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  1. Envy and Ressentiment, a Difference in Kind: A Critique and Renewal of Scheler's Phenomenological Account - See More At: Http://Www.Bloomsbury.Com/Us/Early-Phenomenology-9781474276047/#Sthash.jLOTi3Tn.Dpuf.Michael R. Kelly - 2016 - In Brian Harding & Michael Kelly (eds.), Early Phenomenology. Bloomsbury Academic.
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  2. Résistance Et Existence [Resistence and Existence].Olivier Massin - 2011 - Etudes de Philosophie 9:275- 310.
    I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address a humean objection against the very possibility of experiencing existential mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the only kind of experience by which we directly access existential mind-independence.
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  3. Arguments From the Priority of Feeling From Contemporary Emotion Theory and Max Scheler's Phenomenology.Joel M. Potter - 2012 - Quaestiones Disputatae 3 (1):215-225.
    Many so-called “cognitivist” theories of the emotions account for the meaningfulness of emotions in terms of beliefs or judgments that are associated or identified with these emotions. In recent years, a number of analytic philosophers have argued against these theories by pointing out that the objects of emotions are sometimes meaningfully experienced before one can take a reflective stance toward them. Peter Goldie defends this point of view in his book The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Goldie argues that emotions are (...)
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  4. Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism.Mattia Riccardi - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):443-454.
    Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and (...)
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  5. Pluralität der Erfahrung Als Anthropologische Bestimmung.Gregor Schiemann - 2012 - In M. Wunsch (ed.), Von Hegel zur philosophischen Anthropologie. Königshausen & Neumann.
    Als Vertreter der historischen Anthropologie hat Christoph Wulf die philosophische Anthropologie von Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner und Arnold Gehlen kritisiert: Mit ihrem Interesse an einer einheitlichen Bestimmung des Menschen entgehe ihr die Pluralität von menschlichen Kulturen. Meiner Auffassung nach stellt diese Kritik für die philosophische Lehre vom Menschen eine Herausforderung dar (1.). Um ihr zu begegnen, möchte ich prüfen, ob Ernst Cassirers Kulturphilosophie die Vielfalt menschlicher Erfahrungsweisen angemessener berücksichtigt. Dass dies nicht in hinreichendem Umfang der Fall ist, lässt sich auf (...)
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  6. Values in Contexts: An Ontological Theory.Barry Smith - 2015 - In G. John M. Abbarno (ed.), Inherent and Instrumental Values: Excursions in Value Inquiry. University Press of America. pp. 17-29.
    Values exist not in isolation, but in complex wholes. Values are what they are because of the complex wholes in which they are situated. To do justice to this thesis will require a holistic ontology, a theory according to which many types of entities exist only as inseparable parts or moments of wider contexts or environments. An ontological theory of environments -- with roots in Gestalt psychology and the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson and Roger Barker, and which is (...)
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  7. Realistic Phenomenology.Barry Smith - 1997 - In Lester Embree (ed.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. Springer Science & Business Media. pp. 586-590.
    The tradition of realist phenomenology was founded in around 1902 by a group of students in Munich interested in the newly published Logical Investigations of Edmund Husserl. Initial members of the group included Johannes Daubert, Alexander Pfänder, Adolf Reinach and Max Scheler. With Reinach’s move to Göttingen the group acquired two new prominent members – Edith Stein and Roman Ingarden. The group’s method turned on Husserl’s idea that we are in possession a priori (which is to say: non-inductive) knowledge of (...)
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  8. Scheler's Critique of Husserl's Phenomenological Understanding of "Objective a Priori".Wei Zhang - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (2):265-280.
    On the one hand, Scheler's critique of Kant's concept of a priori benefits from Husserl to a large extent, and it complements and deepens Husserl's. On the other hand, Scheler also critiques Husserl's definition of a priori. Husserl's material a priori as ideal object primarily thanks to his so-called "Bolzano- turn". In this connection, Scheler grabs hold of the relation of Husserl to Bolzano from the very beginning. For Scheler, Husserl thinks in a "platonic" way, and still falls in a (...)
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  9. Schelers Kritik an der phänomenologischen Auffassung des gegenständlichen Apriori bei Husserl.Wei Zhang - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (2):265-280.
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  10. Die Intentionalität des Fühlens und die Schichtung der emotionalen Sphäre: Die fundamentalen Fragen in Max Schelers Phänomenologie des Fühlens.Wei Zhang - 2010 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 6 (5):1-20.
    Les questions les plus fondamentales de la phénoménologie du sentir de Max Scheler concernent la place de l’intentionnalité dans la phénoménologie du sentir et la structuration de la sphère émotionnelle. Dans la première section, nous nous focaliserons avant tout sur la différence entre les sentiments non intentionnels et le sentir intentionnel, en comparant sur ce point les positions de Scheler et de Husserl. En effet, Scheler critique ces deux thèses fondamentales de Husserl: 1) les actes affectifs et leurs corrélats (« (...)
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