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Garrett Cullity
University of Adelaide
  1.  49
    Acts, Omissions, Emissions.Garrett Cullity - 2015 - In Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 148-64.
    What requirements does morality impose on us in relation to climate change? This question can be asked of individuals, of the entire global population, and of groups of various sizes in between. Given the case for accepting that we all collectively ought to be causing less climate-affecting pollution than we do, what follows from that about the moral status of the actions of members of the larger group? I examine two main ways in which moral requirements on group members can (...)
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  2.  36
    Weighing Reasons.Garrett Cullity - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    What is involved in weighing normative reasons against each other? One attractive answer offers us the following Simple Picture: a fact is a reason for action when it bears to an action the normative relation of counting in its favour; this relation comes in different strengths or weights; the weights of the reasons for and against an action can be summed; the reasons for performing the action are sufficient when no other action is more strongly supported, overall; the reasons are (...)
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  3.  31
    Moral Virtues and Responsiveness for Reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2017 - In Stewart Braun & Noell Birondo (eds.), Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons. New York: Routledge. pp. 11-31.
    Moral discourse contains judgements of two prominent kinds. It contains deontic judgements about rightness and wrongness, obligation and duty, and what a person ought to do. As I understand them, these deontic judgements are normative: they express conclusions about the bearing of normative reasons on the actions and other responses that are available to us. And it contains evaluative judgements about goodness and badness. Prominent among these are the judgements that evaluate the quality of our responsiveness to morally relevant reasons. (...)
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  4.  27
    Stupid Goodness.Garrett Cullity - forthcoming - In Karen Jones & Francois Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In Paradise Lost, Satan’s first sight of Eve in Eden renders him “Stupidly good”: his state is one of admirable yet inarticulate responsiveness to reasons. Turning from fiction to real life, I argue that this is an important moral phenomenon, but one that has limits. The essay examines three questions about the relation between having a reason and saying what it is – between normativity and articulacy. Is it possible to have and respond to morally relevant reasons without being able (...)
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  5.  39
    Neutral and Relative Value.Garrett Cullity - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose Jonas Olson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 96-116.
    This chapter examines the distinction that is sometimes drawn between neutral and relative attributions of value. It asks whether a plausible interpretation can be found for claims about relative value; whether an interpretation can be found for claims about neutral value which best captures the thoughts that people express by using this distinction; whether the distinction can be used to produce a satisfactory way of formulating a relative-value consequentialist theory; and whether a theory of that kind is plausible. A positive (...)
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  6.  45
    Introduction.Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity Berys Gaut (ed.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-27.
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  7.  73
    Demandingness and Arguments From Presupposition.Garrett Cullity - 2009 - In Timothy Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 8-34.
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  8. Beneficence.Garrett Cullity - 2007 - In Richard Ashcroft Angus Dawson & Heather Draper John McMillan (eds.), Principles of Health Care Ethics. London: Wiley. pp. 19-26.
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  9.  11
    Compromised Humanitarianism.Garrett Cullity - 2010 - In Keith Horton & Chris Roche (eds.), Ethical Questions and International NGOs: An Exchange between Philosophers and NGOs. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 157-73.
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  10.  27
    Particularism and Presumptive Reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 76:169-90.
    Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and presents a (...)
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  11.  10
    Demandingness and Arguments From Presupposition.Garrett Cullity - 2009 - In Timothy Chappell (ed.), Timothy Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 8-34.
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  12.  32
    Pooled Beneficence.Garrett Cullity - 2000 - In Michael Almeida (ed.), Imperceptible Harms and Benefits. Dordrecht: Kluwer. pp. 9-42.
    There can be situations in which, if I contribute to a pool of resources for helping a large number of people, the difference that my contribution makes to any of the people helped from the pool will be imperceptible at best, and maybe even non-existent. And this can be the case where it is also true that giving the same amount directly to one of the intended beneficiaries of the pool would have made a very large difference to her. Can (...)
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  13.  22
    Compromised Humanitarianism.Garrett Cullity - 2010 - In Keith Horton Chris Roche (ed.), Ethical Questions and International NGOs: An Exchange between Philosophers and NGOs. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 157-73.
    The circumstances that create the need for humanitarian action are rarely morally neutral. The extremes of deprivation and want that demand a humanitarian response are often themselves directly caused by acts of war, persecution or misgovernment. And even when the direct causes lie elsewhere—when suffering and loss are caused by natural disaster, endemic disease or poverty of natural resources—the explanations of why some people are afflicted, and not others, are not morally neutral. It is those without economic or political power (...)
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  14.  42
    Beneficence, Rights and Citizenship.Garrett Cullity - 2003 - Australian Journal of Human Rights 9:85-105.
    What are we morally required to do for strangers? To answer this question – a question about the scope of requirements to aid strangers – we must first answer a question about justification: why are we required to aid them (when we are)? The main paper focuses largely on answering the question about justification, but does so in order to arrive at an answer to the question about scope. Three main issues are discussed. First, to what extent should requirements of (...)
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  15.  44
    Bernard Williams.Garrett Cullity - 2005 - In Stuart Brown (ed.), Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers, Vol. 2. London: Thoemmes Continuum. pp. 1132-8.
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  16.  16
    Public Goods.Garrett Cullity - 2001 - In Lawrence C. Becker Charlotte B. Becker (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, Vol. III. New York: Routledge. pp. 1413-16.
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  17.  29
    The Moral, the Personal and the Political.Garrett Cullity - 2007 - In Igor Primoratz (ed.), Politics and Morality. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 54-75.
    What is the relation between moral reasons and reasons of “political necessity”? Does the authority of morality extend across political decision-making; or are there “reasons of state” which somehow either stand outside the reach of morality or override it, justifying actions that are morally wrong? This chapter argues that attempts to claim a contra-moral justification for political action typically suffer from a fundamental confusion – a confusion about the nature and expression of practical justification. The author aims to bring two (...)
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