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  1. Plantinga's Free Will Defence: Critical Note.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Some atheistic philosophers have argued that God could have created a world with free moral agents and yet absent of moral evil. Using possible world semantics, Alvin Plantinga sought to defuse this logical form of the problem of evil. In this critical note, Leslie Allan examines the adequacy of Plantinga's argument that the existence of God is logically compatible with the existence of moral evil. The veracity of Plantinga's argument turns on whether his essential use of counterfactual conditionals preserves the (...)
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  2. Decision and Foreknowledge.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the consequences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a distinctive and novel problem for causal decision theory (CDT). My thesis is that foreknowledge poses no new problems for CDT. Some of the purported problems are not problems. Others are problems, but they are not problems for CDT. Rather, they are problems for our theories of subjunctive supposition. Others are problems, but they are (...)
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  3. Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention.Taylor W. Cyr & Andrew Law - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Recently, several authors have utilized the notion of dependence to respond to the traditional argument for the incompatibility of freedom and divine foreknowledge. However, proponents of this response have not always been so clear in specifying where the incompatibility argument goes wrong, which has led to some unfounded objections to the response. We remedy this dialectical confusion by clarifying both the dependence response itself and its interaction with the standard incompatibility argument. Once these clarifications are made, it becomes clear both (...)
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  4. Fischer's Fate With Fatalism.Christoph Jäger - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 9 (2017).
    John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argument for logical fatalism. I then point (...)
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  5. Predestinación y libertad. Escritos en torno a la controversia de auxiliis.Domingo Báñez & David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2021 - Pamplona: EUNSA.
    Edition of the opuscules by D. Báñez on De auxiliis controversy. There is the critical edition of three manuscripts and the first Spanish annotated translation of the opuscules. The Latin text is disposed together with the translation. An introduction situates the opuscules in its systematic and historical context.
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  6. Banez’s Big Problem: The Ground of Freedom.James Dominic Rooney - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (1):91-112.
    While many philosophers of religion are familiar with the reconciliation of grace and freedom known as Molinism, fewer by far are familiar with that position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e., Banezianism). My aim is to clarify a serious problem for the Banezian: how the Banezian can avoid the apparent conflict between a strong notion of freedom and apparently compatibilist conclusions. The most prominent attempt to defend Banezianism against compatibilism was (in)famously endorsed by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Even if (...)
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  7. Báñez frente a Suárez acerca de la libertad.David Torrijos Castrillejo - 2021 - Bajo Palabra. Revista de Filosofía 25:179-199.
    On several occasions, Báñez considered Suárez the main supporter of the Molinist doctrine along with Molina himself. According to Báñez, the main mistake of Molinism is its misunderstanding of freedom. This led him to refine his personal Thomistic theory of freedom. Free will is radically in the intellect and formally in the will. Intellect is the root of freedom because the most important indifference is found in the object, whose connection with the end is understood as not necessary. The intellect (...)
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  8. Contingency, Free Will, and Particular Providence.DAvid Torrijos Castrillejo - 2021 - Religions 12.
    The results from contemporary science, especially the theory of evolution and quantum physics, seem to favor process theology. Moreover, the evil committed by free will leads some theologians to reduce divine action in order to prevent God from being responsible for evil. Thus, among those who defend a particular providence, Molinism finds many followers. This article first argues that contemporary science does not constrain us to deny particular providence. Second, it criticizes the implicitly deterministic character of Molinism. Thirdly, a Thomistic (...)
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  9. La ontología de la premoción física según Pedro de Ledesma.David Torrijos Castrillejo - 2021 - In Proceedings of the Seventh World Conference on Metaphysics. Pontifical University of Salamanca, Spain October 24-27, 2018. Fondazione Idente di Studi e di Ricerca. pp. 668-673.
    Throughout the history of Thomism, interpretations of the ontology of God’s physical premotion of human free will have been divided mainly into two main groups. Most authors have thought that physical premotion constitutes a certain “entity” infused by God in the creature, although not all of them accept the account of Cabrera, who affirmed that premotion was a “quality”. On the other hand, there are some authors who understand premotion as a direct intervention of God in the vital act of (...)
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  10. Atemporalism and Dependence.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (2):149-164.
    It is widely thought that Atemporalism—the view that, because God is “outside” of time, he does not foreknow anything —constitutes a unique solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge. However, as I argue here, in order for Atemporalism to escape certain worries, the view must appeal to the dependence of God’s timeless knowledge on our actions. I then argue that, because it must appeal to such dependence, Atemporalism is crucially similar to the recent sempiternalist accounts proposed by Trenton Merricks, (...)
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  11. La moción divina ante la contingencia y la libertad de las creaturas según santo Tomás y Domingo Báñez.Torrijos-Castrillejo David - 2020 - Scripta Fulgentina 30:39-64.
    Against an interpretation of Saint Thomas Aquinas’s thought that understands the divine motion of the created will only providing a generic impulse to it, in this article is defended that God moves specifically for every good choice. This motion doesn’t prevent at all the contingency of creatures and neither freedom of choice. Is also shown how Báñez’s thought is quite faithful to Saint Thomas in this and doesn’t intend anything else but simply to make it known and defend it from (...)
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  12. The Dependence Response and Explanatory Loops.Andrew Law - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (3):294-307.
    There is an old and powerful argument for the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A recent response to this argument, sometimes called the “dependence response,” centers around the claim that God’s relevant past beliefs depend on the relevant agent’s current or future behavior in a certain way. This paper offers a new argument for the dependence response, one that revolves around different cases of time travel. Somewhat serendipitously, the argument also paves the way (...)
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  13. La providencia de los dioses según Alejandro de Afrodisias.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2020 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 53:345-365.
    En este artículo se toma en consideración la noción de providencia en Alejandro de Afrodisias, como hito principal de los esfuerzos del aristotelismo para responder a la noción estoica de “destino” o “hado”. Se tienen en cuenta los precedentes aristotélicos sobre este tema, sobre todo el tratado _De mundo_. El aristotelismo siempre ha recalcado la mayor sujeción al poder divino de los cielos respecto del mundo sublunar, pero será Alejandro quien convierta esta providencia primariamente concentrada en el cielo en una (...)
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  14. Causality and Becoming: Scotistic Reflections.Liran Shia Gordon - 2019 - Heythrop Journal 60 (1):95-110.
    Becoming is a process in which a thing moves from one state to another. In Section 1, the study will elaborate on the discussion of the Aristotelian causes taken broadly, primarily focusing on the relation between efficient and final causes. In Section 2, the study discusses the implications of Scotus’s conception of freedom, as it is reflected in the relation of the future to the past, for the efficient and final causalities. Similarly in Section 3 an examination of Scotus’s conception (...)
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  15. La providencia en santo Tomás de Aquino.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2019 - Revista Española de Teología 79:419-454.
    According to Aquinas, divine omniscience, omnipotence and providence, do not contradict the existence of either true contingency in the natural world or freedom but, on the contrary, they support them. In short, the two peculiarities of the doctrine of providence in St. Thomas here exposed are: first, that God's will is the ultimate foundation of all contingency (and not merely the deficiency of secondary causes); second, that the divine causality cannot be reduced to any of the two groups of created (...)
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  16. Timelessness and freedom.Taylor W. Cyr - 2018 - Synthese:1-15.
    One way that philosophers have attempted to defend free will against the threat of fatalism and against the threat from divine beliefs has been to endorse timelessness views. In this paper, I argue that, in order to respond to general worries about fatalism and divine beliefs, timelessness views must appeal to the notion of dependence. Once they do this, however, their distinctive position as timelessness views becomes otiose, for the appeal to dependence, if it helps at all, would itself be (...)
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  17. Hugh J. McCann (Ed.), Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology. [REVIEW]Garrett Pendergraft - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 16.
    This volume collects a set of papers that were presented at a conference on “Big Questions in Free Will,” held at the University of Saint Thomas in October of 2014. It is dedicated to its editor, who passed away shortly after completing the manuscript. I will briefly summarize each of the 11 chapters and then offer a few critical comments.
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  18. Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
    Many philosophers maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. But the Fixity of the Past principle underlying the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument also for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge. By developing an account of ability that appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of (...)
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  19. The Open Future, Free Will and Divine Assurance: Responding to Three Common Objections to the Open View.Gregory Boyd - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (3):207--222.
    In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; and c) the open view can’t assure believers that God can work all things to the better. I argue that the first objection is premised on an inadequate assessment of future tensed propositions, the second is rooted in an inadequate (...)
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  20. Introduction.Patrick Todd & John Martin Fischer - 2015 - In John Martin Fischer & Patrick Todd (eds.), Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 01-38.
    This Introduction has three sections, on "logical fatalism," "theological fatalism," and the problem of future contingents, respectively. In the first two sections, we focus on the crucial idea of "dependence" and the role it plays it fatalistic arguments. Arguably, the primary response to the problems of logical and theological fatalism invokes the claim that the relevant past truths or divine beliefs depend on what we do, and therefore needn't be held fixed when evaluating what we can do. We call the (...)
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  21. Jumalan ennaltatietäminen ja luotujen vapaus molinismin mukaan (in Finnish) [God's Foreknowledge and Creaturely Freedom according to Molinism].Ari Maunu - 2014 - Ajatus 71:143-172.
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  22. No (New) Troubles with Ockhamism.Garrett Pendergraft & D. Justin Coates - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 5:185-208.
    The Ockhamist claims that our ability to do otherwise is not endangered by God’s foreknowledge because facts about God’s past beliefs regarding future contingents are soft facts about the past—i.e., temporally relational facts that depend in some sense on what happens in the future. But if our freedom, given God’s foreknowledge, requires altering some fact about the past that is clearly a hard fact, then Ockhamism fails even if facts about God’s past beliefs are soft. Recent opponents of Ockhamism, including (...)
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  23. Due osservazioni sulla metafisica della prescienza.Andrea Guardo - 2013 - Lebenswelt 3 (1):47-57.
    Una breve discussione di due problemi concernenti la metafisica della prescienza.
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  24. God, Free Will, and Time: The Free Will Offense Part II. [REVIEW]J. L. Schellenberg - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):1-10.
    God, free will, and time: the free will offense part II Content Type Journal Article Category Article Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s11153-011-9328-z Authors J. L. Schellenberg, Mount Saint Vincent University, 166 Bedford Highway, Halifax, NS B3M2J6, Canada Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Online ISSN 1572-8684 Print ISSN 0020-7047.
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  25. Foreknowledge and Free Will.Alex Blum - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):55-57.
    We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant.
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  26. Original Sin and a Broad Free Will Defense.W. Paul Franks - 2012 - Philosophia Christi 14 (2):353–371.
    I begin with a distinction between narrow and broad defenses to the logical problem of evil. The former is simply an attempt to show that God and evil are not logically incompat-ible whereas the latter attempts the same, but only by appealing to beliefs one takes to be true in the actual world. I then argue that while recent accounts of original sin may be consistent with a broad defense, they are also logically incoherent. After considering potential replies, I conclude (...)
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  27. Non-Moral Evil and the Free Will Defense.Kenneth Boyce - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (4):371-384.
    Paradigmatic examples of logical arguments from evil are attempts to establish that the following claims are inconsistent with one another: (1) God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. (2) There is evil in the world. Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense resists such arguments by providing a positive case that (1) and (2) are consistent. A weakness in Plantinga’s free will defense, however, is that it does not show that theism is consistent with the proposition that there are non-moral evils in (...)
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  28. How Molinists Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2011 - In Christian Kanzian Kanzian, Winfried Löffler & Josef Quitterer (eds.), The Ways Things Are: Studies in Ontology. ontos. pp. 221-240.
    Paper on divine foreknowledge and human freedom.
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  29. Nelson Pike’s Contribution to the Philosophy of Religion.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):409-431.
    In this paper I attempt to capture the essence of Nelson Pike’s contribution to the philosophy of religion. My summary of his insights will revolve around three general topics: omniscience (and in particular its relation to human freedom), omnipotence (and in particular its relation to the existence of human suffering), and mysticism (with a focus on the question of whether and in what sense mystic visions can be sources of knowledge). Although the details vary in interesting ways, his work on (...)
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  30. Geachianism.Patrick Todd - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3:222-251.
    The plane was going to crash, but it didn't. Johnny was going to bleed to death, but he didn't. Geach sees here a changing future. In this paper, I develop Geach's primary argument for the (almost universally rejected) thesis that the future is mutable (an argument from the nature of prevention), respond to the most serious objections such a view faces, and consider how Geach's view bears on traditional debates concerning divine foreknowledge and human freedom. As I hope to show, (...)
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  31. Divine Omniscience and the Fatalist Dilemma.David Kyle Johnson - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (4):435–54.
    Arguments against our free will pose a serious problem. Although there are not very many philosophers who call themselves fatalists, quite a few are convinced that fatalism follows from common assumptions. Assuming that most believe themselves to be free, identifying ways to avoid the conclusion of such fatalist arguments is quite an important task. I begin by dealing specifically with theological fatalism. I present many versions of theological fatalism, but come to the conclusion that only one version constitutes a genuine (...)
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  32. “A Story That is Told Again, and Again, and Again”: Recurrence, Providence, and Freedom.David Kyle Johnson - 2008 - In Jason T. Eberl (ed.), Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy: Knowledge Here Begins Out There. Wiley-Blackwell.
    An exploration of the freedom foreknowledge problem using (New) Battlestar Galactica.
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  33. Mittleres Wissen und das Problem des Übels [Middle knowledge and the problem of evil].Robert Merrihew Adams & Vincent C. Müller - 1998 - In Christian Jäger (ed.), Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Ferdinand Schöningh. pp. 253-272.
    Wenn Präsident Kennedy nicht erschossen worden wäre, hätte er dann Nordvietnam bombardiert? Das weiß Gott allein. Oder doch nicht? Weiß wenigstens Er, was Kennedy getan hätte? ... Die Jesuiten behaupteten unter anderem, daß viele menschliche Handlungen in dem Sinne frei seien, daß die Ausführenden nicht logisch oder kausal gezwungen seien, sie auszuführen. („Frei“ wird im vorliegenden Aufsatz stets in diesem Sinne verwendet werden.) Wie behält Gott dann die Kontrolle über die menschliche Geschichte? Nicht dadurch, daß Er menschliche Handlungen kausal determiniert, (...)
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  34. Partially Resolving the Tension Between Omniscience and Free Will: A Mathematical Argument.Joseph S. Fulda - 1998 - Sorites 9:53-55.
    As the journal is effectively defunct, I am uploading a full-text copy, but only of my abstract and article, and some journal front matter. -/- Note that the pagination in the PDF version differs from the official pagination because A4 and 8.5" x 11" differ. -/- Note also that this is not a mere repetition of the argument in /Mind/, nor merely an application of it; there are subtle differences. -/- Finally, although Christians are likely to take this as applicable (...)
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  35. Leid und Übel [Suffering and evil].George N. Schlesinger & Vincent C. Müller - 1998 - In Christoph Jäger (ed.), Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Ferdinand Schöningh. pp. 245-252.
    Die Welt ist voller Leid. Gott ist entweder unfähig, es zu verhindern – dann ist Er nicht allmächtig –, oder Er will es nicht verhindern – dann ist Er nicht vollkommen gut. Seit Generationen wird dies als das schlagendste Argument gegen den Glauben angesehen, daß ein allmächtiges und allgütiges Wesen existiert. Natürlich haben Theisten sich die größte Mühe gegeben, eine angemessene Erwiderung vorzubringen. ... Selbst wenn nur ein einziges Individuum unnötigerweise für einen kurzen Moment eine leichte Unannehmlichkeit zu ertragen hätte, (...)
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  36. Foreknowledge and Human Freedom in Augustine.Vance G. Morgan - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Research 19:223-242.
    In this paper, I consider Augustine’s attempted solution of the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will. I focus on two distinct notions of God’s relationship to time as they relate to this problem. In Confessions XI, Augustine develops an understanding of time and foreknowledge that cIearly offers a possible solution to the foreknowledge/free will problem. I then turn to On Free Will 3 .1-4, where Augustine conspicuously declines to use a solution similar to the one in the Confessions, rather (...)
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  37. The Christian Theodicist's Appeal to Love.Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder - 1993 - Religious Studies 29 (2):185 - 192.
    Many Christian theodicists believe that God's creating us with the capacity to love Him and each other justifies, in large part, God's permitting evil. For example, after reminding us that, according to Christian doctrine, the supreme good for human beings is to enter into a reciprocal love relationship with God, Vincent Brummer recently wrote: In creating human persons in order to love them, God necessarily assumes vulnerability in relation to them. In fact, in this relation, he becomes even more vulnerable (...)
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  38. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 1985 - Religious Studies 21 (3):279-298.
    If God knows everything he must know the future, and if he knows the future he must know the future acts of his creatures. But then his creatures must act as he knows they will act. How then can they be free? This dilemma has a long history in Christian philosophy and is now as hotly disputed as ever. The medieval scholastics were virtually unanimous in claiming both that God is omniscient and that humans have free will, though they disagreed (...)
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  39. Divine Determinateness and the Free Will Defence.David L. Paulsen - 1980 - Analysis 41 (3):150 - 153.
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  40. Free Will as Private Determinism.J. S. Markovitch - manuscript
    This article suggests that our sense of free will is formed when others react to our behavior with surprise, even though our private knowledge tells us our behavior was determined by our preferences. Such surprised reactions, even when our behavior is from our perspective fully determined, lead us to infer that we exercise free will. -/- .
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