Dependence and the Freedom to Do Otherwise

Faith and Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An increasingly popular approach to reconciling divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to say that, because God’s beliefs depend on what we do, we are free to do otherwise than what we actually do despite God’s infallible foreknowledge. This paper develops a new challenge for this dependence response. The challenge stems from a case of backward time travel in which an agent intuitively lacks the freedom to do otherwise because of the time-traveler’s knowledge of what the agent will do, and this is so despite the fact that the time-traveler’s knowledge depends on what the agent will do.

Author's Profile

Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-08

Downloads
495 (#46,339)

6 months
132 (#33,581)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?