal excitation as a substitute, finding that there is no plausible biochemical or physical mechanism that could explain the causal initiation of volitional actions – at least none that upholds energy conservation. But non-conservation is precisely what interactive dualism, in its most plausible version, predicts. Thus, rather than buttressing physicalism, our empirical knowledge of volitional actions points toward interactive dualism.

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Alin C. Cucu
University of Lausanne

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