Contractualism as Meta-Ethics

In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract

T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism holds that an action is morally wrong when and because it is ruled out by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement. This Contractualist Thesis offers a powerful normative ethical theory. Yet Scanlon’s case for it also comes from its help in answering a question that is more naturally classified as metaethical: what account can we give of what wrongness is that explains its reason-giving force? Scanlon initially formulated his contractualist answer to that question as a reductive property-identification: the property of wrongness just is the property of being ruled out by principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject. In later work, he abandons the property-identification, while continuing to maintain that his contractualism supplies an “account of wrongness” that best explains its distinctive reason-giving force. But once a property-reduction is ruled out, what kind of claim could a contractualist “account of wrongness” be making that could indeed explain its reason-giving force? We distinguish four candidates and point out problems with three of them. We then offer a proposal for developing the fourth into a form that can address those problems. We argue that this provides the best prospect for a contractualist view that speaks to the concerns behind Scanlon’s question. But it does not deliver everything Scanlon is after; in particular, it falls short of a vindication of the Contractualist Thesis itself.

Author Profiles

Garrett Cullity
Australian National University
Nicholas Southwood
Australian National University

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