Orientamento al bene e trascendenza dal sé: Il problema dell'oggettivitá dei valori in Max Scheler

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The German phenomenologist Max Scheler, commonly considered one of the most important exponents of value objectivism, does not claim an “absolute” value objectivism, as often asserted. The values are objecttive towards the will of the subject, not towards the creative act of loving. This presupposes a radical new conception of the value. According to Scheler, in fact, the values are no qualities to be attributed to the perceived object but the very first thing grasped on a phenomenon, i.e. the “first messenger” (erste Bote) of the phenomenon: the value is what orients the formation and development of the experience. This paper proposes to deal with the problem of the value objectivism in relation to the self-transcendence and to the self-realization of the person. The value objectivism should be measured by its faculty to orient the act through which a person detaches himself from the proper factual self. The “Good” isn‟t therefore related to an ideal transcendent object, but to the act to transcend the proper self in a creative way. The fundamental thesis is that the personal identity constitutes itself only in a critical distancing from the self. This concrete act of self-transcending cannot be understood merely in the sense of the self-interpretation – of the “strong evaluations” of Charles Taylor – but requires also the presence of the exemplarity of the other.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CUSOAB
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-03-13
Latest version: 2 (2019-03-13)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-12-18

Total views
10 ( #37,475 of 38,045 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #36,731 of 38,045 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.